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 ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis examines the impact of state weakness on Iraqi foreign policy since the 
US invasion. Drawing on the concept of the social contract in political theory, this 
project seeks to untangle the relationship between state legitimacy, violence and 
foreign policy. In the aftermath of the toppling of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi state 
has undergone many forms of weakness. Each chapter of this dissertation deals with 
a qualitatively different moment in the trajectory of Iraqi state weakness and 
analyses the impact on the key foreign policies or relationships of that period. 
 The limited research that has been conducted on post-invasion Iraq’s foreign 
relations has tended to portray Iraq as a passive victim of external interference. 
There have not been any comprehensive examinations of the way in which Iraq’s 
internal politics influence the activity of foreign powers in Iraq; nor of Iraq’s own 
foreign policy activity. The result is that little is understood about how post-invasion 
Iraq is positioning itself in a volatile regional environment. The literature on foreign 
policy analysis has a propensity to focus overwhelmingly on the role of great powers 
in the international system. Where small or weak states have been addressed, they 
are seen as merely responding to their vulnerable position in the hierarchy of 
powers. Drawing on recent work on the international relations of African states, this 
study introduces a new research agenda that seeks to understand the relationship 
between state weakness and foreign policy production.  
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‘Your foreign policy is a reflection of your domestic politics, if you 
have a cohesive, unified, politically stable country, internal 
security, a unified vision of your interests then it would be very, 
very easy to conduct your foreign policy. 
But if you have instability, if you have insecurity, if you have 
terrorist attacks, if you have civil strife let’s say, if you have 
poverty, if you have these things…it would be extremely difficult.’ 
 
 
Hoshyar Zebari, Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Interview with the Author  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been a tendency to see post-invasion Iraq, bedevilled as it has been by 
internal instability, as irrelevant to regional and international politics. This thesis 
argues that, by virtue of its weakness, Iraq is playing and will continue to play a 
crucial role in shaping conflict dynamics in the Middle East. Iraqi actors are 
involved on both sides of the Syrian civil war, Iraq is a locus of the wider regional 
competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and indeed its geostrategic location, its 
vast oil reserves,
1
 and its sectarian fault lines all indicate that Iraq’s future foreign 
policy choices will have a formative impact on the region. When Iraqi foreign policy 
is not dismissed as irrelevant, it tends to be characterised as either driven by 
sectarian considerations or as subservient to the demands of foreign powers. Such 
depictions are inaccurate and belie a much greater complexity in the relationship 
between Iraqi foreign policy, domestic ethno-sectarian cleavages, and foreign 
influence. This study draws on documentary sources and over 70 in-depth interviews 
with Iraqi, Arab, and Western politicians and diplomats conducted in Iraq, Jordan, 
Egypt, the UK and the US to conduct a thorough analysis of how Iraqi state 
weakness has affected its foreign policy making in the ten years since the invasion. 
This thesis seeks primarily to fill an empirical gap in the academic literature 
on contemporary Iraq. The difficulty of conducting research in Iraq, especially since 
the withdrawal of coalition forces and the closure of international organisations and 
NGOs in the country, has deterred research on contemporary Iraqi politics and 
foreign policy. As a result very little in-depth work has been published on post-
invasion Iraqi politics, and there has been virtually no academic analysis of Iraqi 
foreign policy. This is a grave oversight which I seek to redress in this thesis. The 
literature that there is on post-invasion Iraq is overwhelmingly dominated by works 
written from an American perspective. Such works tend to focus on analysing the 
US decision to go to war,
2
 describing the conduct of the US-led Coalition 
                                                          
1
 Iraq has the fifth largest proven oil reserves in the world, and in 2012 Iraq overtook Iran to become 
the biggest producer of crude oil in OPEC. US Energy Information Adminstration, 'Iraq Overview', 
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=iz>, accessed 12th December 2013. 
2
 See for example Peter W. Galbraith, Unintended Consequences: How War in Iraq Strengthened 
America’s Enemies (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008). Thomas Cushman, A Matter of Principle: 
Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq (Berkley: University of California Press, 2005). Jane K. 
Cramer and Trevor Thrall, Why Did the US Invade Iraq? (Oxford: Routledge, 2011). Douglas Feith, 
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Provisional Authority,
3
 and assessing the efficacy of US military strategy.
4
 There is 
also a surfeit of works written by embedded journalists, CPA staffers, and US 
soldiers – many of them united by a common ignorance of the Iraqi perspective.5 
There are only a handful of monographs that offer a serious, in-depth 
account of post-invasion Iraqi politics. In 2012 New York Times journalist Michael 
R. Gordon and retired Marine Corps general Bernard E. Trainor published a 780 
page history of the Iraq war from invasion to US withdrawal.
6
 Though it documents 
rather than analyses the events of those years, the book is an incredibly detailed and 
well-researched resource that has been the single most important addition to the field 
since 2003. Former Iraqi Minister of Trade Ali Allawi’s The Occupation of Iraq 
provides a valuable insight into the Iraqi perspective on the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, but sadly the narrative ends in 2006.
7
 Military analyst Anthony 
Cordesman’s highly informative two-volume monograph documenting the Iraqi 
insurgency ends in 2007.
8
 Journalist Nir Rosen’s two books on post-war Iraq are 
extremely valuable contributions to the field of Iraqi studies.
9
 Rosen travelled 
throughout Iraq, living amongst and coming to know scores of Iraqi civilians, local 
government officials, police officers and bureaucrats, and his accounts offer an 
unparalleled insight into how ordinary Iraqis experienced the US invasion, Iraqi 
government dysfunction, and the civil war. Of the few academic works that have 
                                                                                                                                                                   
War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: Harper, 
2008). 
3
 See for example Rajiv Chandraesekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green 
Zone (New York: Vintage Books, 2007). Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American 
Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Owl Books, 2005). John 
Agresto, Mugged by Reality: The Liberation of Iraq and the Failure of Good Intentions (New York: 
Encounter Books, 2007). 
4
 See for example Walter J. Boyne, Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, 
and Why (New York: Forge Books, 2003). Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot 
to Change the American Way of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013). Thomas E. Ricks, The 
Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq 2006-2008 (New 
York: The Penguin Press, 2009). 
5
 See for example Bing West and Maj. Gen. Ray L. Smith, The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 
1st Marine Division. (New York: Bantam, 2003). Gy. Sgt. Patrick Tracy, Street Fight in Iraq: The 
Private Journal of a U.S. Marine Warrior (Leatherneck Publishing: Oceanside, CA, 2006). Rick 
Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2004).  
6
 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, 
from George W. Bush to Barack Obama (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012). 
7
 Ali Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007). 
8
 Anthony Cordesman, Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict (Westport: Praeger Security 
International, 2008b).  
9
 Nir Rosen, In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of the Martyrs in Iraq (New York: Free 
Press, 2006). Nir Rosen, Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World 
(New York: Nation Books, 2010). 
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been written about post-war Iraq politics, one of the most important is Fanar 
Haddad’s monograph Sectarianism in Iraq, which analyses the competing myth-
symbol complexes at the heart of Iraqi sectarianism.
10
 In 2010 Amnon Cohen and 
Noga Efrati produced a scholarly volume that deals with the major themes in post-
war Iraqi domestic politics,
11
 and in 2012 Toby Dodge published a persuasive 
account of Iraqi politics, arguing that the Maliki government is returning the country 
to a form of authoritarian rule.
12
 The only book that has been written about post-war 
Iraqi foreign relations is Iraq, Its Neighbors and the US.
13
 Edited by leading Iraq 
scholars Henri J. Barkey, Scott Lasensky, and Phebe Marr in 2011, the book offers a 
strong account of Iraq’s major bilateral relations but has very different aims to this 
thesis. This thesis is focused on delineating the impact of Iraqi state weakness on 
foreign policy production, and as such makes a significant, original contribution to 
the empirical work on post-invasion Iraqi politics and foreign policy. 
Beyond its empirical contribution, this thesis also expands on the nascent 
conceptual literature on foreign policy making in developing states. Traditional 
international relations theory is heavily focused on foreign policy making in strong 
states, and many of the assumptions it makes simply do not hold true in weak state 
contexts. A small literature has emerged that seeks to theorise foreign policy making 
in the developing world. The literature observes that states in the developing world 
tend to be preoccupied with internal threats, they are more likely to have heavily 
personalised foreign policy making processes, and their foreign policy decisions are 
usually motivated by regime security, rather than national security, considerations. 
A problem with this literature however, is the highly unspecific units of analysis it 
chooses to deploy; the ill-defined terms ‘developing state,’ ‘third world state,’ and 
‘African state’ are most readily used. This thesis adopts the ‘weak state’ as its unit of 
analysis, and grounds its definition of the weak state in social contract theory. The 
basic function of the state is to deliver the basic public goods demanded by the 
citizenry and to articulate a vision of the state that resonates with all major sections 
                                                          
10
 Fanar Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity (London: C. Hurst & Co., 
2011). 
11
 Amnon Cohen and Noga Efrati (eds.), Post-Saddam Iraq: New Realities, Old Identities, Changing 
Patterns (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2011). 
12
 Toby Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism (Oxford: Routledge, 2012). 
13
 Henri J. Barkey, Scott B. Lasensky, and Phebe Marr (eds.), Iraq, Its Neighbors, and the United 
States: Competition, Crisis and the Reordering of Power (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace, 2011). 
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of the population. A strong state is, therefore, a state that enjoys both functional 
legitimacy (based on its ability to deliver basic public goods) and normative 
legitimacy (based on its ability to articulate a successful narrative of state), whilst a 
weak state is a state that is deficient in normative and functional legitimacy. 
Drawing on the observations made in the literature on foreign policy in 
developing states, this thesis is guided by three working hypotheses. Firstly, that in a 
weak state, the central government is unable to monopolise authority over foreign 
policy, including in the setting of foreign policy goals and in the exercising of 
effective control over interaction with foreign actors. Secondly, that in a weak state, 
foreign policy is driven by a primary concern for the security and authority of the 
foreign policy actor, which can result in foreign policy choices being made that are 
detrimental to the interests of the population as a whole. Thirdly, that in a weak 
state, the capacity of the central government to effectively implement its foreign 
policy agenda is diminished. The weak state is likely to suffer from limited 
functional capacity, which is compounded by a legitimacy deficit which renders the 
state more cautious about pursuing policies that could elicit negative responses from 
the populace. 
This thesis traces the relationship between Iraqi state weakness and foreign 
policy making in the ten years after the invasion of Iraq. It limits itself to the post-
war period because to posit a worthwhile analysis of the incredibly complex 
relationship between state weakness and foreign policy making in Ba’athist Iraq 
would require a monograph in itself. Ba’athist Iraq was characterised by a highly 
centralised, totalitarian system of government that maintained its power through the 
extensive use of extreme coercion and through an elaborate intelligence 
infrastructure that co-opted much of the population.
14
 Dominated by the highly 
personalised leadership of its President, Saddam Hussein, Ba’athist Iraq 
haemorrhaged billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives in the course of 
its eight year war with Iran. Iraq had initially invaded Iran in a bid to quash the 
                                                          
14
 For more information about the nature of the Ba’athist state and its foreign policies see Joseph 
Sassoon, Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). Kevin Woods, David Palkki, and Mark Stout, The Saddam Tapes: The Inner 
Workings of a Tyrant's Regime 1978-2001 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Derek 
Hopwood, Habib Ishow, and Thomas Koszinowski (eds.), Iraq: Power and Society (Reading: Ithaca 
Press, 1993). Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1998). John Bulloch, Saddam's War: The Origins of the Kuwait Conflict and the 
International Response (London: Faber and Faber, 1991). Saïd K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The 
Politics of Revenge (London: Bloomsbury, 2000). 
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Islamic revolution that had taken hold, and was extensively supported in its efforts 
by the US, Saudi Arabia, and much of the Arab World. Keen to re-coup some of the 
resources lost in the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein launched the ill-fated invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990. The invasion divided the Middle East, and prompted the US to 
launch a military attack that drove the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. As Iraqi soldiers 
flooded across the Kuwaiti border back into southern Iraq, an enormous rebellion 
gathered force in Iraq’s southern and Kurdish provinces. The US, however, was 
reluctant to support the nascent revolution, and stood by as Saddam killed hundreds 
of thousands of Iraqi civilians and suppressed the rebellion. The US instead 
marshalled the international community to institute against Iraq the most 
comprehensive system of sanctions that the world has ever seen. The twelve years 
that Iraq suffered under sanctions fundamentally altered Iraqi society; living 
standards were decimated and the Iraqi middle class virtually disappeared under the 
weight of its own impoverishment.
15
 In some ways the authority of the Ba’athist 
state was strengthened as the sanctions regimen gave the state control over access to 
all the basic goods required by the Iraqi population. It also sought to recapture an 
element of legitimacy by empowering Iraq’s tribal confederations and by adopting a 
religious discourse completely at odds with its defunct Ba’athist ideology. A 
fascinating study could be conducted on the relationship between the changing 
functional and normative legitimacy of the Ba’athist regime and the foreign policy 
choices that it made, but the scale of such a project means that it must remain 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
Chapter Outline 
This study seeks to explore the extent to which conditions of state weakness 
influenced foreign policy making in Iraq in the ten years after it was invaded by 
coalition forces. Chapter one elaborates on the conceptual framework outlined 
above. Chapter two sets out the methodology employed by this thesis, and discusses 
the methods used to gather and assess the empirical material that is at the heart of 
this dissertation. The following chapters explore, in chronological order, the impact 
of changing levels of Iraqi state weakness on foreign policy making in the country.  
                                                          
15
 In the 1990s Iraq’s GNP plummeted from $75 billion to $20 billion. Zaki Laïdi, Limited 
Achievements: Obama's Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 75. 
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Chapter three depicts Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
as effectively an occupied state, and describes how US foreign policy beyond Iraq 
came to directly undermine the strength of both the CPA and of subsequent Iraqi 
governments. Rather than state weakness affecting foreign policy, in this case the 
foreign policy of the occupying power undermined both the normative and 
functional legitimacy of state authorities in Iraq. The chapter argues that poor US 
diplomacy in the lead up to the invasion had alienated the wider Arab World, whilst 
US threats to Iran, Syria and Hezbollah fuelled an influx of support for internal 
violence in Iraq. The chapter also demonstrates that although transitional, unelected 
Iraqi governments were able to conduct diplomacy, they had neither the normative 
nor the functional legitimacy they would have needed to be able to make substantial 
foreign policy decisions.  
Chapter four deals with the relationship between Iran and Iraq during the 
2005 Ja’fari administration. Ibrahim al-Ja’fari headed the first elected government in 
post-invasion Iraq, but struggled to achieve either functional or normative 
legitimacy. His government had been elected despite much of Iraq’s Sunni 
population boycotting the vote; he was heavily dependent on support from the US 
armed forces and civilian diplomats; and his government struggled to articulate an 
authentic and resonant narrative of the Iraqi state. The Ja’fari government also failed 
to deliver security to the Iraqi people. The Iraqi security forces not only failed to 
stem the escalating violence rapidly, but in many cases they were complicit in it. 
Lacking both functional and normative legitimacy, the Ja’fari government saw the 
Iraqi state reach its weakest point. This state weakness had a direct impact on Iraqi 
relations with Iran. The central government failed to establish its authority over 
foreign policy, as multiple sub-state actors including the Sadrists, the Supreme 
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and the Kurdish political parties all 
conducted independent relations with Iran. In the face of such internal instability the 
Iraqi central government was also prepared to prioritise the pursuit of its regime 
security over national security. The Ja’fari government allowed Iran to continue to 
play a role in sponsoring internal violence in Iraq in the hope that it would provide 
the Ja’fari regime with the political support it needed to stay in power.  
Chapter five looks at Prime Minister Maliki’s tumultuous first term in office. 
The Maliki administration inherited much of the normative and functional 
illegitimacy of the Ja’fari government. The weakness of the Iraqi state in the early 
16 
 
days of the Maliki regime enabled tribal sub-state actors to conduct an independent 
military relationship with the US. This military co-operation led to the strategic 
defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq which, when combined with Maliki’s decision to work 
with the US against Shi’ite militias, resulted in a dramatic reduction of violence in 
Iraq. The fall in violence, and Maliki’s adoption of a new Iraqi nationalist rhetoric, 
enhanced both the functional and normative legitimacy of the Iraqi government and 
enabled it to pursue positive economic and political relations with foreign countries. 
Iraq’s strengthening relationship with Turkey is given as an example. But the 
continued deficiencies in Iraqi state capacity prevented Iraq from fully achieving its 
foreign policy goals. The Iraqi government’s lack of control over its own airspace 
meant that it could not prevent Turkey from conducting cross-border raids on PKK 
positions in Iraqi territory. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
had built up a level of institutional strength that made it an attractive foreign policy 
partner to Turkey, despite the strengthening of the Iraqi government. The KRG’s 
ability to conduct foreign policy in a context of growing Iraqi state strength 
challenges my conceptual framework. Possible explanations for this relate to the 
nature of federal institutions, and are more thoroughly discussed in the thesis 
conclusion. 
Chapter six contrasts Iraq’s relative effectiveness in negotiating a Status of 
the Forces Agreement in 2008, during a period in which the Iraqi government was 
more functionally and normatively legitimate than at any point since the invasion, 
with its inability to successfully negotiate an extension of that agreement in 2011. In 
the intervening years the growing authoritarianism of the Maliki government 
reduced its legitimacy and therefore its ability to successfully pursue its own foreign 
policy goals. The chapter also continues the observations noted in chapter five with 
regard to the KRG’s ability to pursue an independent foreign policy regardless of 
growing Iraqi state strength. In this period the KRG is successfully able to negotiate 
oil contracts with super-major oil companies despite the legality of such moves 
being disputed by the central government. 
Chapter seven deals with the disintegration of the normative and functional 
legitimacy of the Iraqi state precipitated by Prime Minister Maliki’s pursuit of his 
political rivals. By targeting senior Sunni politicians, the Prime Minister contributed 
to a widespread collapse of Sunni confidence in the political process. This 
withdrawal of confidence led to the re-empowerment of violent sub-state actors in 
17 
 
Sunni dominated areas, which in turn fuelled a resurgence of violent civil conflict in 
Iraq. In this context, a weakened Iraqi government has lost much of its authority 
over foreign policy. Iraqi sub-state actors, empowered by the dissipation of central 
government authority in Iraq, have intervened on both sides of the Syrian conflict. 
The central government, meanwhile, has been unable to pursue the policy of non-
intervention that it has declared to be in Iraq’s best interests because regime survival 
considerations have rendered it vulnerable to Iranian influence. 
The conclusion of the thesis assesses the extent to which my observed 
outcomes in the Iraqi case meet the expectations set forth by my conceptual 
framework, focusing in some detail on the anomalous case of KRG foreign policy 
making, and closes by suggesting directions for further research. 
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CHAPTER ONE: CONCEPTUALISING WEAK STATE 
FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Introduction 
This thesis asks the question ‘How have conditions of state weakness influenced 
Iraqi foreign policy production?’ In order to address this question I begin by 
clarifying the terms of the enquiry and by setting out the literatures in which it is 
grounded. This chapter begins by exploring the controversial term ‘weak state’ and 
argues that this is a useful way of identifying a state that has lost either its functional 
or its normative legitimacy, or both. Locating the source of state strength in an 
implicit social contract between the government and the governed, this thesis argues 
that a weak state is one in which the government fails to provide the citizenry with 
basic public goods – the most important of which is security – and hence is 
functionally illegitimate. Or the weak state is one in which the state is unable to 
articulate a narrative of purpose that resonates with all major parts of the population 
– and hence is normatively illegitimate. 
The second half of this chapter explores the theorising of scholars of the 
developing world who have exposed the failure of international relations theory to 
account for the way in which foreign policy is produced in non-Western states. 
Drawing on the findings of these scholars, this thesis develops three working 
hypotheses that guide the remainder of this study. 
Conceptualising the Weak State 
The first half of my discussion focuses on the fundamentals of state weakness. I 
ground my conceptualisation of the weak state in the liberal social contract tradition, 
before fleshing out the concept using Seymour Martin Lipset’s theories of effective 
democracy. The existing literature on weak states is also briefly explored, and I 
make a case for advancing a definition of state weakness that is based on functional 
and normative legitimacy, rather than on a host of governance indicators. Finally, 
criticisms of the weak state term are addressed, and a case is made for using this 
label as opposed to pursuing possible alternative conceptualisations.  
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Social Contract Theory and the Basis of State Strength 
Before I can define the weak state, I must ascertain the sources of state strength.
1
 
Although state strength is sometimes conceived of simply as the ability of the state 
to execute its will,
2
 this study contends that genuine strength is located in the 
functional and normative legitimacy, rather than in the coercive capacity, of the 
state. The social contract concept espoused by a number of political theorists, though 
contentious, offers a useful tool for the conceptualisation of state strength.  
Political theorists including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and John Rawls have all advanced theories of political 
legitimacy (though they differ substantially) based in part on the notion that there 
exists some kind of explicit or implicit contract between the government and the 
governed. For the purpose of this study, the Lockean conception of the social 
contract is particularly useful. Locke begins by defining the pre-political ‘state of 
nature’3 as a ‘state of perfect freedom’4 in which humans are capable both of 
respecting and disrespecting the ‘life, health, liberty, or possessions’ of the other.5 
When human beings inflict force on each other in the state of nature there is no 
‘common superior on earth to appeal to for relief,’6 and thus emerges a state of war. 
In order ‘to avoid this state of war,’7 Locke continues, man ‘seeks out, and is willing 
to join society with others’8 and to subject himself to a government. The purpose of 
that government is to arbitrate between men so as to prevent the outbreak of 
                                                          
1
 This study does not seek to advance a theory of state strength, and as a result my examinations of 
the strong state will only serve to establish an idealized counterpoint against which I can begin my 
discussions of state weakness. 
2
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3
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4
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5
 John Locke, 'The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, 
and End of Civil Government', in Peter Laslett (ed.), Two Treatises of Government: Edited With an 
Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 271. 
6
 Locke, 'The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and 
End of Civil Government', 280. 
7
 Locke, 'The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and 
End of Civil Government', 282. 
8
 Locke, 'The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and 
End of Civil Government', 350. 
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violence, and to preserve life, liberty and property. For Locke, the government is 
legitimate because man has consented, either implicitly or explicitly, to be subjected 
to it, and only to the extent that it fulfils its purpose in preserving the rights of man.
9
 
Should the government fail in this purpose, Locke follows, subjects would have an 
automatic right to remove the government.
10
 Locke contends that such a government 
would lose its legitimacy even if the governed continue to consent to its rule out of 
fear of the repercussions, a matter I will come back to in my discussion of the 
coercive state. 
A number of criticisms are levelled against the Lockean conception of the 
social contract, and indeed against the contractarian approach in general. The 
Kantian and Hobbesian approaches to the social contract, though they differ on a 
vast array of points, both contend that the social contract is permanent and that 
power cannot be removed from the sovereign – no matter how tyrannical he may 
be.
11
 Tyranny is considered preferable to anarchy because it would not be beneficial 
to the human condition to return to the state of nature.
12
 This study, however, locates 
the utility of the social contract concept precisely in its recognition of the 
conditional nature of the political legitimacy of the sovereign. If political legitimacy 
is derived from a contract, it follows that when the sovereign fails to uphold his side 
of the contract he forfeits his political legitimacy, and when the citizen contravenes 
her side of the contract she forfeits a portion of her rights. This study, therefore, 
concurs with Locke that a tyrannical state which contravenes the expectations 
established by the social contract must be characterised as one which has lost its 
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political legitimacy, whether or not overthrowing the government will constitute a 
net gain to society. 
One of the major criticisms of the social contract tradition comes from David 
Hume, who asserts that the concept fails to elucidate the reasons why citizens obey 
their governments. According to Hume, most governments in history came about by 
illegitimate conquest, and citizens obeyed these governments because it was in their 
individual best interests to do so.
13
 This argument, however, fails to account for why 
some governments are considered more legitimate than others. No matter how a 
government comes about historically, it is supported in the long term if citizens 
consider that they are getting something out of the arrangement. If a government is 
instituted by force, but nonetheless maintains internal security and fulfils the basic 
expectations of its citizens it can be said to enjoy a measure of political legitimacy 
that contributes to insuring it against overthrow in the medium to long term. 
Georg Hegel further attacks the concept of the social contract because it 
assumes that citizens have consented to be governed, when in actuality citizens are 
born into a state and very few, if any, have the option of leaving that state.
14
 For 
Hegel, citizens only have responsibilities to the state to the extent that the state 
protects their rights.
15
 This study contends that Hegel takes too circumscribed an 
approach to the social contract. The contract is useful merely as a trope that helps us 
to conceive of a two-way relationship between the government and the governed 
that involves rights and expectations on both sides. Indeed the Hegelian approach 
also implies a contract by asserting that citizens only have duties to the state in 
proportion to its rights against the state. Therefore if the state fails in its implicit 
promise to protect the rights of the citizens, the citizens are no longer obliged to 
obey the laws of the state.  
In sum, conceiving of the social contract as the basis for political legitimacy 
is considered useful to this study because it characterises the relationship between 
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rights.’ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy of Right (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001) 199. 
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the government and the governed as one that is based on a number of implicit 
expectations. When those expectations are not met, political legitimacy is withdrawn 
from the government. 
The Substance of the Social Contract  
Since the social contract is an abstraction, rather than a historical reality, it is 
necessary for us to further theorise what the core expectations are that a modern 
state is generally expected to fulfil if it is to be considered legitimate. A great variety 
of expectations are posited by the social contract philosophers. For Hobbes the 
obligation of the sovereign to protect the citizenry is its only duty,
16
 whereas Rawls 
defines a far more expansive list of expectations for the just government. For Rawls 
the citizenry is only obliged to obey a just government, and justice requires that 
citizens have equal access to ‘social primary goods’ including ‘liberty and 
opportunity, income and wealth and the basis of self-respect.’17 This study 
recognises that there is variation between states in terms of the expectations that the 
state would need to fulfil in order for it to be considered legitimate. So instead of 
trying to enumerate the characteristics that must be present in a legitimate state, I 
will try to identify some of the key principles that indicate that a state is fulfilling its 
social contract. 
In order to generate these principles, this study draws on the work of 
Seymour Martin Lipset on state legitimacy and democracy, and on Max Weber’s 
work on the sources of political authority. Lipset contends that ‘the stability of any 
given democracy depends’ on the ‘effectiveness and the legitimacy of its political 
system.’18 For the sake of clarity, this study labels effectiveness as functional 
legitimacy, that is the legitimacy conferred onto the state through its provision of 
expected public goods, and Lipset’s understanding of the term legitimacy is referred 
to as normative legitimacy. This study argues that Lipset’s identifying of functional 
and normative legitimacy as central to political stability is applicable to both 
democracies and non-democracies, and suggests that it is helpful to bring these 
principles to bear on the social contract state. At its broadest, the state that is 
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fulfilling its social contract can be characterised as one that is both functionally and 
normatively legitimate.  
Lipset defines functional legitimacy as ‘the extent to which the system 
satisfies the basic functions of government as most of the population...see them.’ 
The core function of government, as is recognised by much of the social contract 
literature, is to provide security to its citizens. Max Weber, a theorist outside of the 
social contract tradition, also recognises the centrality of coercion to the state. 
Weber defines the state as a ‘human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.’19 From 
the perspective of social contractarians such as Hobbes and Locke, the primary 
reason that man sacrifices his natural freedom is in order to secure safety under the 
arbitration of a sovereign. Thus a functionally legitimate government must first and 
foremost secure the physical safety of its citizens. Beyond the provision of security, 
in most contemporary states there is an expectation that the state will provide a 
range of public goods and will encourage economic growth in a bid to help secure 
the economic wellbeing of its citizens.
20
 Indeed, theorists recognise that the very 
process of delivering public goods helps to institutionalise the state, and strengthen 
state-society relations.
21
 Furthermore, a state best attains functional legitimacy, as 
Max Weber argues, when it provides these public goods through a professional and 
depersonalised bureaucracy – thereby shielding itself from the inefficiencies 
inherent in a partisan, corrupt or patrimonial system of service delivery.
22
 Thus, a 
state is functionally legitimate if it professionally provides the public goods 
expected by the citizenry, with the provision of security being overwhelmingly the 
most important public good. 
Lipset contends that a state is normatively legitimate if it can ‘engender and 
maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate 
ones for society.’ This definition is an unhelpful one because the state needs to do 
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more than simply convince the citizenry that the particular political system is 
appropriate. It needs, more broadly, to articulate a narrative of state that is resonant 
with all major sections of the populations. This includes narratives of history, 
mythologies of nationhood, and the investment of meaning into symbols that can 
engender trust in and loyalty to the state. This study, therefore, contends that a 
normatively legitimate state is one that can stir a sense of belonging in most sections 
of the citizenry. Of course it is impossible for the state to create a narrative that 
resonates with every single citizen, which is why I am focusing on major sections of 
the community.
23
 What is key here is that the state does not exclude a particular 
community that is united in some other way, perhaps through regional, linguistic, 
ethnic or religious ties, because doing so would undermine the stability of the polity. 
This study argues that it is not useful to try to measure functional or 
normative legitimacy in any absolute sense, because the expectations that the 
citizenry have of the state differ between states. Expectations are shaped by the 
specific history and local context of the state in question, and this study considers 
that attempting to measure functional or normative legitimacy by creating lists of 
indicators would inevitably mean missing important case-specific nuance. To 
understand the level of normative legitimacy achieved by a state, for instance, 
requires a detailed appreciation of the local history, particularly of past conflicts and 
social cleavages, and a sensitivity to the way in which certain memories can be 
evoked to either unite or to tear apart communities. The Centre for Research on 
Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity, for instance, does attempt to establish 
indicators to measure the level of normative legitimacy in a country.
24
 The 
indicators chosen to establish the lack of normative legitimacy included: lack of 
democracy, strong governmental role for the military, acquisition of power by force, 
suppression of opposition, control of media, exclusion of significant groups of the 
population from power, absence of civil and political liberties, with arbitrary arrest, 
and absence of free speech. This long list does little to explain, for instance, the 
impact on Iraq’s Sunni population of the Iraqi government’s heavy use of Shi’ite 
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symbolism in public places, and the consequent impact on the legitimacy of the Iraqi 
state. 
I have established that functional and normative legitimacy are important 
components of state strength, and that the levels of each must be ascertained through 
a close reading of the local political context, but what is the relationship between 
functional and normative legitimacy? Is a state stronger overall if it is functionally 
legitimate, or is it more important that it be normatively legitimate? It is relevant at 
this point to note that I conceive of state weakness on a spectrum, with the idealised 
strong state on one side, and the collapsed state on the other, with most actual states 
positioned somewhere along this spectrum. Although the social contract trope 
encourages a binary view of the state as either fulfilling or failing to fulfil its 
contract, in actuality almost all states are to some extent fulfilling their social 
contracts – and are thus positioned at various positions on the spectrum. Lipset 
argues that a state is obviously most stable when it possesses both functional and 
normative legitimacy, but that if a state were only to posses one it would be more 
stable if it were normatively legitimate rather than functionally legitimate. Lipset 
argues that although functional legitimacy can engender normative legitimacy over a 
long period of time, in the short-term a normatively legitimate but functionally 
illegitimate government is less prone to unrest than a functionally legitimate but 
normatively illegitimate one.
25
 Lipset does not suggest an overly deterministic 
relationship between functional and normative legitimacy, but rather uses examples 
of some of the possible combinations of the two to suggest that normative 
legitimacy is more important than functional legitimacy in ensuring stability in the 
short-term. ‘The social stability of a nation like Thailand,’ Lipset writes, ‘stands out 
in sharp contrast to the situation in neighbouring former colonial nations.’26 
Thailand’s normative legitimacy renders it stable in the short-term despite its 
functional illegitimacy, whereas the deficit in normative legitimacy in some post-
colonial countries makes them more vulnerable to instability even if they are 
relatively functionally legitimate. This is perhaps because organising an effective 
opposition to state authority requires that citizens coalesce around some form of 
shared oppositional identity, and that this is easier to create when there is a 
deficiency in the normative legitimacy of the state. 
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The Coercive State 
Though it is the case that most successful social contract states are likely to be 
democracies, a state does not have to be democratic in order to be functionally and 
normatively legitimate. Non-democratic states can in some cases fulfil the implicit 
social contracts with their citizenries, and, conversely, being democratic does not 
guarantee that a state will be able to achieve functional and normative legitimacy. A 
number of democracies, including Iraq, are weak states because they are unable to 
fulfil the basic expectations of their populations despite operating in ostensibly 
democratic structures.  
This study includes in its definition of the weak state those states that are 
widely considered to be illegitimate by their societies, but that maintain power 
predominantly through their use of coercion. Such states fail to fulfil their social 
contracts and as such cannot be considered to be strong. By failing to deliver on the 
expectations of their citizens, and by abusing their monopoly over violence, such 
states may be able to endure in the medium term, but are likely to engender deep-
seated resentment and resistance in the long term. I do not consider, therefore, Iraq 
prior to 2003 to have been a strong state. Ba’athist Iraq was a coercive state that was 
able to maintain control through the use of extreme violence, but that suffered from 
a fundamental, underlying weakness that would have ultimately led to the collapse 
of that particular state structure. 
Nazih Ayubi writes compellingly about coercive states, which he labels 
‘fierce’ states, arguing that ‘A strong state should also be distinguished from the 
‘fierce’ state, which is so opposed to society that it can only deal with it via coercion 
and raw force.’27 That the fierce state has to subjugate its population through 
coercion is evidence of its fundamental weakness. For Ayubi, the foundation of a 
strong state is the ability to be ‘complementary, not contradictory, to society,’ and 
the success of the strong state is ‘not demonstrated by its subjugation of the society 
but by its ability to work with and through other centres of power in society.’28  
It is important to be nuanced in the characterisation of coercive states, 
however, as the differences between states are usually a matter of degree rather than 
of hard and fast fundamentals. All states are to some extent founded on their ability 
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to monopolise violence, and most states are required to occasionally use coercion to 
enforce their laws or protect the government or the citizenry. The difference, 
therefore, between a coercive and a social contract state is the level and frequency of 
force it is required to use in order to govern on a day to day basis. The coercive state 
category is, however, a fluid one – with states moving between higher and lower 
levels of reliance on coercion. The literature on authoritarian upgrading persuasively 
points out that coercive regimes rarely rely solely on force to maintain their 
governments, but they also deploy a range of other tactics in order to try to enhance 
the legitimacy of their regimes.
29
 The Ba’athist regime in Syria, for example, 
deployed various tactics in order to bolster its legitimacy – including deploying a 
ubiquitous Arab nationalist narrative of state,
30
 establishing an elaborate judicial 
structure, 
31
and by extending government control over religious institutions.
32
 
Coercive states often realise the danger of relying substantially on force to maintain 
power, and experiment with an array of methods designed to enhance the state’s 
functional and normative legitimacy. As a consequence the relative strength of these 
types of regimes fluctuates depending on the success or otherwise of their attempts 
to enhance the legitimacy associated with their governance. 
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Defining the Weak State 
Building on the discussions to this point, the weak state can be defined as a state that 
fails to fulfil the implicit social contract with its citizenry because it is unable to 
achieve functional or normative legitimacy. To unpack this statement further, a 
weak state is one that fails to deliver the most important public goods demanded by 
society, security being the most important of those goods, and that fails to articulate 
a narrative of state that resonates with all major sections of the population. How 
does this characterisation of the weak state tie in to the existing literature on weak 
states?  
There has been a tendency in the literature to define weak states in terms of 
lists of indicators, rather than seeking out a definition – as this study has – that 
locates the fundamental source of weakness in the state. In his classic text on state 
weakness, Robert Rotberg defines the weak state with reference to an extraordinary 
host of characteristics including ‘geographical, physical, or fundamental economic 
constraints;’ ‘internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or external 
attacks;’ ‘ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal tensions;’ high or 
rising ‘urban crime rates;’ falling ‘critical economic indicators;’ very high ‘levels of 
venal corruption;’ deteriorating ‘physical infrastructural networks’ and neglected 
‘schools and hospitals.’33 Although Rotberg recognises that states fail when they are 
‘convulsed by internal violence,’ when they ‘lose legitimacy,’ and when they can 
‘no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants,’34 he is unable to 
build a definition of the weak state around these core principles that speak to the 
heart of state weakness and instead focuses excessively on enumerating the 
characteristics that may or may not be found in a weak state. 
In his study of weak state foreign policy, Michael Handel
35
 much more 
arbitrarily defines weak states as states with ‘very small populations and surface 
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areas, low GNPs with little heavy industry, a high degree of specialisation, small 
domestic markets, high levels of dependency on foreign markets and capital and low 
levels of investment in research and development.’36 Defining the weak state in this 
way makes little sense. For instance, one could describe states with very small 
populations, such as Gulf emirates, as strong because of their unique ability to meet 
the expectations of their very small citizenries. This study contends that dividing up 
state types into categories based on such arbitrary characteristics offers little by way 
of helping us to understand the important dynamics at play in weak states. 
Barry Buzan and Caroline Thomas offer more comprehensive definitions of 
state weakness. Buzan describes the weak state as one with a ‘high level of concern 
with domestically generated threats to the security of the government’ and as a state 
that has ‘failed to create a domestic and social consensus of sufficient strength to 
eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the 
domestic political life of the nation.’37 I believes that the presence of domestic 
threats to government security is better understood as an outcome of state weakness, 
and is not a useful way of defining state weakness. Buzan’s second point, however, 
goes to the heart of what makes a state weak, and points to the importance of a state 
fulfilling the social and political expectations of society so that it can largely govern 
without resorting to force. Caroline Thomas takes a different approach, excluding 
the coercive state from her definition of the weak state. Thomas sees a weak state as 
one in which the state is deficient in either or both coercive power and 
infrastructural power.
38
 This study argues that although coercive power may enable 
a state to survive in the short-term, a state’s reliance on force is an indication of its 
underlying weakness. Deficiency in infrastructural power, however, is a useful part 
of the definition of state weakness and can be approximated with my use of the term 
functional legitimacy. 
This study adopts the following definition of state weakness that draws on 
the core principles touched on by Buzan, Rotberg and Thomas. The weak state is 
one that fails to articulate a narrative of state that resonates with all major sections of 
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the population, and/ or is unable to provide the basic security, social and economic 
services expected of a state. There is a great deal of variation between weak states, 
with the weakest lacking both normative and functional legitimacy.
39
 Of the states 
that either have functional or normative legitimacy, I would suggest that the 
possession of normative legitimacy makes a state stronger than the possession of 
functional legitimacy. Rather than, at this point, defining lists of indicators that 
would label states as belonging to a discrete ‘level of weakness,’ this study propose 
to engage in a close reading of a specific country in order to understand a great deal 
more about the level and character of state weakness in that state. I believe that a 
close-reading approach better positions this thesis to understand the implications of 
state weakness on policy making. 
This thesis is chiefly concerned with foreign policy making rather than with 
international relations theory, however, it is useful here to point out the ways in 
which my approach complements and differs from mainstream approaches to the 
analysis of international affairs. My approach to defining the weak state follows a 
broadly constructivist position; I question the utility of objective lists of criteria for 
defining the weak state, I recognise that state legitimacy is differentiated between 
the functional and the normative, I believe that state weakness is contextual and 
defined by the varied expectations of different societies, and I accept that states are 
structurally constrained by the rules and norms of statehood. This thesis does not, 
however, find the Wendtian depiction of the state as a unitary actor a useful way of 
approaching foreign policy analysis, and in this sense positions itself alongside 
recent works in foreign policy analysis that criticize the ‘black box’ approach. My 
work is part of a movement in foreign policy analysis that seek to understand foreign 
policy making in different ways, drawing on some of the insights that constructivist 
international relations theory has brought into the field, whilst also drawing on 
alternative literatures in order to resist some of the more restrictive and euro-centric 
aspects of existing constructivist models. For example, constructivism has come be 
an important tool in helping foreign policy analysts to frame and assess the impact 
of identity and state self-understanding on international relations. While foreign 
policy analysis continues to grapple with these new approaches, for the purposes of 
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this project I have found it most beneficial to primarily ground my conceptual point 
of departure in the literature on the social contract, and the literature on foreign 
policy making in the developing world. 
Alternative Conceptualisations  
This study has deliberately chosen to characterise its unit of analysis as the ‘weak 
state’ as opposed to a number of possible alternatives, and in this section I discuss 
the advantages of this label as well as the criticisms levelled against it. 
The term ‘small power’ which tends to be used in the literature on 
international relations is inappropriate for the purposes of this study because it 
defines the state according to the level of power it wields in the international system. 
This study is primarily focused on the dynamics of domestic foreign policy making, 
and although an internally weak state is also usually weak in terms of its position in 
the international system – its external weakness is only of a secondary concern to 
this study. 
 ‘Quasi-state’ is a term most associated with Robert Jackson’s Quasi-States: 
Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World. The central argument of 
Jackson’s work is that the post-colonial international normative framework has led 
to the premature recognition of states that ‘lack many of the marks and merits of 
empirical statehood postulated by positive sovereignty.’40 The term quasi-state 
reflects the inability of such states to perform the full range of state functions. The 
problem with this term is that it focuses excessively on the role that international 
institutions play in facilitating the endurance of such states. This study would assert 
that the act of external recognition is not a sufficient condition of state survival; 
internal factors must also coalesce in order for a state to be formed and to endure. 
When the international community turns away from a state, like it did with Iraq after 
the invasion of Kuwait, the act of withdrawing support and recognition is not 
enough to precipitate the collapse of the state. Conversely, international support for 
the continuation of the Somali state did not prevent its collapse in 1991. 
The term ‘deeply divided society’ is a controversial one. A number of weak 
states fail to articulate a narrative of state that resonates with all major sections of 
the population because strong sub-state identities have coalesced around particular 
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religious or ethnic groups that are at odds with the state’s attempts to articulate a 
shared national identity. The conflicting demands of each community can make it 
impossible for the state to fulfil the social contract as defined by any single 
community, and the threat of civil war can lead to the militarisation of society in a 
way that prevents the state from exercising a monopoly over violence. Nevertheless, 
the term deeply divided society implies that some societies are essentially ‘divided’ 
whilst others are not.
41
 This study would contend that every society possess within it 
divisions that could be politicised in the right circumstances, whether they are racial, 
religious, class or regional differences. It is not the existence of difference that is 
important, but rather it is the process by which difference can be transformed into a 
source of threat in society that is significant. The term deeply divided society is 
therefore problematic because it implies that particular types of difference – 
particularly ethnic and religious difference – are essentially predisposed to conflict, 
and because it focuses on the existence of difference rather than on the process by 
which differences acquire meaning. The term ‘weak state’ does not locate state 
weakness in the existence of particular groups within a polity. It rather looks to the 
ability of the state to control violence within its territory – whether this is communal 
violence, class based violence or criminal violence – and it asks whether or not the 
state’s performance is deemed satisfactory by the many different groups that may 
constitute its citizenry. 
The term ‘failed state’ also comes with a fair amount of baggage. In policy 
terms it has been linked to the foreign interventionism of the administration of 
President George W. Bush. The 2002 National Security Strategy placed failed states 
at the heart of Bush’s new foreign policy approach when it declared that, ‘America 
is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.’42 Partly 
because of its instrumentalisation by the Bush administration, the term ‘failed state’ 
has been widely criticised for signalling that states labelled as such ought not be 
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treated as sovereign and by extension for justifying pre-emptive military strikes 
against them.
43
 
Many of the criticisms levelled against the failed state label are also 
applicable to the term ‘weak state.’ It has been argued that the ‘European model of 
the nation-state is simply the wrong institution’ for many post-colonial states.44 If 
this is the case, to constantly measure such states against the unachievable ideal of 
the essentially European nation-state is to condemn them to being constantly 
labelled as ‘weak’ or as ‘failed.’45 Drawing on Foucauldian discourse analysis, Mary 
Manjikian further attacks the deployment of the terms ‘strong,’ ‘weak’ and ‘failed’ 
with reference to states. Manjikian suggests that the use of such language sets up an 
unequal power relationship between the strong and the weak state, whereby the 
strong ‘doctor’ state is empowered to dictate the treatment of the ‘weak,’ 
‘irresponsible’ and ‘incapable’ ‘patient’ state with or without the consent of the 
inferior state.
46
 The terms have also been criticised for identifying ‘weakness’ or 
‘failure’ as part of the essential characters of particular states, which can be 
construed as an extension of colonial discourses that depicted certain racial groups 
as more or less capable of governing.
47
 It has further been argued that the terms 
imply that weakness derives solely from the internal deficiencies of the state, 
thereby implicitly belittling the role that colonialism, global trade inequality, and 
other historical processes have played in constructing the ‘failure’ or ‘weakness’ of 
those states.
48
 
Responding to these many valid criticisms, the next section seeks to tease out 
the subtle differences between the terms ‘failed state’ and ‘weak state’ in order to 
explain why this study has chosen to deploy the fraught term. Because of its 
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association with a particular era of misdirected foreign policy interventionism, the 
term ‘failed state’ possesses more immediately negative connotations than the term 
‘weak state.’ It is therefore easier to use the term ‘weak state’ without having 
assumptions about your ideological position read into your work. Furthermore, the 
word ‘failed’ refers to a definitive state of being and as such a failed state could be 
construed as having irreversibly lost its sovereignty. Weakness, on the other hand, is 
located on a spectrum and offers more fluidity. The term weakness does not depict a 
static condition of being; rather it indicates the evolving nature of state strength and 
is therefore somewhat more defensible than the failed state label. 
As for the contention that describing a state as weak implies a continuation 
of colonial discourses, this study simply does not link state weakness to any 
particular ethnicity or culture. Whilst it is the case that colonial discourses 
describing particular ethnic groups as weak implied an inability for self governance 
that legitimised colonial structures of domination, in this study the term refers to the 
ability of the state to achieve normative and functional legitimacy. In all states it is 
possible for legitimacy to be linked to the ability of the state to articulate a narrative 
of nation that is based on certain racial or cultural attributes. But this is completely 
divorced from the allegation that to use the term state weakness implies that certain 
states are inherently weak due to their ethnic or cultural characteristics. It is the case 
that weak states tend to be found in the global south or in formerly colonised 
regions, but this is because particular conditions, such as de-colonisation and the 
structuring of the global economy, have had disproportionately detrimental effects 
on the development of state structures in these particular regions. 
The assertion that the nation state structure is essentially European and sets 
too difficult a standard for poorer states is a crude criticism that ignores the fact that 
most of the developing world is now divided into nation-states that are not on the 
brink of collapse. One cannot characterise a huge diversity of people as unsuited to a 
particular form of political system. Indeed, the remarkable feature of the 
introduction of the nation-state structure beyond Europe has been its durability, with 
the vast majority of nation-states having survived despite the often very difficult 
circumstances surrounding their inception.
49
 Many of the national liberation 
movements that fought against colonialism referenced the nation-state as the ideal 
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form of political organisation. And a number of post-colonial states, perhaps in part 
because of their internal weakness, have since become vocal defenders of the nation-
state and of the principles of non-intervention, territorial integrity and the sanctity of 
state borders.
50
 Moreover, this study is interested in how conditions of internal state 
weakness affect internal foreign policy making processes, and is not focused on 
power relationships between states. I am not, therefore, at risk of perpetuating 
oppressive ways of understanding inter-state power relationships. On the contrary, 
this study attributes agency to the weak state by recognising its ability to formulate 
and conduct its own internally generated foreign policy – whereas most studies tend 
to cast weak states as merely the objects of the foreign policies of more powerful 
states or as helpless passengers in the game of international politics. 
Foreign Policy of Weak States 
Scholars of the Third World
51
 have long argued that the core tenets of mainstream 
international relations theory are wholly inapplicable to the majority of non-Western 
states. The preoccupation with states as actors, the focus on hegemony, balance of 
power and territoriality, the elevating of external threats and the separation of 
foreign and domestic policy fails to ‘address the contemporary nature of the Third 
World’ and as such is ‘inadequate.’52 One of the core problems is that much of 
traditional international relations theory is built on assumptions that simply do not 
hold for many developing states. For instance it tends to be assumed that the state is 
an effective, legitimate, and sovereign entity. Many developing states, meanwhile, 
encompass numerous competing identity groups, are governed by regimes that are 
not considered legitimate by significant sectors of the population, and are unable to 
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provide peace and stability for their citizens.
53
 States which face such a myriad of 
internal problems cannot possibly interact with the international system in the same 
way as legitimate, effective and internally coherent states. Scholars of the Third 
World have, therefore, advocated for taking into account state type when theorising 
foreign policy behaviour. In his comprehensive study of African international 
relations, for instance, Christopher Clapham concluded that ‘The foreign policies of 
African states were, in short, most basically determined by the kind of states that 
they were.’54 
Much of the literature that I discuss in this chapter is based on African, rather 
than on Middle Eastern, case studies. This study contends that many of the features 
of the African states discussed in this literature are highly relevant to the Iraqi case, 
and does not accept that the cultural or historical specificities of the Middle East as a 
region render the comparison with Africa problematic. In many ways Iraq is a 
unique case that bears little relation to states either in the Middle East or in Africa. 
As a deeply totalitarian state that was demolished from the inside during a decade of 
crippling sanctions, Ba’athist Iraq came to a dramatic end after a unique US invasion 
and attempt at state-building. If we look to the characteristics of post-invasion Iraqi 
governments, however, there are plenty of similarities between them and the 
governments described in the developing states literature. This thesis does not 
suggest that there is anything specifically ‘Middle Eastern’ about the Iraqi 
experience that would render a region-specific frame of reference more analytically 
useful than the one deployed in this study. After all, this study is focused primarily 
on the internal relationship between the government and the governed and on the 
impact this relationship has on internal foreign policy making processes. The 
specific conflict dynamics in the Middle East do not, therefore, have any particular 
bearing on the conceptual framing of this study.  
There is an important tangential literature to that on the foreign policies of 
developing states that seeks to mount a broad-based challenge to international 
relations theory as a whole on the basis of the Third World or developing state 
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experience.
55
 This literature contends that, rather than balancing against threats as 
traditional international theory would expect, states in the Third World tend not to 
engage in alliances, and that the maximisation of state power is not the primary goal 
of the Third Word state.
56
 This study is focused much more narrowly on the 
domestic foreign policy making process, so I do not want to become unduly 
distracted by this wider literature but simply to acknowledge that the sub-literature 
with which I am engaging exists within a broader context. This study will 
concentrate on what scholars of the developing world have observed about how 
internal foreign policy making processes differ in the non-Western world. This will 
provide the basis on which I can develop working hypotheses, more specifically, 
about the way in which state weakness affects foreign policy making. Although this 
study’s focus is on the weak state, the existing literature considers a range of much 
broader categories including Third World states, developing states and African 
states. For the purposes of  explaining the extant literature I will use all these terms, 
before bringing the discussion back to weak states later in the chapter. 
Internal Threats Prevail 
One of the key observations made in the literature on the foreign policy of 
developing states is that such states are primarily faced with internal rather than 
external threats. International relations theory focuses to such an extraordinary 
extent on the threats levelled against states by external powers that we would expect 
weak states to be even more vulnerable to – and therefore preoccupied with – 
external threats. In actuality, an international normative system has emerged that 
places enormous value on the sanctity of state boundaries and which confers 
external sovereignty on states whether or not they successfully achieve internal 
sovereignty.
57
 Many regimes in the developing world, therefore, do not feel 
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especially worried about the prospect of being invaded – they instead worry about 
the myriad threats emanating from domestic actors that could lead to their downfall. 
The problem for many African states, Christopher Clapham argues, is that 
they fail to articulate and pursue an inclusive vision of the state, leading to a 
proliferation of threats by internal actors who feel underrepresented or victimised by 
the state. Clapham writes that, ‘In cases where the idea of the state is almost 
universally shared, any threat to the security of the incumbent government, by other 
than legitimate constitutional means, can only come from outside.’58 But when the 
idea of the state is contested by internal actors, the state is much more likely to be 
focused on securing itself from internal threats. The proliferation of internal threats 
leads to a general feeling of insecurity, which is labelled by Brian Job as ‘the 
insecurity dilemma.’59 According to Job, the inability of many Third World states to 
garner ‘popular legitimacy’ renders them vulnerable to the ‘insecurity dilemma,’ 
whereby ‘each component of society [is] competing to preserve and protect its own 
well-being.’60 
In such a context, protecting the security of the regime becomes the primary 
task of the ruling elite. For many leaders in internally unstable states, traditional 
national interest considerations pale in significance when ‘their own regimes and 
even their own lives’ are threatened by internal discord.61 Clapham writes of African 
leaders that they begin any foreign policy decision making process with ‘an 
assessment of the domestic situation, since their security was usually much more 
directly threatened by domestic than by external considerations.’62 Regimes that feel 
constantly under threat by internal actors tend to respond with repression, although 
they sometimes also attempt to upgrade their legitimacy. Repression, however, often 
further exacerbates the internal security dilemma and undermines state-society 
relations, and indeed intra-society relations. Local actors may even turn to the 
international community to support them against their heavily repressive regimes.
63
 
                                                          
58
 Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of Survival, 45. 
59
 This is an inversion of the traditional concept of the ‘security dilemma,’ which is at the heart of 
much of international relations theory. 
60
 Job, 'The Insecurity Dilemma: Theory and Practice', 18. 
61
 Christopher Clapham points out that the price of failure is high for politicians in many African 
states, where ‘well over half of leading African politicians between independence and 1991 were 
assassinated, executed, imprisoned, or forced into exile.’ Clapham, Africa and the International 
System: The Politics of Survival, 58. 
62
 Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of Survival, 63. 
63
 Job, 'The Insecurity Dilemma: Theory and Practice', 12. 
39 
 
Traditional ways of understanding the nature of the state in the international system 
are upended when we consider that citizens in such states do not turn to their states 
for protection from external threats, but ask the international community for 
protection from their own governments.  
‘National Interests’ Do Not Direct Foreign Policy 
The idea that there are a set of policies that can be objectively defined as being ‘in 
the national interest’ is somewhat outdated, and it tends to be recognised now that 
states struggle to define foreign policy according to a range of criteria, taking into 
account domestic politics, the capability of the state, the nature of external threats 
and the international environment. Realist conceptions of the national interest as the 
‘perennial standard by which political action must be judged’ have been thoroughly 
interrogated and discredited by foreign policy analysis.
64
 Scholars of foreign policy 
analysis have taken issue with the ‘ambiguous nature of the nation and the difficulty 
of specifying whose interests it encompasses,’ and have pointed out that ‘a 
description of the national interest can never be more than a set of conclusions 
derived from the analytic and evaluative framework of the describer.’65 Nonetheless, 
states continue to refer to the national interest with remarkable frequency when 
describing and justifying their foreign policy choices. It is worth noting at this 
juncture that the rhetorical power of the notion of a national interest is a very 
important part of its utility to foreign policy actors in strong states and perhaps even 
more so in weak states. Claiming to act in the national interest offers a foreign 
policy actor a claim to legitimacy, and is a way of suggesting that one’s opponents 
are not acting in the interests of the nation. In a weak state setting where there may 
be an existential battle for legitimacy between political actors, access to this tool of 
legitimization is extremely important and offers us a way to analyse how the term is 
deployed and how its meaning is understood in a weak state setting. 
 Beyond its appropriation as a tool in the competition over power and 
legitimacy, the literature on developing state foreign policy making identifies an 
interesting dynamic in consideration over interests in a weak state setting. Namely, 
in developing states, the pursuit of regime survival trumps any consideration of the 
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national interest. There is virtually no separation between foreign and domestic 
policy, and foreign policy is directed according to the narrow interests of the ruling 
elite. Regime survival is an imperative that motivates many regimes in the 
developing world who are often faced with existential threats posed by internal 
oppositional forces. The successful pursuit of particular foreign relationships can 
help to bolster a struggling regime with political and material resources that can be 
used to enhance its domestic support and/or suppress domestic opposition. Clapham 
writes that in many African states, foreign policy became ‘a means through which 
leaders attempted to gain access to the resources required to maintain the domestic 
political structure.’66 Regimes may even go to the extent of actively compromising 
traditional notions of the ‘national interest’ in order to ensure the longevity of the 
regime. For example a state may invite a foreign power into its territory to suppress 
internal violence, thereby borrowing ‘power from outside to pursue their aims.’67 
In many states preoccupied with regime survival, domestic political 
considerations become a fundamental, even leading part, of foreign policy – 
contravening the theoretical separation between the two that has long been imposed 
by currents in international relations theory. We can even go so far as to say that, 
‘for many purposes systemic boundaries between internal and external environments 
simply do not exist.’68 For when regimes are weak, pursuing foreign policies that 
can ‘help bolster the government against its domestic opponents,’ must take higher 
priority.
69
 
It is also the case that many developing states pursue a foreign policy that 
fails to reflect the interests of the nation as a whole, because the regime itself is not a 
reflection of its own citizenry. In this case foreign policy interests can come to be 
defined by the narrow interests of the political faction in power. Clapham writes that 
‘Insofar as the idea of the state is “owned” by particular sections of the 
population...its foreign (and also domestic) policies will correspondingly reflect the 
interests of its owners, and be directed against those members of the population who 
contest the idea of the state.’70 In a country that is governed by a small, 
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unrepresentative and illegitimate elite, the regime inevitably orients foreign policy 
towards the interests of the leader, party or regime rather than the interests of the 
nation as a whole. The narrower the governing elite, the more danger there is of 
foreign policy becoming simply an exercise in personal relationships and 
animosities. William Zartman writes that ‘ideology and personal interest are used 
more frequently than national interest as a criteria for foreign policy,’ meaning that 
foreign policy sometimes becomes ‘an exercise in pure politics – a struggle for 
external influence for its own sake – and at times has no other criterion than whim, 
emotion, or accident.’71 
It is important not to overstate the differences between developed and 
developing states in this regard. The foreign policy decisions of many developed 
states are highly vulnerable to a range of internal political dynamics,
72
 and indeed 
‘Foreign policies are pursued to help in-groups stay in power in modernised states 
no less than elsewhere.’73 Although the differences between developing and 
developed state foreign policy are important to theorise, it is the case that differences 
can often be a matter of degree rather than of fundamentals. Therefore tendencies 
that may be observable in economically advanced states are simply far more 
exaggerated in a developing state context because of the particular dynamics that 
such a state generates.  
Decision-Making is Highly Personalised 
The literature on foreign policy making in developing states recognizes that the 
potential importance of foreign policy to regime survival, and the absence of 
established bureaucratic structures, often means that individual leaders have a great 
deal of personal control over foreign policy. Gilbert Khadiagala and Terrance Lyons 
write that ‘African foreign policy decision making has always been the province of 
leading personalities’ because bureaucratic structures are ‘Weak and manipulatable’ 
and because it can be used as a tool to ‘disarm their domestic opponents.’74 
Although in some states uncontentious foreign policy matters are delegated to the 
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bureaucracy, when the stakes are high leaders almost always directly oversee the 
policy-making process.
75
   
Part of the problem is that in many underdeveloped states the regime heavily 
dominates the government machinery because it is an important source of power and 
patronage for the regime. Ministries are often used as a conduit through which 
politicians can extract resources from the state, that they in turn can distribute to 
their supporters. The development of regularised bureaucratic processes is either not 
prioritised or actively sabotaged by ruling elites who want to prevent constraints on 
their freedom of action. The result is that very few individuals participate in the 
foreign policy making process, and policy risks being excessively influenced by the 
‘anger,’ ‘ardour,’ ‘whims,’ ‘convictions,’ and ‘friendships’ of the leader.76 Though 
parliament and the cabinet may engage in discussion about foreign policy options, 
their input is rarely influential, and the diplomatic infrastructure is more often than 
not excluded from the real business of foreign policy.
77
   
It is important to note that in many economically developed countries foreign 
policy is also the closely guarded prerogative of the leader, and that there are often 
tensions been the Foreign Ministry and the executive office.
78
 Again, this is a matter 
of degree; developing states face far fewer bureaucratic constraints on their policy-
making processes, which affords individual leaders enormous discretion over policy 
choices. 
Though leaders in many developing states may not have to compete with a 
bureaucracy to define their foreign policies, they do have to contend with powerful 
sub-state actors who conduct ‘traditional international relations activities even 
though they are not official states.’79 Such actors go so far as to wage wars 
independently of the government, and can shape the character of their country’s 
foreign policy without the input of the government. There is an extremely wide 
range of such actors, from private business interests, to militia groups, to political 
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parties, all who are able to take advantage of the weakness of the state in order to 
pursue audacious policies of their own.   
Capacity and Foreign Policy Making 
The ability of developing states to conduct foreign policy is also severely hampered 
by a host of domestic constraints. When a regime is facing severe internal threats, its 
energy and resources must be directed to countering that threat, leaving its ability to 
effectively conduct foreign policy greatly reduced. Writing about the foreign 
policies of African leaders, Clapham observes that ‘When leaders faced appreciable 
domestic threats...their scope for independent action was correspondingly 
reduced.’80 Internal weakness can render a state vulnerable to foreign intervention, 
and can weaken its bargaining position when it comes to international affairs. And 
the pressures of managing a volatile domestic situation can detract a great deal from 
the ability of a leader to effectively manage foreign policy, often leading to short-
termism and desperation in foreign policy strategy.   
Moreover, a dependent position in the international system means that 
developing states are often unable to extract favourable agreements with stronger 
states.
81
 Some theorists argue that the Third World should always be analysed in 
light of its subordinate position in the international system
82
 because foreign policy 
outcomes for such states are inevitably shaped by the ‘pervasive influence of global 
economic and military asymmetries.’83 There exists a vast literature that assesses the 
impact on such states of their position in the international system, but this is outside 
of the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it is fitting to recognise that foreign policy 
decisions are often made against a backdrop of enormous inequality that severely 
constrains the range of possible courses of action that it is possible for developing 
states to pursue.
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It would also have been possible to take an approach to this study that 
emphasises the federal nature of the post-2003 Iraqi state. The Iraqi constitution is a 
radically federalist document, and the Iraqi Kurdish region exercises a great deal of 
power independently of Baghdad, which is bound to have an impact on the foreign 
policy making dynamics in the Iraqi state. However, the existing literature on 
federalism in weak states tends to focus on its viability as a conflict management 
tool, and to date there has not been any academic work conducted on the impact of 
federalism on weak state foreign policy. Theorising the relationship between 
federalism, state weakness and foreign policy is a complex task that requires a stand-
alone study and it therefore cannot be incorporated into this thesis. I do think that 
such a study would make a valuable contribution to the field, and in my conclusion I 
expand further on this possible future research agenda.  
Hypothesising Weak State Foreign Policy 
The existing literature on foreign policy production in developing states offers a 
very useful point of departure for my enquiry into weak states. The extant work, 
however, is somewhat limited by its use of very broad ranging terms such as ‘Third 
World,’ ‘developing state,’ and ‘African state.’ There is extraordinary diversity 
amongst states in Africa, and it is difficult to argue that they should all be treated as 
comparable units in foreign policy analysis. Particular experiences of 
decolonisation, the subsequent evolution of types of governance, differences in 
resource wealth, and ethnic and religious makeup are just some of the things that 
account for the wide variation in experience across African states. In order to try to 
understand how domestic governance structures affect foreign policy, therefore, it 
makes sense to differentiate states by their political characteristics, rather than by 
their geographical location. When we take a narrower look at those African states 
which are struggling to impose their authority over their territories and populations, 
it quickly becomes clear that they have much in common with states beyond Africa 
that are experiencing similar legitimacy deficits.  
The terms ‘developing state’ and ‘Third World’ are similarly inappropriate 
for the purposes of this study. The large swathe of states encompassed by these 
terms have little in common beyond a broadly low level of economic development. 
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Grouping states by level of economic development may be instructive in a study of 
international relations that focuses on the relative position of states in a global 
hierarchy of powers, but it offers little value for studies which are focused on 
internal foreign policy production. This study contends that focusing attention on 
how a state relates to authority and legitimacy better helps us to delineate types of 
states and better enables us to theorise the relationship between state type and 
foreign policy production than the categories used in the extant literature. The term 
‘weak state,’ which we have defined throughout this chapter as a state that lacks 
functional and normative legitimacy, brings together states that face similar 
fundamental challenges and as such allows us to construct an analytically powerful 
point of departure.     
This chapter has extensively discussed social contract theory and the 
literature on foreign policy making in developing states, and from these literatures I 
will now extrapolate a set of expectations or hypotheses that can be used to guide 
this study. 
The exploration of social contract theory conducted earlier in this chapter 
concluded that one of the fundamental purposes of the state is to provide public 
goods to its population, chief amongst them being security. When a state cannot 
achieve the public goods provision that is central to its legitimacy, it provides non-
state actors with the opportunity to take on part of this important public role. 
Especially when it comes to security, local actors often take control of securing 
neighbourhoods or towns in the event of a breakdown in the central government’s 
ability to keep the peace. By taking over the provision of public goods where the 
government has failed, sub-state actors may gain local legitimacy and may reach a 
position where they can contest the sovereignty claims of the central government. 
This is even more likely to be the case if the central government propagates an 
exclusionary narrative of state. When the central government generates the 
impression that it exists for the benefit of only part of the population, or that it is 
concerned only with securing itself, sub-state actors are given the opportunity to 
compete with the government’s claim to legitimacy by articulating narratives that 
resonate with those who feel normatively neglected by the central government. A 
weak state, therefore, is liable to be confronted by actors with competing claims to 
legitimacy, and such a dynamic is likely to be reflected in the foreign policy sphere. 
The literature on developing states, explored earlier in this chapter, points to the fact 
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that in such states we often find a range of governmental and non-governmental 
actors competing over foreign policy, and this thesis will focus in large part on 
seeking to understand in greater depth how state weakness relates to the proliferation 
of competing foreign policy actors within the state.  
This thesis hypothesises that the fragility of the weak state’s narrative, in 
addition to its inability to sufficiently furnish the population with public goods, 
renders it vulnerable to competing claims to legitimacy mounted by sub-state actors 
who can provide public goods and robust narratives of purpose at a sub-state level. 
Such actors are able to challenge the state’s authority in a number of areas, including 
its jurisdiction over foreign policy. I would therefore expect a weak state to be 
unable to exercise control over both the setting of foreign policy goals and the 
modes of foreign policy interaction, including the entering into of agreements with 
foreign powers, the engagement in diplomatic activity, and giving or receiving of 
material or political support. The first hypothesis, therefore, is: In a weak state, the 
central government is unable to monopolise authority over foreign policy, including 
in the setting of foreign policy goals and in the exercising of effective control over 
interaction with foreign actors. 
This chapter’s discussions of social contract theory lead to the conclusion 
that the weak state is by definition vulnerable. Its inability to effectively perform the 
functions of state diminish its legitimacy and lay it open to contestation from 
alternative claimants to authority. Since the weak state is constantly vulnerable to 
challenges from domestic rivals, it follows that such a state is preoccupied with the 
pursuit of regime security. The literature on foreign policy production in developing 
states characterises such states as being fixated on the task of securing the regime in 
the face of challenges mounted by domestic political rivals. The literature also 
indicates that threats posed by domestic actors are considered more dangerous to 
regime security than those posed by foreign powers. Indeed, the literature points to 
instances of regimes allowing foreign militaries to access their territory in the hope 
that they will help to protect the regime from its domestic political rivals. This study 
seeks to understand the extent to which the domestic vulnerability of the weak state 
leads it to pursue foreign policies that promise to secure the security of the regime 
even if such policies are detrimental to the population as a whole. It also seeks to 
understand whether or not the security imperative drives the foreign policy goals of 
the sub-state actors who conduct foreign policy in competition with the central 
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government. Such sub-state actors are also operating in an insecure environment in 
which legitimacy and authority are under contestation, and may similarly deploy 
foreign policy so as to bolster their own claims to authority.  
I, therefore, hypothesise that the foreign policies of actors within a weak 
state reflect the wider competition for legitimacy in the body politic. The state is 
likely to construct its foreign policies with a view to retaining and enhancing its 
current claim to sovereign authority, whilst sub-state actors will tend to pursue 
foreign policies that they believe will protect and augment their ability to make 
authority claims. This preoccupation with the preservation and expansion of 
domestic authority means that foreign policy choices are likely to be made that fail 
to take into account the interests of the wider population. The second hypothesis, 
therefore, is: In a weak state, foreign policy is driven by a primary concern for the 
security and authority of the foreign policy actor, which can result in foreign policy 
choices being made that are detrimental to the interests of the population as a 
whole. 
 Severe functional limitations in a state are a core, contributing part of what 
makes a state weak because a state’s inability to perform the tasks that are expected 
of it undermines its legitimacy. The reasons for the functional ineptitude may be 
manifold: it could have low institutional capacity, it may be resource poor, or it may 
have recently emerged from civil conflict, indeed there is a vast literature on the 
causes of and possible remedies for the limited functional capacity of developing 
states. In any case poor functional performance contributes both to diminishing the 
legitimacy of the state and to reducing its capacity to effectively pursue its foreign 
policy goals. The reduction of state legitimacy further compounds the already 
limited functional capability of the state because it renders the state vulnerable to 
contestation and reduces its ability to absorb the resistance and opposition that may 
be generated in the pursuit of policy goals. This study hypothesises that weak states 
struggle to effectively pursue and enact their foreign policies. Such states face 
sustained challenges from sub-state actors who seek to use the state’s declared 
policies and priorities to further undermine the legitimacy of the state. By 
successfully undermining the ability of the state to effectively execute its policies, 
sub-state actors may seek to enhance their own authority over foreign policy by 
engaging with foreign governments and actors through alternative channels. In 
establishing these competing relationships with foreign powers, sub-state actors 
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further reduce the ability of the central government to effectively deliver its policy 
agenda. The third hypothesis, therefore, is: In a weak state, the capacity of the 
central government to effectively implement its foreign policy agenda is diminished. 
The weak state is likely to suffer from limited functional capacity, which is 
compounded by a legitimacy deficit which renders the state more cautious about 
pursuing policies that could elicit negative responses from the populace. 
This study does not try to separate out dependent from independent 
variables. It contends that social relations are mutually constructed, and that it is 
therefore neither feasible nor instructive to try to delineate clear casual links. The 
weakness of a state is a fluid and changing condition that is affected by the 
realisation of the hypotheses even as it creates the circumstances in which the 
hypotheses take place. Moreover, the three hypotheses that I have laid out here are 
clearly interrelated. When sub-state actors conduct foreign policy in competition 
with the government, as the first hypothesis expects, this increases the regime’s 
insecurity and makes it more likely that the regime will deploy foreign policy in the 
pursuit of regime security goals, as per the second hypothesis. Similarly the 
proliferation of competing sub-state foreign policy actors makes it more difficult for 
the central government to effectively pursue its own foreign policy goals, as 
hypothesis three anticipates. The realisation of any of the three hypotheses further 
reduces the legitimacy and functional effectiveness of the regime, thereby 
compounding state weakness, and making it more likely that the conditions 
anticipated by the remaining hypotheses will come about. For instance, the citizenry 
is likely to withdraw further legitimacy from the weak state when it becomes 
apparent that the state is unable to successfully execute its foreign policies. This 
withdrawal of confidence in the government is likely to better enable sub-state 
actors to compete with the government in the foreign policy arena, which in turn 
will increase the likelihood of the state using foreign policy as a tool for enhancing 
their domestic security. As each hypothesis comes into effect, the regime becomes 
increasingly vulnerable, and therefore increasingly focused on protecting itself 
against threats to its authority. The energy of the regime is consumed by the need to 
secure itself, and is likely to mean that little attention is given to improving the 
institutional capacity of the state’s foreign policy systems. This neglect of functional 
ability is likely to further compound state weakness, whilst the clear focus of the 
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regime on self-preservation, rather than on the national interest, further contributes 
to the tapering of public confidence in the central government.  
Whilst each of these hypotheses has an important impact on weak state 
foreign policy production, I would venture that the proliferation of sub-state foreign 
policy actors is the most important anticipated outcome of state weakness. The 
multiplying of foreign policy actors opens up the space for foreign powers to 
become deeply involved in the domestic politics of the state, and enables foreign 
powers to play domestic actors against each other in order to best secure their own 
goals. A divided foreign policy landscape makes it much more difficult for the state 
to achieve its own foreign policy goals abroad, partly because it renders them 
vulnerable to foreign influence domestically and partly because the proliferation of 
actors reduces the functional capacity of the state by raising the political costs of 
pursuing controversial policies. The empowering of sub-state actors in foreign 
policy also increases the threat perceptions of the central government and makes it 
more likely that regime security becomes a driving factor in foreign policy. I would 
suggest that the poor functional capacity of the state and its limited ability to execute 
foreign policy is the second most important hypothesis. The state’s inability to 
achieve its own goals reduces it legitimacy, and increases its vulnerability to sub-
state competitors. The pursuit of regime security rather than national security 
interests I believe is the least consequential of the three hypotheses, partly because it 
is possible that there is a very high interrelation between the national interest and the 
regime interest. It is rarely in the interests of the regime to conduct a policy that is 
thoroughly at odds with the national interest. For instance a regime is unlikely to 
allow a foreign power to annex part of its territory because the public backlash 
against the regime is likely to pose an even greater threat to regime security. In 
addition, the pursuit of regime security is clearly a consideration in the foreign 
policy making calculations of all states, not just weak ones, and perhaps more than 
with the other two hypotheses the difference here between a strong and a weak state 
is matter of degree. I do think, however, that the focus on regime security is an 
important dynamic to trace in the weak state context, but perhaps its outcomes will 
be more nuanced than with the other two hypotheses.  
This study focuses on several distinct phases in Iraqi political history since 
2003. In each period I trace the level of state weakness, discussing the relative 
functional effectiveness of the state and the discursive power of the narratives being 
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propagated by the state using the extensive evidence I have collected through my 
fieldwork. I then scrutinize in detail the most significant foreign policy activities 
occurring at that time, again using the original material that I have compiled, and I 
use my three hypotheses to guide the questions I ask and the themes I look for in my 
data. I then conclude my analysis of each period by assessing the utility and 
limitations of the hypotheses and the extent of their ability to make sense of the 
period in question. A more detailed discussion of the methodology that underpins 
this process of data analysis follows in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH 
METHODS 
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of interpretive research methodologies, and 
explains the particularities of the constructivist approach. Thereafter I assess the 
specific research methods that have been deployed in gathering, sorting, and 
analysing the evidence that forms the bedrock of this thesis with reference to the 
constructivist framework. 
Methodology 
The nature of this study lends itself to the adoption of an interpretive methodology. 
It is fundamentally concerned with how citizens confer legitimacy on, and withdraw 
it from, a range of actors and how this influences a state’s interactions with foreign 
powers. The concepts with which I am dealing are invested with meaning through 
social construction, and the best way to meaningfully understand them is by 
adopting a sensitive and person-oriented approach such as that offered by 
interpretive methodology. This project also seeks to understand in detail the 
dynamics present in one particular case study, rather than attempting to produce 
findings that are generalisable but that do not satisfactorily explain any particular 
case. Interpretivists tend to believe that meaning cannot be found without a deep 
understanding of context, and that achieving a rich understanding of a research 
subject is preferable to reaching shallow but ostensibly generalisable results. 
Adopting an interpretive perspective requires the recognition that reality is 
socially constructed and that investigating how individuals interpret the world is a 
basic part of coming to understand social phenomena.
1
 Indeed, the basic goal of 
interpretive research is to ‘understand the fundamental, emergent nature of the social 
world at the subjective, experiential level.’2 Another important element of the 
interpretive approach is its recognition that it is not possible to identify clear causal 
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linkages in social research. In the previous chapter I discussed the mutual 
constructedness of state weakness, deficient legitimacy, and the hypothetical 
influences on foreign policy production. For interpretivists, such entanglement is 
part of the natural character of the social world, and the best we can hope to achieve 
in research is the identification of broad patterns and suggested directions in the 
travel of influence from one phenomenon to the next. 
Grappling with social research requires that the researcher recognise her 
fundamental subjectivity. Because all sensory perception is filtered through the 
human mind, which is steeped in its own social context, there is no way of 
differentiating in absolute terms between the subjective and the objective.
3
 The 
researcher can never totally transcend her socialisation, and cannot isolate her 
research design, data collection, and analytical processes from elements of 
subjectivity.
4
 It is only by recognising the inevitability of subjectivity, and by 
engaging in a conscious process of reflexivity that the researcher can understand 
how it has inevitably influenced the outcomes of her research. The interpretive 
acknowledgment of the subjectivity of research encourages the conducting of 
qualitatively driven investigations that are deeply grounded in the specificity of a 
particular context. Indeed, interpretivism would contend that such research practice 
offers the best route to obtaining an insight into the uniqueness and individuality that 
constitute the social situation at hand.  
Interpretivism is a very broad, over-arching methodological approach. This 
study more specifically adopts a constructivist standpoint, which is within the family 
of interpretivism but differs from other interpretive approaches such as 
constructionism. Methodological constructivism is distinct from constructivism as a 
theoretical school within international relations, therefore the differences that I 
described between my work and constructivist international relations theory do not 
prevent me from adopting a constructivist methodology. Constructivism focuses on 
the constructedness of experience and the schemas through which experience is 
assigned meaning.
5
 It tends to encourage the recognition of multiple narratives, and 
an acceptance of contextual relativity. And it promotes data collection processes that 
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focus on experiencing and directly questioning the subject, rather than relying on the 
more removed method of discourse analysis.  
The adoption of a constructivist methodology dictates that research must be 
conducted and results analysed in a way that is consistent with constructivist 
principles. One of the key approaches that constructivist researchers adopt is the 
empathic method. Max Weber writes that ‘empathic or appreciative accuracy is 
attained when, through sympathetic participation, we can adequately grasp the 
emotional context in which the action took place.’6 A similar argument was 
advanced by William Dilthey, who believed that profound understanding was 
attained by imagining oneself in the ‘social location’ of the subject.7 This method is 
so deeply subjective, however, that the evidence it produces must be cross-checked 
against that obtained using alternative methodological tools.  
The hermeneutic strategy is another important tool used in constructivist 
analyses. Hermeneutics, which is the practice of iteratively interpreting parts of the 
data in relation to the data as whole, and the whole in relation to its parts, can be 
applied to social analysis. The researcher would thereby interpret social action with 
repeated reference to the social context, whilst simultaneously analysing the social 
context in terms of individual social acts. Moreover, whilst engaging in this activity 
the researcher ought to assess her own relation to the social world that she is 
analysing (the double hermeneutic).
8
 
The constructivist researcher also recognises that there is no distance 
between herself and the research. Particularly in situations in which there is a direct 
interaction between the researcher and the subject, the researcher must appreciate 
that the outcome of the interaction is constructed by the subjectivities and schemas 
brought by both the researcher and the participant. Constructivist research practice is 
built on the notion that ‘research with humans is inherently dialectical,’9 and that 
meaning is found through the reflexive engagement with this imperfect process of 
human interaction. Although in the course of this thesis I often refer to corporate 
subjects, such as the Kurdistan Regional Government, rather than to individuals, I 
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do so as a shorthand whilst nevertheless recognising the complexity of individual 
relationships that make up these groups. The interview subjects I chose to interact 
with where selected on the basis of their roles within these corporate agents, and part 
of the interview findings reflect their socialisation as participants within these 
institutions and as such offer insights into the narratives, structures and priorities of 
these institutions.      
Research Methods 
Constructivism asserts that social meaning can best be garnered through the use of 
human led and human focused research methods. Qualitative methods enable the 
researcher to be present in instances where relevant meaning is being produced, and 
offers the researcher the opportunity to appreciate the nuances and multiplicity of 
perspectives held by respondents. This study is primarily based on a series of in-
depth, semi-structured interviews because these encounters offered me the 
opportunity to hear the nuances in the perspectives of respondents and gave me 
access to a quality and range of data that I would not have been able to obtain using 
any alternative method. In particular, this study is based on over 70 such interviews 
with elite figures who have directly experienced the foreign policy dynamics that are 
being analysed in this study. 
The interview process begins with sampling, or deciding who to interview. 
The constructivist approach requires that sampling be done purposively, so as to 
increase the range of divergent data and to thereby increase the researcher’s access 
to multiple perspectives. The researcher can achieve this by mapping out the figures 
who are important to interview, and by ensuring that a range of different ethnic, 
tribal, religious or political perspectives will be reflected by the chosen respondents. 
It is also important that the researcher attempts to interview widely, so as to capture 
variation both within and between identity groups. Securing interviews can be 
challenging, but a successful tactic often involves starting with more junior figures 
within the establishments you are interested in and then eliciting contact with their 
seniors. This has the benefit of achieving the constructivist requirement of obtaining 
a wide range of perspectives, in addition to offering a path to interviewing more 
senior figures. For instance, I interviewed a staffer in Washington DC who offered a 
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unique and insightful perspective to this study and who was also able to connect me 
to the Head of the Kurdistan Region’s Department of Foreign Affairs.  
My sampling for this study was extremely successful, and I was able to 
access many of the key figures who have been at the heart of Iraqi foreign policy 
production since 2003. Amongst many others, I interviewed the Iraqi Foreign 
Minister, Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, and close advisors to Prime Minister 
Ja’fari and Prime Minister Maliki. I interviewed numerous Foreign Ministry 
officials and ambassadors, senior political party figures from across the political 
spectrum and members of the parliamentary foreign relations committee. It was also 
very interesting to interview senior British and American diplomats who had worked 
with Iraqi politicians and civil servants, and who held very different narratives about 
Iraq’s political development over the relevant time period. 
When it comes to interview design, the constructivist approach encourages a 
negotiation of the content of the discussion between the researcher and the interview 
subject. The subject is considered to own their perspective, their time and to have 
rights over the interview. I therefore chose to use semi-structured interviews so as to 
allow myself to gently guide the discussion whilst allowing plenty of room for the 
respondent to reframe the terms of the dialogue according to their perspective. The 
constructivist tradition also points to the value of all the incidental information that 
emerges from an interview; the tangents, the jokes, the small talk about family and 
travelling are all an important source of meaning and in my interviews I both 
allowed the space for this kind of material and I included it in my analysis. 
The questions I did bring to each interview differed considerably according 
to the particular knowledge, expertise and experience of the respondent. Although 
some scholars recommend consistency of questions for the purpose of the easy 
codification of results,
10
 the constructivist perspective sees interviews as reflecting 
the unique and individual perspectives of the subjects and questions their 
comparability. Constructivists also advocate the use of ‘emergent design’ whereby 
part of the ‘research process emerges from the experience rather than being totally 
developed beforehand,’ as this responsiveness allows for more authentic findings to 
emerge.
11
 Adopting this approach meant that my interview style and the types of 
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questions that I asked evolved throughout the interview process, as I learnt how to 
garner the best data from different types of interview settings. Each interview is 
analysed and integrated into this study in its own right, based on the particular 
circumstances in which the interview was conducted and taking into account the 
precise questions asked to that respondent. 
In my interview guides I avoid excessively leading the subject, and I tried to 
use open-ended questions so as to allow the respondent to deploy his or her own 
frame of reference. I have found, however, that the richness of data achieved from 
an interview is much more a reflection of the rapport the researcher builds with the 
interview subject rather than a reflection of the specific phrasing of questions. 
Creating a friendly, relaxed and non-confrontational atmosphere and being a 
thoughtful and empathic listener is the best way that a researcher can come to 
understand the perspective of the interview subject. Such an approach is also 
consistent with constructivist principles which emphasise the power that the 
interview subject should have over the interview and their right to a positive 
experience. 
Data Collection 
Recording an interview on a digital recording device is the best method of capturing 
the data produced in an interview, but it can also change the atmosphere of the 
interview and can reduce the quality of the discussion. I made an assessment on a 
case by case basis regarding whether or not the value of having a recording 
supersedes the value of having written notes of a less inhibited conversation. This 
assessment was made on the basis of a variety of information, including how willing 
the interview subject was to agree to the interview, how sensitive they were to 
anonymity, and how likely they were to have access to privileged information. For 
example when I met with US officials who were extremely worried about being 
identifiable I did not attempt to record the encounter. For Iraqi officials who easily 
agreed to an interview I would usually ask to record at the start of the interview. For 
Iraqi officials who had been reluctant to meet, or with whom there was an uneasy 
rapport upon meeting I usually held off asking permission to record. In some 
instances where the subject subsequently relaxed into the interview, I then would 
say something along the lines of ‘this is all so interesting, do you mind if I record 
this?’ and I was usually was given a positive answer. 
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The purpose of the qualitative interview is not simply to uncover facts, but 
also to discover what meanings are invested in those facts by the interview subjects. 
It is therefore critical to note down observations beyond the simple words that are 
being spoken; where is the interview taking place and why are you meeting there, 
what is the respondent like, how did they greet you, how have they responded to the 
situation, what mood are they in, how have they reacted to you and to what you have 
told them about yourself, what is the atmosphere like, how does the respondent react 
to particular questions – do any make them laugh or grimace, do they provoke anger, 
and do they talk louder and faster at particular points? This information gives 
context to and confers wider meaning upon the words that are actually spoken in an 
interview setting. With this in mind, writing up the interview immediately after it is 
completed vastly enhances the quality of the record produced. I start with a simple 
description of the context of the interview, where it took place, what time, how it 
came about and so on. Next I write up a description of my personal impressions of 
the interview and of the respondent, and think about how my experience may have 
affected my judgment of the interview.
12
 Only then do I write up a full transcript of 
the interview. 
A Two-Way Street: Some Ethical Considerations 
The rights of the interview subject are central to constructivist perspectives on 
research ethics. It is important for the researcher to recognise the humanity of the 
subject involved, and to appreciate what the interview subject may seek from the 
interview encounter. Usually the interview subject wants little more than to have 
their perspective attentively and respectfully listened to. Constructivism dismisses 
the notion that the interviewer should be an objective and detached observer of the 
interview subject.
13
 From a constructivist perspective such detachment is not 
possible, and any attempt at achieving it renders the interview an alienating and 
dehumanising experience for the interview subject. Rather the interviewer should 
deeply engage with, and seek to appreciate the perspective of the interview subject 
and should react with empathy and understanding where appropriate. The richest 
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interviews are deeply engaging conversations, lightly steered by the researcher and 
otherwise guided by the thought processes and knowledge of the respondent. 
Constructivist interviews are a two way process, and interview subjects can 
be empowered and put at ease if the interviewer is prepared to also share 
information about herself. This works best if the information shared is not directly 
relevant to the subject of the interview, so as to avoid excessively guiding the 
responses of the interview subject. For example, I will often discuss my experiences 
of learning Arabic, or discuss university life in the UK in order to put the respondent 
at ease and to prevent the interview process from feeling exploitative or exclusively 
one-way.  
Eliciting the informed consent of the interview subject is a crucial prelude to 
every interview, especially from a constructivist perspective. With each respondent I 
offer a clear summary of my research, and ask for their consent, and I ask if they 
would prefer their interview to be anonymous. I do not automatically assume 
anonymity is required because a number of my interview subjects are public figures 
who engage in the interview because they wish to publicly divulge their views on 
Iraqi politics. I therefore leave the matter to the discretion of the respondents, and 
make a clear note of their choice both during and after the interview. All of my 
interview transcripts are kept in password protected documents that only I have 
access to. I transported the data between sensitive locations by uploading them to the 
university servers, where they were protected behind an encrypted firewall, and then 
wiping them from my laptop. Twelve months after the submission of my PhD this 
information will be destroyed to protect the privacy of the respondents. I have not 
been given, in the course of my interviews, any information that is particularly 
sensitive, controversial or dangerous – so I do not need to put into place any special 
procedures to manage that information beyond those which I have described.  
Analysing Semi-Structured Interviews 
Constructivist analysis occurs iteratively: as data is collected the researcher reflects 
on it and allows the lessons that emerge from it to guide and reform the continued 
process of research. When the data collection phase is over, however, a more formal 
process of data analysis must begin. Constructivist data analysis methods propose 
that the researcher should allow the data to authentically suggest its own 
conclusions. This is done through a process of iterative categorisation. The 
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researcher reads and re-reads the research material noting down themes that emerge 
from the material. As themes multiply, the researcher begins to group them into sets 
of over-arching themes. Once a set and sub-set of themes are identified, the 
researcher codes every piece of data, assigning it to either one or several thematic 
groups. Every thought, sentiment, sentence, or even expression emergent from an 
interview can be assessed as an individual piece of data and can be assigned a 
theme.  
 My commitment to allowing the data to speak for itself led me to use the 
sophisticated qualitative research analysis software NVIVO. Confronted with a vast 
amount of data collected in the course of dozens of interviews, I was afraid of 
inadvertently imposing pre-conceived patterns or sets of conclusions onto the data in 
the process of trying to make sense of it. NVIVO allowed me to avoid this trap by 
giving me a process by which I could categorise the layers of data before me. I 
began by reading through all of my transcripts and tagging every sentence by 
analytical theme and by content. By the end of this process I had uncovered the wide 
range of themes, foreign policies, time periods and issues that had been embedded in 
this data, but had also been able to ascertain what themes most consistently came up 
and which issues were most repeatedly talked about. This thesis is divided up 
according to those themes and issues identified by the data as being most important. 
For example, when talking about Iraqi foreign policy in 2005 people most 
consistently talked about the role of Iran’s Quds Force in the Iraqi civil war and how 
it related to the weakness of the Ja’fari government, so that became the focal point 
for Chapter 4. NVIVO also offered my data versatility. Because I was able to code 
every sentence with multiple codes, and I was able to search and cross-reference my 
data by code, I have been able to thoroughly integrate my data into the bedrock of 
this thesis – as I hope will become apparent to the reader throughout. I can search 
NVIVO, for example, for every instance in my data in which a Sunni political figure 
referred to Iraq’s official policy towards Syria. This ability to cross-reference data 
from different sources has enabled me to gather together data from disparate 
interviews and, in comparing these pieces of data, has enabled me to uncover new 
patterns and insights. 
This process of inductive data analysis allowed me to choose which foreign 
policy issues to deal with in this thesis. The most salient foreign relationships and 
foreign policy moments clearly emerged from the data and allowed me to direct my 
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enquiry such that it would resonate with the original interview subjects from whom 
my data has come. I used the codified data, along with some secondary literature, to 
build narratives of the foreign policy case studies that relate to each particular period 
of Iraqi political history since 2003. Once these narratives were constructed out of 
the data, I then compared the narrative to the working hypotheses that I developed in 
the conceptual chapter of this thesis and reflected on the extent to which these 
hypotheses offer explanatory value and how they might be modified to better reflect 
the meaning offered by the data. 
Of course there is no single, straightforward narrative that emerges from the 
data, and assessments have to be made about which interpretations to privilege. As a 
constructivist I recognise that we each encounter the world steeped in our own 
subjectivity, and that perspectives are shaped by a variety of factors that deserve to 
be understood rather than dismissed. Whilst recognising the validity of this 
difference, however, at many points I need to make an assessment for the sake of 
providing a coherent narrative about which perspectives most closely represent the 
turn of events. At such moments I turn to triangulation, the method by which 
uncertain facts are verified with reference to three separate sources, in order to 
determine which narrative to privilege. The process of triangulation enables me to 
avoid falling into the trap of privileging accounts given by people whom I 
particularly identified with or liked; as Jeffrey Berry warns, it is easy to give 
disproportionate credence to the accounts of respondents who were likable, who 
shared the same political position as the researcher, who seemed to offer a lot of 
detail in their accounts and who appeared to go out of their way ‘not to give you the 
party-line.’14 I also keep note of a range of information about an interview subject, 
such as their political, religious, geographic or class-based affiliations, that may 
have influenced their particular perspective, and try to take those into account 
without distorting or belittling their point of view. 
Lastly, I am constantly aware of my own subjectivity and try to control for 
the biases that inevitably emerge from being situated in a particular social and 
cultural context. As Brian Fay writes, ‘Don’t hide behind an illusory facade of 
neutrality to convince yourself or others that you are objective.’15 I have had to 
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guard, for instance, against privileging the data generated by respondents who 
happen to speak good English, who have strong links with the UK and who are very 
easy to establish a rapport with. But by being reflexive and aware of these 
influences, I go some way to reducing their impact on my data analysis process.  
Conclusion 
This study takes as its starting position the notion that human interpretation is at the 
heart of knowledge about social realities, and that it is only by bringing humanity to 
the research process that we can begin to understand the truths that we seek. The 
constructivist methodology grounds this study in an appreciation of the multiplicity 
of narratives, the importance of social construction and the inevitability of 
subjectivity. The research methods based on this approach include sensitive, 
responsive and ethical qualitative interviews which produce data that the researcher 
allows to speak for itself. Categories iteratively emerge from the data, and it is only 
then that the tentative working hypotheses that guide this study enter into dialogue 
with the data, and conclusions about their utility are reached.  
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CHAPTER THREE: IRAQ OCCUPIED 
 
Introduction 
This chapter defines Iraq as effectively occupied during 2003 and 2004, when 
virtually all political and military power lay in the hands of the American led 
administration. In the context of this occupation, this chapter explores Iraq’s 
relationships with neighbouring countries, Iran and Syria, and with the wider Arab 
world and argues that the antipathy towards Iraq was a way in which disgruntled 
regional countries could punish the US. The fact of the invasion and the manner in 
which it was conducted was widely seen as threatening in the region, and by 
refusing to accept the new status quo in Iraq regional countries registered their 
disapproval and sought to prevent further US adventurism in the region. This 
dynamic leads me to conclude that the weak state framework is not ideal for 
assessing the foreign policies of an occupied state, because of the level of influence 
that the occupying country has over these relations and because of the need to take 
into account internal dynamics in the occupying country. This chapter concludes by 
looking at the activities of Iraq’s non-elected transitional government and argues 
that, although this government was active in reaching out to establish relationships 
with neighbouring countries, their efforts were undercut by continued US 
dominance in Iraq.   
 Part of the social contract tradition asserts that normative legitimacy must be 
grounded in states having acquired power ‘in conformity with either custom or 
law,’1 and the literature on state legitimacy in Africa concurs that a state is only 
normatively legitimate when ‘its structures evolved endogenously to its own society 
and there is some level of historical continuity to its institutions.’2 The sudden 
invasion of Iraq by coalition forces, the total demolition of Iraqi state structures, and 
the establishment of an entirely foreign-run, and barely Arabic-speaking 
administration in Baghdad offered Iraqis little by way of ‘continuity’ with existing 
modes of governance. The fact of the invasion was regarded with deep suspicion by 
many Iraqis who had little reason to trust the Americans after a decade of US-led 
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sanctions had devastated the Iraqi economy and public infrastructure. Many 
suspected that the Americans were in Iraq in pursuit of their own economic or 
political interests, and both Sunnis and Shi’ites tended to view the coalition forces 
‘as occupiers, although Shi’ites also saw the intervention as an opportunity to seize 
power in Baghdad.’3 
The manner in which the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was 
established, and its character as a foreign administration, prevented it from 
establishing normative legitimacy amongst the Iraqi population. The CPA’s inability 
to operate effectively also meant that it failed to establish the functional legitimacy 
that it could have achieved had it fulfilled the needs and expectations of the Iraqi 
public. Iraqis had extremely high expectations of what the CPA would be able to 
achieve in its first few months, but, as extensive accounts demonstrate,
4
 the CPA 
was a model of bureaucratic incompetence and few improvements were seen in 
public goods provisions during its tenure. A May 2004 poll found just 24% of Iraqis 
had confidence in US/UK occupation forces, and over half said that life was better 
under Saddam.
5
 
Although it is a loaded term, it is useful to characterise Iraq as effectively 
occupied in this period because it was governed and administered almost exclusively 
by foreign forces.
6
 Iraq temporarily became an extension of the US,
7
 and non-Iraq 
focused US foreign policy would begin to have a direct impact on Iraqi domestic 
life. In something of an inversion of the working hypothesis that framed this thesis 
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(that state weakness undermines foreign policy), US foreign policy undermined the 
normative and functional legitimacy of the Iraqi state. Threats issued by the US to 
Iraq’s neighbours led regional states to support growing internal violence in Iraq, 
which in turn further undermined the normative and functional legitimacy of the 
CPA and subsequent Iraqi governments. The first part of this chapter, therefore, 
focuses on the impact that US threats towards Iran, Syria and Hezbollah had on 
these states’ financing, equipping, and supporting of the early violent ‘resistance’ 
movement in Iraq. It goes on to discuss how the bullish approach of America’s 
neoconservative government alienated governments in the wider Arab world, 
leading to a normative environment that strongly rejected the invasion and supported 
the ‘resistance.’ 
The second part of this chapter will examine foreign policy making 
following the disbandment of the CPA and the appointment of an Iraqi caretaker 
government led by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. Though the formal governing 
institutions of the foreign powers had been dismantled, the Iraqi government could 
not act independently, and its foreign policy on controversial issues was heavily 
constrained by the continued presence of foreign forces. A top-level comparison  
could be ventured here with the recently decolonised states in 1960s Africa, where 
‘African elites had only tenuous control over the postcolonial states, [whilst] 
external actors, particularly the former colonial powers, retained considerable 
influence over most facets of African life.’8 Though Iraqis had been given formal 
control of state institutions, they had no armed forces at their disposal, and so were 
unable to perform the most fundamental function of the state, which is to provide 
security to its citizens. For this they were wholly dependent on foreign forces, in 
addition to being dependent on them for the resources and expertise that they needed 
to re-establish the ministries and institutions that had been devastated by sanctions 
and subsequent war. The caretaker government, therefore, had little normative or 
functional legitimacy and was extremely limited in its ability to project foreign 
policy. 
Provoking Regional Enmity towards the New Iraq 
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The proposed invasion of Iraq was not popular with the region’s elites. It was the 
American rhetoric surrounding the build-up to war, however, that led regional 
powers to perceive the invasion as a potential threat to their own security. The war 
in Iraq was characterised as part of the ill-defined and ever-expanding ‘war on 
terror,’ and was cast as part of a grand scheme to re-make the Middle East. 9 The 
pronouncements of President George W. Bush and his neoconservative coterie were 
unpleasant listening for many of the autocratic powers in the Middle East, but for 
America’s declared enemies, Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah, it constituted a credible and 
imminent threat to their national security. 
This threat was heightened by the enshrining of the principle of pre-emptive 
war in US foreign policy. The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, published in June 2002, stated: ‘Given the goals of rogue states and 
terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we 
have in the past.’10 The US had already declared Syria and Iran to be rogue states11 
and Hezbollah to be a terrorist organisation,
12
 and was now publicly stating that such 
actors would be considered fair game for a pre-emptive strike. 
 For Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, therefore, the invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq marked a re-orientation of American national security goals and tactics in a way 
that directly threatened their survival.
13
 These actors would go on to be at the root of 
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some of the earliest security challenges faced by the post-Saddam Iraqi state, 
challenges which would seriously damage the domestic legitimacy of the CPA and 
subsequent Iraqi governments. For Syria, Iran and Hezbollah, deterring future 
American adventures in the region by making the occupation of Iraq as difficult, 
demoralizing and costly as possible became an essential part of ensuring their own 
national security. 
Syria 
Syria was shaken by the US invasion of Iraq, and for the next few years geared its 
foreign policy towards undermining the US position in Iraq and forestalling the 
possibility of the US invading Syria. Fearful of the consequences of openly defying 
US authority in Iraq, Syria pursued a twin track approach, periodically co-operating 
with the Americans to raid terrorist cells in Syria, yet subsequently easing 
restrictions on the movement of such fighters.
14
 But there was little doubt that 
Syria’s policy was to bring about the failure of the US project in Iraq. On 31st March 
2003 Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al-Sharra stated that, ‘Syria’s interest is to see 
the invaders defeated in Iraq,’ and went on to commend Iraqis for their ‘heroic 
resistance to the US-British occupation of their country.’15 In an interview with the 
Lebanese news website al-Safir, President Bashar al-Assad went further and 
insinuated that the Syrians were preparing to respond to any US aggression towards 
Syria. President Assad answered the question: ‘Does Syria feel threatened by this 
war [in Iraq]?’ by saying; ‘as long as there is aggression against an Arab country and 
as long as there is war on our border, the danger exists…But worry does not mean 
fear, it means preparing for the confrontation.’16  
For the Syrian government the primary weapon in ‘preparing for 
confrontation’ was ensuring that the US became so mired in the conflict in Iraq that 
it would not be able to countenance further offensive action against neighbouring 
states. To this end the Syrian government allowed the operation of extensive militant 
jihadist networks across the Syrian-Iraqi border and enabled the smuggling of 
military equipment across the border. A Department of Defense Report to Congress 
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summarised the Syrian position thus: ‘Syria continues to provide safe haven, border 
transit, and limited logistical support to some Iraqi insurgents…Syria remains the 
primary foreign fighter gateway into Iraq.’17 The report went on to acknowledge that 
the Syrian government supported such groups because they ‘share Syria’s desire to 
undermine coalition efforts in Iraq.’18 Syria wasted no time in implementing this 
policy, beginning before the war started, and quickly escalating in the early days of 
the conflict. In testimony before the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and 
Central Asia, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security 
John Bolton said that ‘Syria allowed military equipment to flow into Iraq on the eve 
of and during the war. Syria permitted volunteers to pass into Iraq to attack and kill 
our service members during the war and is still doing so.’19 Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld further declared that ‘busloads’ of Syrian fighters had crossed into 
Iraq with ‘hundreds of thousands of dollars,’ offering rewards for the killing of 
American soldiers.
20
 It was even alleged that President Assad tried to incite a full-
scale rebellion in Iraq, passing a secret message to Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Husyani al-Sistani asking him to ‘issue a fatwa calling for a jihad against the 
Coalition.’21 Caution must be exercised when it comes to some of these claims. It 
was, after all, in the interests of the Coalition to depict the Iraqi insurgency as a 
problem of foreign imposed terror, rather than as an indigenous rejection of the US 
occupation. It is also difficult to ascertain the extent to which the Syrian government 
was directly involved in the activities of militants crossing its border; for example, 
allegations that its secret service passed equipment directly to anti-coalition fighters 
cannot be conclusively substantiated,
22
 but what is clear is that at the very least the 
Syrian government allowed such groups to operate in its territory and over the 
border.
23
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The US was furious about allegations of Syrian complicity in the transfer of 
fighters and military equipment into Iraq, but its harsh response served only to 
harden the Syrian position. On 29
th
 March 2003, only 9 days after the start of the US 
invasion, Secretary Rumsfeld lashed out at the Syrians for shipping military supplies 
into Iraq and warned that the US considered such activity to constitute ‘hostile acts’ 
and that it would ‘hold the Syrian government responsible.’24 The charges were 
hotly denied by the Syrians as ‘unfounded’ and ‘irresponsible.’25 Almost 
immediately after securing military victory in Iraq, the US administration moved to 
penalise Syria by cutting off an oil pipeline from Iraq to Syria,
26
 reducing Syria’s oil 
exports by 20-30%
27
 and depriving the country of crucial revenue. The US Congress 
turned its fury at Syrian defiance into law, introducing the Syria Accountability and 
Lebanese Restoration Bill on 12
th
 April 2003. The Act, which was signed into law in 
December 2003, lambasted Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism, occupier of 
Lebanese land, and supporter of aggression against Israel. Echoing the claims that 
led the US to war against Iraq, the Act further warned that the Syrian government 
was ‘pursuing the development and production of biological and chemical weapons 
and has a nuclear research and development program.’28 The Act declared that it was 
the policy of the US to prevent Syria’s acquisition of such weapons, and promised to 
hold it accountable for any harm that should come to coalition troops as a 
consequence of Syrian facilitation.
29
 On the basis of this law, President Bush 
enacted new sanctions against Syria in May 2004, banning the export of US 
products apart from medicine and food to Syria, cutting ties with the Syrian 
Commercial Bank, and freezing the assets of those suspected of having links with 
terrorists.
30
  
The escalating rhetoric from the US in the early days of the invasion served 
only to substantiate President Assad’s fears that American success in Iraq would be 
fatal for Syria, and the Syrian government began to lobby for an early American 
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withdrawal and UN takeover of the Iraqi transitional process. In September 2003 
Syria declared that it would even be willing to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq if 
the UN took control of the situation and US forces were given a timetable for 
withdrawal.
31
 As fears grew of an intensification of the animosity between Syria and 
the US, the UN and the UK began to weigh in to try to dampen the rhetoric. British 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw insisted that Syria was not being considered for pre-
emptive military action and that ‘there is no plan for Syria to be on the list.’32 Kofi 
Annan, Secretary General of the UN, meanwhile chastised the US for its careering 
war of words, saying that he was ‘concerned that recent statements directed at Syria 
should not contribute to a wider destabilisation in a region already heavily affected 
by the war in Iraq.’33 
Iran 
The US relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran has long been mediated 
through a ‘wall of mistrust.’34 The US has had no formal diplomatic relations with 
Iran since they were severed in the aftermath of the hostage crisis in 1980,
35
 
sanctions on US-Iranian activity have been in place since 1979 (although they have 
been recently eased due to the early successes of the P5+1 Joint Plan of Action with 
Iran)
36
 and Iran is often considered one of the countries that poses the greatest threat 
to American national security. Despite the election of reformist Mohammad 
Khatami to the Iranian Presidency in 1997, overtures made by both the Iranians and 
the Americans failed to overcome the deep-rooted bias against rapprochement in 
both political systems and little progress was made in transforming the 
relationship.
37
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Everything changed after the attacks on September 11
th 
2001. The Iranians, 
who had been supporting anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan for much of the 
previous decade, were keen to remove the Taliban and to restart a dialogue with the 
US. Iran offered the Americans extraordinary strategic value in Afghanistan, 
supplying them with intelligence, connecting them with local partners, and 
brokering a new political settlement in the country.
38
 US-Iranian collaboration in 
Afghanistan, however, caused more than a little consternation on the part of the 
Israeli government and neo-conservative elements of the US administration. Furious 
lobbying ensued not only to prevent further Iranian-US dialogue but also to label 
Iran as a state sponsor of terror and as such a legitimate target in the ongoing ‘war 
on terror.’39 In his State of the Union address in January 2002, President Bush 
signalled the shift of his administration away from tacit co-operation with Iran 
towards outright hostility. The speech declared that the US knew Iran’s ‘true nature’ 
as an unelected and repressive regime, aggressive pursuer of weapons of mass 
destruction and exporter of terror, and declared its intention to prevent Iran and the 
other members of the ‘axis of evil’ from threatening the US and its allies.40 
The Iranians were shocked by this turnaround, and President Khatami’s 
conciliatory approach was widely discredited – yielding political ground to hard-
liners who would eventually win Iran’s next parliamentary election. As momentum 
towards the invasion of Iraq gathered, neoconservative influencers and the Israeli 
government urged the Bush administration to make Iran its next target. In an 
interview with The Times newspaper in November 2002, Israeli Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon said that Iran, as the ‘centre of world terror,’ should be targeted ‘the 
day after’ the culmination of the war in Iraq.41 The bombastic rhetoric around the 
invasion of Iraq convinced the Iranians that they were facing a real risk of invasion, 
and as coalition forces raced to victory in just three weeks the Iranians scrambled to 
save themselves. In May 2003 the Iranians offered to give up all strategic assets – 
Hezbollah, Hamas, its nuclear programme, its opposition to the Arab League Peace 
                                                          
38
Barnett R.  Rubin, 'The U.S. and Iran in Afghanistan: Policy Gone Awry', The Audit of 
Conventional Wisdom,  (2008). Milani, 'Iran's Strategic Objectives in Post-Saddam Iraq', 7. Barton 
Gellman and Dafna Linzer, 'Afghanistan, Iraq: Two Wars Collide', The Washington Post, 22nd 
October 2004. James Dobbins, 'The Wasington Post', Time to Deal With Iran, 6th May 2004. 
39
Shireen T. Hunter, Iran's Foreign Policy: Resisting the New International Order (Santa Barbara, 
California: Praeger, 2010) 58-59.  Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 231-32. 
40
 Bush, 'State of the Union Address'. 
41
 Stephen Farrell, Danielle Haas, and Robert Thomson, 'Target Iran the Day Iraq War Ends, 
Demands Israel', The Times, 5th November 2002. 
71 
 
Plan – in return for an end to US hostile action towards Iran.42 It was an 
unprecedented peace deal, but the Americans, intoxicated with their apparent 
success in Iraq, rebuffed the advance.
43
  
The US had well and truly set the stage for the Iranian belligerence that was 
to cripple Iraq in the years ahead. Iran had been convinced that it was to be 
imminently targeted in a military operation aimed at regime change and 
simultaneously told that no peace offer – no matter how comprehensive – could halt 
a US offensive. The Iranians realised that undermining the US inside Iraq was the 
best and perhaps only option for ensuring its own national security. Iran would go 
on to play a crucial role in fuelling the Iraqi civil war between 2005 and 2007, and 
this will be dealt with in chapter five, but in 2003 the Iranians were more cautious.
44
 
Fearful of US retaliation, Iran started by strengthening its already impressive array 
of allies, both within and outside of Iraq’s formal political and religious structures, 
and by laying the groundwork for violent action against the US.
45
 Gradually as the 
Iranians gained confidence, they began funnelling significant financial aid and 
military equipment to Iraqi insurgents. Evidence emerged that the deadly improvised 
explosive devices, which were fast becoming a hallmark of the anti-US 
insurgency,
46
 were manufactured in Iran, and as anti-coalition violence increased, 
evidence of Iranian sponsorship snowballed. As for co-operating with the US in 
Iraq, as it had in Afghanistan, it seemed Iran had no intention of ‘making the same 
mistake twice.’47 
Hezbollah 
Hezbollah has long had pariah status in the US, and in the aftermath of 9/11 a 
cacophony of voices called for its destruction. Associated with the 1983 bombing of 
a US marine corps barracks in Lebanon that killed 241 Americans and precipitated 
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the withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon, Hezbollah’s meteoric rise as principal 
resister to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon was bitterly watched by the US. On 20
th
 
September 2011, 41 leading conservatives published an open letter to President 
George W. Bush labelling Hezbollah ‘one of the leading terrorist organisations in 
the world’ and stating that ‘any war against terrorism must target Hezbollah,’48 
whilst Secretary of State Colin Powell declared Hezbollah ‘a threat to the region.’49 
By November 2001 Hezbollah had been put on the list of terrorist organisations 
subject to a stringent executive order that authorised the US to freeze, block and 
disrupt their financial assets and transactions.
50
 
Much of the anger directed at Syria and Iran in the months after 9/11 focused 
on the financial, military and logistical support they offered Hezbollah. Hezbollah 
was often depicted as little more than a proxy, and its actions were read as a 
barometer of the attitudes of their two powerful backers.
51
 Most of the pressure that 
Hezbollah faced, therefore, was indirect and took the form of US demands on Syria, 
Iran and the Lebanese government to desist supporting them and to deny them 
sanctuary.
52
 In 2002, for example, US officials declared that, after al-Qaeda, 
Hezbollah was next on its list and demanded that the Lebanese government hand 
over three Hezbollah members accused of terrorist acts against the US.
53
  
For Hezbollah the invasion of Iraq was both an affront to its anti-Western 
liberationist ideology
54
 and represented an existential threat to the militant group. If 
the US found easy success in Iraq there was a very real risk that Hezbollah would 
either be directly targeted, or that its sources of financial, military, and political 
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support in Syria and Iran would be cut off. As mentioned above, Iran was so nervous 
about being subjected to an attack after the fall of Baghdad that it even offered the 
US a peace deal that included abandoning its support for Hezbollah.
55
 Thus 
Hezbollah became yet another regional actor invested in the failure of the coalition 
efforts in Iraq. During the invasion, Hezbollah’s Secretary General gave an 
incendiary speech on the party’s TV channel al-Manar declaring that ‘the people of 
the region will receive [America] with rifles, blood, arms, martyrdom and 
martyrdom operations.’56 Reports surfaced in 2004 and 2005 that Hezbollah had 
opened offices in Iraq
57
 and had begun funnelling Iranian funds and military 
equipment to Shi’ite militant groups inside Iraq.58 It was soon clear that Hezbollah 
had been training Shi’ite militants in camps both in Lebanon and in Iran,59 and that 
the Mahdi Army, the most dangerous Shi’ite opponents of the coalition forces in 
Iraq, had largely modelled themselves on Hezbollah.
60
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The Arab World 
Even for those countries long considered friends and allies of the US, the unilateral 
and jingoistic lead-up to the invasion was a deeply alienating experience that gave 
regimes little incentive to squander political capital by backing the endeavour. Much 
of the rhetoric that preceded the invasion celebrated the start of a new era of 
American interventionism that would bring freedom to the people of the Middle 
East. In one particularly undiplomatic speech, former CIA director James Woolsey 
said that by invading Iraq the US would ‘scare’ the ‘Mubarak regime, or the Saudi 
royal family’ and that such regimes were right to be scared, because the US is ‘on 
the march’ and planned to be ‘on the side’ not of its allies but rather on the ‘side’ of 
the oppressed people of such countries.
61
 Needless to say, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 
two of America’s strongest partners in the region, were outraged by such direct 
attacks on their regimes. Even at the highest levels of government, officials were 
constantly insinuating that Iraq was only the first piece of the puzzle, and that the 
Iraq project was an opportunity for the US to transform the region. Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, for example, confidently stated that the war in Iraq 
would ‘cast a very large shadow…across the whole Arab world,’62 whilst President 
Bush said that a free Iraq would ‘show the power of freedom to transform that vital 
region.’63 
The idea that invading Iraq would embolden the US in its dealings with its 
autocratic allies in the region, or that it might abandon its support for them 
altogether, was profoundly troubling and caused a great deal of consternation in 
regional capitals.
64
 There was also a concern that the US had no idea what it was 
getting itself into, and resentment – particularly on the part of Iraq’s neighbours – 
that they had not been consulted or that their advice was not being taken into 
account in America’s hasty build up to war.65 Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud 
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al-Faisal cautioned against the war in Iraq, arguing that the US would simply be 
‘solving one problem and creating five more,’66 and King Abdullah of Jordan 
declared the proposed war to be a ‘tremendous mistake’ that would ‘throw the whole 
area into turmoil.’67 Iraq’s neighbours were not necessarily opposed to the removal 
of Saddam Hussein; the Saudis were long keen on a covert operation to remove him 
in a military coup.
68
 But the idea of a unilateral invasion, unsanctioned by the UN, 
as part of the neoconservative narrative to ‘fix’ the region felt a very uncomfortable 
solution.  
Once it became absolutely certain that the US was going to invade regardless 
of regional opinion, calculations had to be made about how best to avoid alienating 
the US at the same time as appeasing Arab public opinion, which was furiously anti-
war. Most of America’s regional allies walked the ‘tightrope’69 by discreetly 
allowing the US access to the facilities they needed whilst at the same time loudly 
denouncing the war. In Saudi Arabia, where the vast majority of the population 
opposed any association with the US invasion,
70
 the government allowed US special 
forces to launch into Iraq from Saudi airstrips,
 71
 but in public Crown Prince 
Abdullah referred to the ‘illegal occupation of Iraq’72 as a ‘reckless’ mistake. Hosni 
Mubarak, President of Egypt, declared his government had done ‘all we could to 
avoid war’ which he believed would ‘unleash a hundred Osama Bin Ladens,’ but 
nevertheless allowed coalition ships to use the Suez Canal.
73
 Jordan, Qatar and the 
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UAE all similarly offered the US at least some of the access it demanded despite 
being officially against the war.
74
 
Although the Arab world was largely quiescent when it came to US military 
demands, this did not translate into them embracing America’s political vision for 
the new Iraq.
75
 In many of the region’s governments there was at best a sullen 
indifference towards the US political project in Iraq, and at worst a desire to see the 
experiment fail. A number of religious figures throughout the Arab world, but 
particularly in Saudi Arabia, called on the Iraqi people to wage jihad against the 
occupying forces, and some even began to incite anti-Shi’ite violence. In an open 
letter twenty-six Saudi clerics declared that ‘jihad against the occupation was 
mandatory for those who were able,’76 and Syria’s pre-eminent religious figure, 
Sheikh Ahmad Kafaro, called ‘on Muslims everywhere to use all means possible to 
thwart the aggression, including martyr operations against the belligerent American, 
British and Zionist invaders.’77 Abdullah bin Jibrin, a former member of Saudi 
Arabia’s Council of Senior Ulama, declared war on Iraq’s Shi’ites, whilst senior 
scholar Abd al-Rahman al-Barrak pronounced that Shi’ites had left the Islamic 
faith.
78
 Regional governments did very little to prevent such incitements to violence 
in Iraq; Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak even joined the fray proclaiming on 
satellite TV that Shi’ites were ‘mostly loyal to Iran and not to the countries where 
they live.’79 Even more troubling, regional countries failed to prevent their citizens 
from joining the insurgency in Iraq; an estimated 1,500 Saudi citizens travelled to 
Iraq to fight,
80
 many of them supported by wealthy benefactors back home,
81
 whilst 
Jordanian radical Abu Musab al-Zarqawi introduced the incitement of civil war in 
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Iraq into al-Qaeda policy.
82
 Although the total number of foreign fighters in Iraq has 
been exaggerated in an attempt to discredit the indigenous Iraqi ‘resistance,’ those 
fighters that did come to Iraq tended to be experienced, brutally violent, hardcore 
ideologues who wreaked havoc in the areas they arrived in.
83
    
Arab Reporting of the War 
The invasion of Iraq was almost unequivocally rejected by all Arab populations, 
with the exception of Kuwait.
84
 Having been deeply engaged in the level of 
suffering faced by the Iraqi people during a decade of devastating sanctions 
organised by the West, many Arabs scoffed at the idea of Americans invading Iraq 
for humanitarian reasons.
85
 The Arab experience of the US as a persistently partisan 
actor in the Israel-Palestine conflict and supporter of dictatorships throughout the 
region further reinforced perceptions of the American government as a hypocritical, 
self-serving, and ultimately malevolent force in the region.
86
  
The popular pan-Arab satellite TV stations, such as al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya 
and Abu Dhabi TV, widely reflected the mood on the Arab street when it came to 
reporting the war in Iraq. The war was framed as an invasion, rather than a 
liberation; early signs of stubborn ‘resistance’ to the US invasion in places like 
Nasiriya were met with pride and delight; and those who were killed fighting 
coalition forces were referred to as martyrs rather than insurgents.
87
 In contrast to 
much Western media, journalists for the pan-Arab stations had un-embedded 
reporters on the ground, interacting with local people, and witnessing the violence 
inflicted on ordinary Iraqis. Partly as a result of this access, and partly as a reflection 
of the hostility of the Arab populace towards the Iraq war, satellite channels ‘ran 
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endless footage of grieving, wounded, screaming Iraqis.’88 Faisal Bodi, senior editor 
for al-Jazeera’s website, frankly stated that al-Jazeera’s coverage of the war starts 
from ‘the premise that this war should be viewed as an illegal enterprise’ and as 
such it was considered the duty of the channel to broadcast the horrors wreaked by 
the conflict, including graphic images and footage of ‘the blown-out brains, the 
blood-spattered pavements, the screaming infants and the corpses…’89  
The relentless focus of Arab satellite stations on the carnage in Iraq was 
extremely controversial and was met with heavy criticism on the part of coalition 
politicians. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz accused al-Jazeera of ‘false 
reporting and very biased reporting that has the effect of inciting violence against 
our troops. The minute they get something they can use to spread hatred and 
violence in Iraq, they are broadcasting it around.’90 Defending the choices of the 
broadcaster, al-Jazeera’s editor-in-chief argued, ‘What we are doing is showing the 
reality. We didn’t invent the bodies, we didn’t make them in the graphics unit. They 
are shots coming in from the field. This is the war.’91 The Arab stations further 
argued that, unlike the many American stations that had fallen into a patriotic stupor 
over the war, it was not their job to transmit coalition propaganda around the Arab 
World.
92
    
Coalition hostility to the Arab stations ran deep, and reports abounded of 
their maltreatment. In April 2003 two separate raids attacked the al-Jazeera Bureau 
in Baghdad and a hotel in Basra being used as a base by al-Jazeera correspondents.
93
 
al-Jazeera complained to the US State Department that their offices and journalists 
had been subjected to ‘strafing by gunfire, death threats, confiscation of news 
material and multiple detentions and arrests.’94 Though the coalition found their 
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coverage of the ugly side of the Iraq war to be highly damaging, it is difficult to 
disentangle how much of this aggression towards the station was intentional. Many 
in the Arab world, however, saw it as a sustained campaign of intimidation against 
the ‘truth telling station,’95 and perceptions of coalition forces plummeted further. 
Criticisms of the Arab networks became much more serious as the anti-
coalition insurgency began to intensify, and as Iraqi politicians began to express 
their anger towards the stations for further inflaming an already very fragile 
situation. The coverage of the vicious battle for Fallujah, which had fallen under the 
control of radical groups including a foreign militant contingent, was particularly 
contentious as al-Jazeera was accused of mounting a ‘rallying cry’ for the 
insurgents.
96
 One Fallujah resident who was mildly sympathetic to the insurgents 
described al-Jazeera as a ‘sports commentator...encouraging people to support one 
team against the other’ and said the coverage had ‘led people inside and outside Iraq 
to sympathise with Falluja’ and ‘raised the spirits of fighters.’97 Some foreign 
fighters even cited al-Jazeera’s coverage as a motivating factor in their decision to 
travel to Iraq to join the insurgency.
98
 Iraq’s interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi 
decided that the impact of the station’s broadcasts was too damaging, and, declaring 
that ‘the terrorists feed on the oxygen of propaganda,’ he shut al-Jazeera’s Iraq 
bureau down.
99
   
It was not only Iraq’s political elites who tired of the reporting of the Pan-
Arab stations. Many Iraqis, particularly those from the Shi’ite community, were 
personally offended by the Arab rejection of the new Iraq, by their failure to 
sufficiently recognise the horrors perpetrated by Saddam Hussein, and by their role 
in fomenting further violence in Iraq.
100
 Prominent Sunni scholar Yusuf al-
Qaradawi’s call for jihad in defence of Iraq, on his show on al-Jazeera,101 was met 
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with disgust by many Iraqis, and in an open letter to the station some Iraqis accused 
it of being ‘the station of Zarqawi and kidnapping and terror’ and of concealing 
‘every crime of Saddam against Iraq.’102 
 
The first half of this chapter has argued that US foreign policy choices directly 
fuelled a culture of antagonism towards the US project in Iraq on the part of 
influential neighbouring and regional powers. The fact that Iraq was effectively 
occupied by the US whilst it was administered by the CPA rendered it vulnerable to 
foreign actors seeking to defend themselves against threats they perceived to be 
emanating from the US. Iran, Syria and Hezbollah felt directly threatened by the 
invasion of Iraq, and they provided manpower, smuggling routes, weapons and 
resources to the nascent Iraqi ‘resistance.’ The wider Arab World established a 
normative environment that strongly encouraged and celebrated Iraqi ‘resistance’ 
and undermined the normative legitimacy of the CPA. The violence inflicted by 
militant groups inside Iraq weakened the functional legitimacy of the CPA and 
successive Iraqi administrations because it demonstrated that these governments 
could not perform the basic function of the state – which is to provide security for its 
citizens. In the next chapter I will show that, as internal violence continued to 
escalate, citizens began to confer legitimacy on local armed groups who claimed to 
protect their neighbourhoods from violence. These armed groups would go on to 
challenge the Iraqi government’s authority over foreign policy by conducting 
independent relationships with foreign powers. 
Transitional Iraqi Government Foreign Policy  
Both the Iraqi Governing Council, which operated as an advisory board to the CPA, 
and the transitional government led by Ayad Allawi, enjoyed some scope to conduct 
diplomacy, but, deprived of control over the means of coercion and highly deficient 
in normative legitimacy, they were also effectively powerless. The Governing 
Council and the Allawi government both prioritised improving relations with their 
neighbours, and restoring Iraq’s position in the Arab League and status as an Arab 
power. Though the Arab League initially resisted reinstating Iraq – pointing to its 
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inability to operate as a state without US assistance – it eventually conceded but 
with little positive impact on Iraq’s position in the Arab World. The Governing 
Council and the Allawi government engaged in relentless diplomatic efforts, but 
their ability to reduce the hostility of neighbouring governments towards Iraq was 
hampered by the clear threat that the US presence in Iraq posed. When it came to the 
most serious foreign policy success of this period, the cancellation of much of Iraq’s 
sovereign debt, it was US rather than Iraqi diplomats who took the lead. 
Nonetheless, the individual talent of appointed Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari led 
to the establishment of a Foreign Ministry that is amongst the best-performing in the 
Iraqi public sector. The lone success of the Foreign Minister reflects the observation 
made by the literature on foreign policy making in the developing world that the 
efficacy of such ministries is highly dependent on the individuals who lead them. 
Outreach to the Arab and Muslim World 
It was against a backdrop of immense hostility that the new Iraq had to make 
tentative steps towards re-establishing itself in the Arab world. Within months of the 
invasion, appointed Iraqis were shaping the diplomatic agenda, albeit under the 
ultimate authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority.
103
 The Iraqi Governing 
Council (IGC), which was established on 13
th
 July 2003, saw itself as Iraq’s 
provisional government, and by 1
st
 September 2003 it had appointed a cabinet which 
named Hoshyar Zebari as Foreign Minister. Although the Iraqi Governing Council 
was essentially toothless, having no resources or legal authority distinct from the 
Coalition Provisional Authority,
104
 it was nonetheless able to conduct diplomacy and 
its priority was to re-integrate Iraq into the region. Zebari launched a charm 
offensive in the Arab world,
105
 making a particular effort to soften the hostile stance 
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of Saudi Arabia,
106
 but struggled to raise much enthusiasm or support for the Iraqi 
Council. Attempts made by the IGC to join the Arab League, for instance, were 
stonewalled. Prior to the war, the Arab League stated its ‘categorical rejection’ of 
the invasion of Iraq, saying that such a move would be considered ‘a threat to the 
national security of all the Arab states.’107 So it came as little surprise when the 
League prevented the IGC from becoming Iraq’s representative in the pan-Arab 
forum. The League declared that as an unelected body, the Council represented not 
the will of the Iraqi people but the will of the American occupiers,
108
 and as such 
could not represent Iraq in the Arab League. After some intense behind-the-scenes 
lobbying by the Iraqis and the Americans, the Arab League relented and reluctantly 
announced that, as a matter of logistical necessity, Iraqi Foreign Minister Zebari 
would represent the IGC at the Arab League.
109
 The concession was resented in 
some quarters, however, with various Arab states refusing to accept Iraqi Shi’ites as 
ambassadors to their countries,
110
 and one senior Jordanian diplomat commented 
that just because ‘the US wanted Iraq back in the Arab fold, Iraq thought it could 
bully its way back in.’111 
On 30
th
 June 2004 the CPA was dissolved and sovereignty was handed over 
to a new Iraqi interim government, headed by Ayad Allawi, that was to govern Iraq 
until parliamentary elections could be organised. Allawi, a secularist Shi’ite and 
leader of the Iraqi opposition movement, was a figure with some stature and with 
already well-established relationships in the Arab world. For Allawi the foreign 
policy priorities for his government were clear; he wanted to ‘rebuild Iraq’s 
relationship with the neighbours,’ to ‘secure the relief of debts from Iraq,’ and to 
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‘get both political help and military help to Iraq.’112 In pursuit of his first objective 
Allawi embarked on a regional tour immediately on taking office, visiting almost all 
of the Arab world, and building on his pre-existing relationships, particularly in the 
Gulf. One senior British diplomat remarked that Allawi’s diplomacy merely 
involved ‘looking to his friends: the Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Jordan,’113 and fears 
were raised about the length of his absences from Iraq, and about the content of his 
discussions with foreign leaders.
114
 In September 2004 US National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice put her concerns about Allawi to a National Security 
Council meeting chaired by President Bush, asking; ‘are we worried that Allawi is 
spending ten to eleven days [a month] outside the country?’115  
One initiative that Prime Minister Allawi pursued with some persistence was 
the attempt to assemble a multi-lateral, Muslim peacekeeping force to replace 
coalition troops in some Iraqi urban areas. Allawi was convinced that US military 
ignorance of ‘the culture, the habits, the customs’ of the Iraqi people was directly 
fuelling the growing insurgency in the country.
116
 To illustrate this point Allawi tells 
a story of an elderly Iraqi man who told the Prime Minister to his face that he had 
instructed his clan to ‘work for the insurgents’ because American soldiers had 
broken into his home, thrown him to the ground and put a boot on his head ‘in front 
of the women.’117 For Allawi it was clear that a multi-national force composed of 
Muslim soldiers would avoid antagonizing the local population and make a huge 
contribution to stabilizing Iraq. The Prime Minister was neither legally nor 
effectively Iraq’s commander in chief, and therefore did not have the power to bring 
this force about without the full support of the US.
118
 
Overall, Allawi was unable to prevent neighbouring countries from 
supporting internal violence in Iraq, because he had no ability to prevent US forces 
in Iraq from being considered a threat to its neighbours. As an appointed, rather than 
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elected, Prime Minister who was still entirely dependent on the US military for 
security, much of Allawi’s diplomacy suffered from a credibility deficit despite him 
being relatively well-liked in neighbouring countries. Allawi was also Prime 
Minister for a very short time, and many of the positive initiatives that Allawi did 
bring about, such as the Sharm al-Sheikh Conference in November 2004, failed to 
be honoured by signatories or successfully pursued by subsequent premiers.
119
 The 
Sharm al-Sheikh conference, which Allawi cites as a ‘breakthrough’ meeting,120 
brought together Iraq’s neighbours, members of the G8 and China, and in its final 
communiqué the conference affirmed Iraq’s ‘sovereignty, political independence,’ 
accepted the principle of ‘non-interference’ in Iraq’s internal affairs, and committed 
participants to help the Iraqis achieve a ‘democratic,’ ‘secure and stable’ state.121 
The Arab states, however, did very little to honour that agreement, and subsequent 
Iraqi governments have struggled to achieve even the level of positivity that Allawi 
enjoyed in his regional relations. 
Debt Forgiveness 
While the forgiveness and restructuring of Saddam-era Iraqi debt was considered 
‘one of the great success stories’122 of the transition period, there is little evidence 
that Allawi’s transitional government played any role in the process. Effectively 
managing the massive $130 billion external debt owed by Iraq
123
 in 2003 was a 
priority for the US government. The US Congress urged the Bush administration a 
month before the invasion to ‘organise debtor and donor conferences in order to 
restructure Iraq’s debt…and accumulate sufficient resources to fund the needs of an 
interim government.’124 For Congress and for the US treasury, if Iraq reduced its 
debt repayment obligations it would be able to contribute more towards the cost of 
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reconstruction, thereby lowering the burden for US taxpayers. Debt relief was 
therefore seen as a ‘coalition of the wallet,’125 a way in which the US could share the 
cost of Iraq’s reconstruction with donor countries. Senior US statesman James Baker 
was appointed as President Bush’s special envoy on Iraqi debt relief and the US 
exerted significant pressure on the Paris Club countries, which had been reluctant to 
reduce Iraq’s debt burden beyond the 50% mark.126 Eventually it was agreed that, 
subject to Iraq’s co-operation with IMF mandated structural reform, the debt burden 
would be reduced by 80%. The US also ensured that the UN protected Iraq’s 
resources from debt-collectors until settlements could be worked out.
127
 Whilst the 
US achieved a great deal by taking on the responsibility for this task, views of 
relevant Iraqi officials were not taken into account. Sinan al-Shabibi, Governor of 
Iraq’s Central Bank, for example, took a position that has gained considerable 
currency in the international arena – namely that Iraq’s debt should be considered 
‘odious’ because it was incurred in the pursuit of warfare and terror, and as such 
ought not to be honoured.
128
 This perspective was rejected by the US negotiators, 
and it appears that binding agreements were entered into on Iraq’s behalf without 
significant Iraqi input.  
As for the Arab countries with which Allawi claimed to have so much 
currency, they refused to make any significant concessions on the issue of debt 
forgiveness. Between them, Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE 
and Kuwait held over $40 billion of Iraqi debt.
129
 Despite significant pressure from 
the US and from successive Iraqi governments, little has been able to move these 
countries to forgive this debt. It appears that they consider the debt a form of 
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leverage, and there has been little by way of political developments in Iraq to induce 
them to give this up.
130
  
Rebuilding a Foreign Ministry 
Establishing a Foreign Ministry from scratch in a post-war environment was an 
enormous task. Hamid al-Bayati, who was deputy Foreign Minister in the interim 
government, described how the new team not only had to ‘open embassies all over 
the world’ but also had to deal with some strange situations in the bid to resurrect its 
foreign service. An envoy sent by the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to Libya, for instance, 
found the Ba’athist representative still in place whilst the country observed a 
mourning period for the loss of Saddam’s regime. And when Iraq’s new 
representation arrived at the UN, they found that Iraq’s Ba’athist ambassador to the 
UN had never formally closed his office, so the new Iraqi team was forced to pay 
fees owed by the previous representation before they could establish their office.
131
  
During the interim government the almost universally admired Foreign 
Minister Hoshyar Zebari
132
 was mainly preoccupied with building the Foreign 
Ministry,
133
 and he took a mature and far-sighted approach to the task. Zebari claims 
that he instituted Iraq’s first reconciliation process within the Foreign Ministry,134 
and indeed evidence abounds that Zebari did reach out to skilled and talented people 
throughout Iraq and within exile communities regardless of their political, ethnic and 
sectarian backgrounds.
135
 Notably Zebari reached out to ex-Ba’athists, particularly 
accomplished and well-educated diplomats who had served under Saddam.
136
 
Sadoun al-Zubaydi, Saddam Hussein’s former personal translator and architect of 
the Ba’athist Foreign Ministry’s diplomat training school, was approached on 
numerous occasions to join the new Iraqi Foreign Ministry – and though he declined 
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he offered Zebari advice about structuring and managing the Ministry.
137
 Zubaydi 
clearly appreciated and respected the effort that Zebari made to seek out advice and 
expertise from the former Ba’athists despite the sweeping de-Ba’athification laws 
that had been imposed on the Iraqi civil service.
138
 The Iraqi Foreign Minister also 
took advantage of the wealth of technical advice and expertise that was offered by 
both coalition and non-coalition countries in order to better go about building 
capacity at the Foreign Ministry.
139
 According to Foreign Minister Zebari, 
approximately 1200 diplomats were sent abroad for training as far afield as Japan, 
Canada and the US.
140
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that Iraq’s foreign relationships in the period before Iraq 
held its first democratic elections were largely defined by the US occupation of the 
country. Iran, Syria and Hezbollah were keen to undermine the US presence in Iraq 
and to strongly disincentivise the US from expanding the scope of its democratizing 
mission. The wider Arab world, meanwhile, presided over media stations that 
valorised and celebrated the violent Iraqi ‘resistance,’ turned a blind eye to the flow 
of jihadist fighters to Iraq from their own countries, and watched the growing 
violence of Iraq with some self-satisfaction. Although formal-legal sovereignty was 
passed to the unelected Iraqi transitional government in June 2005, attempts by this 
administration to establish productive foreign relationships continued to be undercut 
by extent of US power in Iraq. Because of the degree to which the US presence 
defined Iraq’s foreign relationships in this period, I have concluded that the weak 
state framework is not sufficient for analysing the occupied state because of its 
inability to take into account the dynamics produced by the occupying country. 
 During the period of CPA rule Iraq was effectively occupied, in that all 
coercive and administrative authority ultimately derived from the US government. 
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Ambassador Paul Bremer was appointed by President Bush as his envoy to Iraq and 
as the administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority with total power over ‘all 
executive, legislative, and judicial functions’ in Iraq.141 With CPA Orders One and 
Two,
142
 Bremer sacked thirty thousand civil servants and four hundred thousand 
Iraqi soldiers, leaving the CPA – which was ultimately answerable to the American 
President and to the US Congress – as the only incarnation of an Iraqi 
administration.
143
 Occupied Iraq suffered the consequences of America’s threatening 
behaviour towards Iraq’s neighbours and its alienation of the Arab world. US 
foreign policy towards the wider Arab World undermined the functional and 
normative legitimacy of both the CPA and subsequent Iraqi governments. The fact 
of its occupation complicates the relationship between the legitimacy of the Iraqi 
government and Iraqi state foreign policy. Whilst it was occupied, the US was 
responsible for Iraqi foreign policy, and the US derived its functional and normative 
legitimacy primarily from the American, not the Iraqi, public. Of course the US also 
needed an element of legitimacy in Iraq in order to be able to govern effectively, but 
it was empowered to conduct foreign policy with little regard for the domestic 
political situation in Iraq. I would suggest, given these complexities, that the 
relationship between foreign policy and domestic legitimacy in an occupation setting 
could benefit from further theorising. 
Occupied Iraq became an imminent and credible security threat for 
America’s adversaries, including Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. For these actors, 
undermining US power in Iraq was key to ensuring their own security. US foreign 
policy choices had led directly to the fuelling of instability in Iraq, which 
highlighted the inability of the CPA to deliver security to the Iraqi people – thereby 
further damaging its functional legitimacy. The CPA’s normative legitimacy in Iraq 
was also diminished by the relentless attack mounted against the US project in Iraq 
by the Arab media. 
Legitimacy was rapidly transferred from the CPA to other social actors who 
could perform at a local level. The Sadrist movement, led by the controversial 
Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, provided electricity, food and armed ‘protection’ for 
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local communities.
144
 On the basis of their developing stature and local legitimacy, 
the Sadrists captured the attention of Iran and in May 2003 Muqtada al-Sadr was 
invited to meet with senior members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.145 This 
relationship would soon flourish, threatening the stability of the Iraqi state. As for 
the many Iraqi Sunnis
146
 who had rejected the invasion, the mass ejections from the 
civil service and from the army in the wake of de-Ba’athification did nothing to 
convince them that the coalition had their interests at heart. Many Iraqi Sunnis 
retreated into tribal groups and into locally organised ‘resistance’ militias, and 
received some financial but mostly moral support from their many fellow 
rejectionists throughout the Arab world. 
The ability of the Iraqi Governing Council and the Allawi transitional 
government to conduct foreign policy suffered because of their lack of normative 
legitimacy and their inability to exercise a monopoly over violence. Foreign 
Minister Zebari said, ‘it was really the most difficult thing to represent your country 
in the face of the international community’ when ‘your country is occupied, you 
don’t have full sovereignty, so how to lead a foreign policy?’147 For many countries, 
dealing with Iraq was in fact a route to punish the US, and so much of the negativity 
in Iraq’s early foreign relations was bound up in the US involvement. And 
ultimately, although the Iraqis had some scope to conduct diplomacy,
148
 they had 
absolutely no military power, and as such were utterly dependent on the US – a 
point not lost on Iraq’s neighbours. Even after the transfer of sovereignty to interim 
Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, the Americans expected to continue to play a major 
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political and military role in the country.
149
 Allawi poignantly wondered:  ‘Can you 
imagine, I am Prime Minister of Iraq, and I do not even have a battalion.’150 The 
result was that Iraqi politicians were able to conduct diplomacy, but were unable to 
significantly enhance their standing in the Arab World, and were powerless in the 
face of the US-related hostility directed toward Iraq by the region. Though Prime 
Minister Allawi conducted endless regional tours, he was unable to bring about the 
multi-national force that he believed would have made the biggest difference to 
security in Iraq. As for the most important foreign policy priorities, such as 
stabilizing the Iraqi economy by securing the forgiveness of sovereign debt, it was 
the US ‘parent-state’ which took the lead. The transitional Iraqi government’s lack 
of control over the coercive apparatus of government and its clear dependence on 
US forces starved it of both the functional and normative legitimacy it needed to 
effectively pursue its foreign policy priorities. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: IRAN IN THE IRAQI CIVIL WAR 
 
Introduction 
This chapter argues that Iraqi foreign policy entered a new phase once an elected 
Iraqi government was in place. From this point, although US influence continued to 
be strong, Iraqi politics began to overtake US politics as the defining factor in Iraq’s 
foreign relationships. The weak state framework helps us to understand the extent to 
which Iran was able to penetrate Iraqi politics and its extraordinary ability to 
sponsor violent actors in Iraq in this period. The first elected Iraqi government 
suffered from a serious deficit in both normative and functional legitimacy, and this 
led to a proliferation of Iraqi foreign policy actors. In their competition over 
domestic political power, Iraqi political actors sought support from Iran – and in 
doing so undermined Iraq’s ability to protect its national security. 
 The level of control that the US had over Iraq in 2003 and 2004 justifies its 
being labelled as an ‘occupied’ state, but it is more difficult to ascertain the moment 
at which Iraq ceased to be occupied. Although responsibility for governance 
gradually began to be shifted to Iraqis, in the transitional government for instance, 
the US continued to overwhelmingly dominate the security sector in the country in 
addition to wielding significant political influence. I would argue that a shift in Iraqi 
sovereignty occurred in January 2005, when Iraqis elected their first post-invasion 
government. These elections did not fully restore Iraqi sovereignty, but offered a 
significant transfer of power and legitimacy to an Iraqi government such that the 
country could no longer be characterised as occupied. 
 The January 2005 elections posed a number of challenges. Plans to hold 
these elections, which were the first since the invasion of Iraq, were rapidly brought 
forward, partly in the hope that an elected government would be able to rebuild the 
normative legitimacy of the Iraqi state. Violent ‘resistance’ to coalition forces had 
escalated sharply throughout the two years since the invasion, as the Americans 
were accused of stalling the inauguration of an elected and authentically Iraqi 
government. Although it meant that the timelines for drafting an electoral law were 
tragically truncated, the Americans decided that bringing the elections forward 
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would restore some normative legitimacy to the new Iraqi state and could temper the 
violence. 
For one section of the Iraqi population, however, the elections were not 
considered legitimate. Many Iraqi Sunnis believed that the elections were an attempt 
by the Americans to sanction their continued presence in the country, and they 
declared that elections held whilst the country was under occupation could never be 
valid. This is a clear example of a government failing to articulate a narrative of the 
state that resonates with all major sections of the population. The Iraqi state 
characterised elections as the means by which agency could be returned to the Iraqi 
people, but much of the Sunni population believed that the agency of the Iraqi 
people was compromised so long as there was a foreign troop presence in Iraq. From 
the start, therefore, the elected government of Prime Minister Ja’fari failed to 
articulate an inclusive narrative of state, which rendered it deficient in normative 
legitimacy before it was even inaugurated. Throughout its tenure, the Ja’fari 
government failed to provide the basic public goods demanded by its citizenry and 
presided over a rapid escalation in violence that quickly transformed from armed 
‘resistance’ into sectarian civil war. Not only did the Ja’fari government fail to 
prevent this descent into civil war, elements of the government bureaucracy 
participated in sectarian killings using government resources and wearing 
government uniforms. Whilst the plummeting levels of security were the main 
concern of the Iraqi populace, the Ja’fari government also failed to provide a range 
of additional public goods, including vital electricity supplies, sewage management 
systems and properly functioning health and education systems.   
In the Ja’fari government we see state weakness in one of its most extreme 
forms. At this moment, therefore, it is instructive to examine Iraq’s interaction with 
one of its most important foreign policy partners, Iran. The Iran-Iraq relationship is a 
highly controversial one that is subject to much misinformation, so this chapter deals 
with it at some length. The chapter draws two major conclusions about the impact of 
Iraqi state weakness on its foreign policy towards Iran. Firstly, the breakdown of the 
Iraqi state empowered sub-state actors who were able to build their legitimacy by 
assuming some of the functions of the state at a local level. These sub-state actors 
were able to conduct independent foreign relationships with Iran, thereby 
challenging the authority of the central government over foreign policy. Indeed 
some of these actors, such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in 
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Iraq, were part of the coalition government but pursued relations with Iran 
independently of the executive. Secondly, the Ja’fari government prioritised its 
pursuit of regime security over traditional national security considerations, such as 
maintaining Iraqi independence from foreign intervention. Despite being acutely 
aware of the role that Iran was playing in fuelling the violence in Iraq, the Ja’fari 
government pursued affable relations with Iran and made little attempt to prevent 
Iranian intervention in Iraq. Fearful that Iran would empower the domestic rivals of 
the governing Da’wah Party, Prime Minister Ja’fari’s priority was to maintain the 
favour of the Iranian political elite regardless of the cost to Iraq. Both conclusions 
correspond with the expectations set out by my conceptual framing of the thesis; 
namely, that in a weak state the central government is unable to monopolise 
authority over foreign policy, and that foreign policy is driven by a primary concern 
for the security and authority of the actor. 
Dismal Performance of Iraq’s First Elected Government 
On 30
th
 January 2005 Iraqis took to the polls for the first time since the invasion, 
electing a caretaker government to oversee the drafting of Iraq’s new constitution. In 
an inauspicious start, the newly elected Iraqi politicians spent the first three months 
of their eleven month term wrangling over positions – with Ibrahim al-Ja’fari finally 
being sworn in as Prime Minister on 3
rd
 May 2005. Ja’fari was a spokesman and 
leading member of the Da’wah Party, Iraq’s oldest Shi’ite political party,1 and 
emerged as a compromise candidate in the grand Shi’ite coalition that had won the 
elections.
2
 The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which 
dominated the coalition alongside the Da’wah party, focused its efforts on gaining 
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control over the state’s security apparatus – and succeeded in having senior SCIRI 
member Bayan Jabr appointed as Interior Minister. 
As the new government struggled to allocate cabinet posts, Iraq’s violent 
insurgency was intensifying. The January 2005 elections had been overwhelmingly 
boycotted by Sunni provinces, in response to the heavy-handedness of the coalition 
in assaults against Fallujah,
3
 and as a result Sunni representation was largely 
excluded from political power. The lack of meaningful Sunni participation in 
government further compounded the alienation of much of the Sunni community 
and allowed extremist elements to consolidate their increasing dominance over the 
insurgency. The end of 2004 witnessed an escalation of extremist violence, and a 
broadening of targets away from a focus on coalition forces towards softer targets – 
such as Iraqi police recruits and increasingly Shi’ite places of worship.4  
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian extremist who led a hard-line Sunni 
militant group in Iraq, gathered destructive momentum during this period and the 
indiscriminate violence unleashed by his affiliates propelled Iraq towards civil war. 
Whereas previous ‘resistance’ activity had focused on coalition troops or Iraqi 
‘collaborators,’ violence became progressively more sectarian as militant Sunni 
groups began to characterise Shi’ites as traitors en masse. In October, Zarqawi 
announced that his group had joined al-Qaeda, and mass casualty attacks on Shi’ite 
funeral processions, religious gatherings and even simply in Shi’ite neighbourhoods 
became increasingly common.
5
 
It was in the midst of this precarious security situation that the Ja’fari 
administration came into office with a completely unrealistic set of goals. The 
administration promised to improve governance, though state institutions were 
barely functioning; to enhance security, though the election itself had polarised Iraqi 
society more than ever before; to develop public services and the economy, despite 
constant sabotage by militant groups; and to oversee the process of writing a new 
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constitution in the face of a major Sunni boycott.
6
 Though success in such 
circumstances was near impossible, the Ja’fari government was an abysmal failure, 
even underperforming the lowest expectations. 
Prime Minister Ja’fari himself was widely perceived as an inappropriate 
leader for such a critical time. Though the Prime Minister claimed to understand that 
his was a ‘government of war,’7 he behaved as though there was no crisis in the 
country. Dubbed ‘Papa Ja’fari’ by a senior US diplomat,8 the premier loved long 
meandering conversations about history, literature and the classics and had a 
tendency to talk at length around a subject whilst avoiding core matters of 
substance.
9
 One senior British diplomat summed up the attitudes of many when he 
described Ja’fari as ‘charming’ but ‘completely incompetent.’10 
The Prime Minister’s failure to effectively oversee the government was to 
prove extremely serious as state institutions were transformed into violent fiefdoms 
heavily engaged in the escalating Iraqi civil war. SCIRI, the Da’wah party’s primary 
partner in government, was an Iraqi opposition group formed in Iran, and heavily 
supported by the Iranian government, that returned to Iraq in 2003 with an estimated 
10,000 man militia known as the Badr Brigades.
11
 Following the January 2005 
elections, SCIRI took over the Interior Ministry and flooded police and security 
services with militiamen from the Badr Brigades and from the Mahdi Army, the 
militia loyal to Shi’ite militant cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. By July 2005 some 50,000 
men had joined the police, undergoing minimal vetting, whilst de-Ba’athification 
edicts were used to remove some Sunni officers.
12
 The new police and security 
forces were accused of running death squads targeting Sunnis and former Ba’athists 
and of interning prisoners without charge or due process. The prison population 
rocketed from just 4,300 in October 2004, to an estimated 25,000 in November 
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2005.
13
 12,000 of these prisoners were held by Iraqi authorities, the remainder were 
in American custody. The Badr dominated ‘Wolf Brigade’ tortured prisoners and 
confined them underground in rooms full of human waste; men dressed as 
commandos of the Interior Ministry kidnapped and murdered predominantly Sunni 
men; and in November 2005 American soldiers discovered a secret bunker hosting 
168 detainees, many bearing signs of torture, in gruesome surroundings.
14
 There was 
evidence that Interior Ministry personnel were systematically targeting people for 
revenge. Many of those discovered in the bunker for example had been pilots during 
Saddam’s regime, and it soon came to light that a number of Sunnis were being 
mistreated in the Interior Ministry building itself – where different floors of the 
building were run ‘like fiefdoms’ by the various factions.15 All the while, Prime 
Minister Ja’fari appeared ‘oblivious’ to his government’s role in fuelling an 
escalating civil war,
16
 and in June 2005 he even found it appropriate to celebrate the 
paramilitary Badr Organisation as a ‘shield’ for Iraq.17 
Ja’fari’s noncommittal leadership style gave ministries an incredible amount 
of autonomy,
18
 and the Interior Ministry was not the only one to abuse this latitude. 
Figures loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr took key positions in the Health Ministry and 
transformed many of the nation’s hospitals into death traps for those who could be 
identified as Sunnis, and used the Ministry’s infrastructure for murder, abductions 
and weapons transfers.
19
 In February 2007 Prime Minister Maliki arrested the 
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Sadrist Deputy Health Minister, charging him with embezzling Ministry resources 
for the Mahdi Army, and accusing him of allowing hospitals and ambulances to be 
used to carry out kidnappings and killings.
20
 According to an embassy cable sent by 
US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad in September 2005, ‘Ja’fari strongly disagreed’ 
that the Mahdi Army’s behaviour presented a serious problem, instead viewing the 
Sadrists as partners in government.
21
  
Poor ministerial performance together with heightening violence and 
constant sabotage of public infrastructure led to an ‘unprecedented crisis in the 
public services sector.’22 Ministries were packed with talentless political appointees, 
electricity production remained completely inadequate and important rations failed 
to reach the Iraqi public.
23
 Iraqis still had to wait an average of one hour in lines for 
petrol, supplies of which had only slightly improved since 2004, and the nation 
struggled to function with just 12 hours of electricity a day.
24
 Though public 
optimism had improved with the January 2005 election, it quickly started to tail off 
as evidence of governmental incompetence abounded in people’s everyday lives25. 
A senior Ja’fari adviser described how ministries became consumed with petty 
fights over resources, and admitted that, though he adored Prime Minister Ja’fari, 
‘Iraq needed a Prime Minister with strong execution to cut the nonsense and get the 
ministries to work.’26 
By late 2005 sectarian tension pervaded Iraqi society as the brutality of the 
insurgency and rising casualties prompted increasingly indiscriminate retaliation 
from government affiliated militias, in turn fuelling further insurgent activity. In one 
particularly haunting tragedy, 953 Shi’ite pilgrims died on 31st August 2005 when 
rumours of a suicide bomber prompted a stampede over the al-Aima bridge. A 
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furious Muqtada al-Sadr promised to avenge the deaths, announcing that a sectarian 
war had begun, and 14 days later, on an audiotape produced by al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-
Zarqawi declared war against the Shi’ites.27 By February 2006 the floodgates were 
open, as the massive destruction of the religiously significant al-Askariya shrine 
prompted a frenzy of violent revenge killings, abductions and mutilations of 
civilians identified as Sunnis. 
The potential consequences of the destruction of the shrine were quickly 
recognised by the US Ambassador who recommended that Prime Minister Ja’fari 
immediately enforce martial law. But Ja’fari was determined that the people ‘needed 
to let off some steam,’ and that his government was not prepared to stand in their 
way.
28
 Just hours later, Shi’ite militias took to the streets and an estimated 1,300 
civilians, mostly Sunni, were murdered in a display of violence that would mark a 
turning point in post-invasion Iraq.
29
 Iraq’s national police were increasingly drawn 
into the vicious sectarian violence, setting up checkpoints by routes that the local 
populace had to take to procure necessities in order to ‘intimidate and dominate the 
Sunni population’ and support militias who were murdering by identity card.30 In 
one massacre uncovered by the Americans, the National Police arrested Sunni 
workers from a meatpacking plant, executed them and dumped their bodies, setting 
off a wave of retaliatory violence against the police.
31
  
The Ja’fari government failed either to articulate an inclusive vision of the 
state or to effectively provide security and public services, and as a result was highly 
deficient in both normative and functional legitimacy. The government compounded 
the already extensive alienation of the Iraqi Sunni community from the narrative of 
the new Iraqi state by allowing state institutions to be used violently and 
disproportionately to target the Sunni community. The government thereby heavily 
reinforced the sense of Sunni alienation from the state which hastened the descent 
into civil war. 
The Foreign Ministry in a Time of Crisis 
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The previous chapter described how, despite having little authority, the Iraqi Foreign 
Ministry was able to build a relatively functional and professional bureaucracy that 
could at least be involved in day-to-day diplomacy. As sectarian killing became 
more and more prevalent, however, the work of the Foreign Ministry almost ground 
to a halt. Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari remembers how the ‘sectarian war’ sent 
the country ‘to hell’ and back, and describes how they ‘used to count daily dozens of 
bodies in the street of Baghdad killed or shot in the head purely on identity or 
sometimes on whether his name is Omar or Abd al-Zahra.’32 In such circumstances 
it was difficult for the Ministry to operate effectively, people could not come to 
work for fear of being stopped by militiamen en route at fake checkpoints and being 
shot; others were afraid to leave the Ministry to go home and were sleeping in the 
office.33 According to Deputy Foreign Minister Labeed Abbawi, the civil war was 
affecting ‘morale, performance and productivity.’34 
Iraq was being consumed by internal war, and the Foreign Ministry’s 
priorities – when it was able to operate – reflected that. For Foreign Minister Zebari, 
beseeching the international community to try to put an end to the violence in Iraq 
became a crucial part of his work. He pleaded with the Arab League and 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference to fulfil ‘their responsibility’ towards Iraq 
and take the initiative to ‘bring all the Iraqi leaders’ from the various sects and 
parties together and to ‘let them talk.’35 Zebari succeeded in convening two 
conferences at ‘the peak of sectarian strife,’ bringing together Iraqi representatives 
from the ‘resistance,’ from the opposition and from the government.36As for the 
pursuit of long-term foreign policy objectives, they were put on the back burner. As 
Zebari admits: ‘if you have instability, if you have insecurity, if you have terrorist 
attacks, if you have civil strife, if you have poverty’ the task of presenting your 
country in a favourable light to the world becomes nigh impossible and the best you 
can hope to achieve is to leverage your contacts with the outside world to try to 
bring about some internal stability.37  
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This characterisation of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry at the height of civil war 
echoes some of the findings of the literature on foreign policy in the developing 
world. The literature points out that the prevalence of internal threats means that 
foreign policy often becomes a tool through which states seek to address internal 
threats with the help of foreign powers or international bodies. In the Iraqi case, the 
Foreign Ministry reoriented itself towards seeking help from the international 
community to bring an end to the violent internal conflict that was threatening the 
collapse of the Iraqi state. 
Iran in Iraq’s Civil War 
Iranian Interests 
The government was a shambles as ministries either struggled to function or were 
overrun by militias jockeying for power, resources and influence against a backdrop 
of mounting civil violence. For interested foreign powers, Iraq became a very 
permissive environment in which to operate. Foreign Minister Zebari himself 
warned that the absence of a unified, coherent and functional government was 
enabling ‘interventions by regional countries in the internal affairs of Iraq’ who 
wanted to ‘install themselves as patrons of its future.’38 Iran was one country that 
was extremely interested in becoming a ‘patron’ of Iraq’s future. The eight year long 
Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988, which had cost Iran $627 billion and 262,000 
lives,
39
 traumatised the young Islamic Republic and strengthened Persian narratives 
of a centuries-long rivalry between the two territories.
40
 Since then, ensuring that 
such devastation could never again be wreaked on Iran by its western neighbour has 
been a core tenet of Iranian foreign policy. Though the US invasion removed Iran’s 
long-time foe, Saddam Hussein, from power, it also established a vast US military 
presence on Iran’s western border that was decidedly hostile. Iran’s key strategic 
priorities in post-invasion Iraq, therefore, were a) to ensure that Iraq would never 
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again be in a position where it could mount a successful attack on its neighbour, and 
b) to deter any possible future attack by the US on Iran.
41
 
Iran was keen to ensure that the new Iraq would emerge as a militarily weak 
nation that was politically and economically dependent on the Islamic Republic and 
therefore unlikely to pose a threat.
42
 It was also deemed crucial for Iranian regime 
survival that the US should be defeated in Iraq; in the words of one senior British 
diplomat, Iran determined to ‘make life hell for the coalition’ to ward off the risk of 
Iraq becoming ‘a US protectorate.’43 
Though much attention is given to Iran’s revolutionary Islamist ideology,44 
there is little evidence that its policies in Iraq have been driven by any desire to 
export Iran’s religio-political philosophy.45 Rather, Iran sees itself as primarily on 
the defensive and its Iraq policy is a reflection of its assessment of the threats posed 
by Iraq and by the US.
46
 Even anti-Iranian politician Ayad Allawi, who often decries 
Iran’s pernicious role in Iraq, recognises that Iran is motivated primarily by a desire 
to ‘build defences to protect Iran,’ a need that has been made more acute by 
America’s ‘statements and threatening gestures’ which have fuelled Iranian 
perceptions that ‘everybody is conspiring against them.’47 
In addition to diminishing the threats to its national security, Iran was also 
interested in securing a powerful position in mediating internal Iraqi power politics; 
shutting down the Iraq-based Iranian opposition group Mujahedin-e Khalq; gaining 
preferential agreements on land and water borders; developing a lucrative economic 
relationship with Iraq; and strengthening its influence over the clerical establishment 
in Najaf.  
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Patronising Iraqi Political Parties 
Iran has long supported Iraqi Shi’ite political parties, building strong and lasting ties 
with these parties years before they were in contact with the US. The Shi’ite Islamist 
Iraqi Da’wah Party sought refuge in Iran after the Iranian revolution in 1979, and 
although they disagreed with Iran’s system of government by clerics, vilayat-e faqih, 
they nonetheless maintained open relations with the Iranian leadership. The 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was established by 
offshoots of the Da’wah party, together with the Iranian government, as a party 
more sympathetic to Iran’s revolutionary vision. Iran also sponsored the Badr 
Brigades, a military wing of SCIRI, which controversially fought alongside Iran in 
the Iran-Iraq war.
48
 These relationships between Iran and Iraq’s Shi’ite political 
parties gave Iran a head start in the post-2003 era. As one former American diplomat 
commented, ‘Iraqi Shi'a politicians had long-standing relations with Iran, they knew 
each other,’ whereas the US was coming into Iraq with a relatively poor 
understanding of the nuances of intra-Shi’ite politics.49 Attitudes towards Iran on the 
part of those politicians who were exiled there are mixed, however. Though some 
publicly declare their gratitude to the country for hosting them,
 50
 others bitterly 
recall the humiliations and frustrations of dealing with the Iranian government 
whilst in exile.
51
 
Whether or not pre-existing relationship between Shi’ite politicians and the 
Iranian government lubricated relations, Iran was the only regional country willing 
to engage with the new Iraqi government immediately after the invasion. Unlike 
many of Iraq’s Arab neighbours, who displayed their dissatisfaction with the 
invasion by shunning Iraq’s new leaders, Iran was open for business with the new 
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political elite from the earliest days of the Iraqi Governing Council.
52
 As one senior 
member of the Da’wah party commented, ‘when all the Arab doors are closed in 
front of the Shi'a they find only the Iranian door opened.’53 Iran quickly surmised 
that making a ‘sympathetic ally’54 of Iraq could best be achieved by becoming 
deeply involved in Iraq’s electoral politics, and by supporting the political 
ascendance of Iraqi Shi’ite political parties. Iran was under no illusion about Iraqi 
Shi’ites having fealty to the Islamic Republic, but they did believe that Shi’ite 
politicians might make for ‘more amenable interlocutors’55 and as such were keen to 
ensure their political dominance in Iraq.
56
 This did not mean that Iran focused 
exclusively on patronising Shi’ite groups; in fact, ‘they sought to have influence 
across the spectrum, including Sunni and Kurdish [political groups],’57 but Iran was 
committed to seeing Shi’ite parties in pole position.58 
To the Americans’ surprise, Iran was an avid supporter of elections in Iraq,59 
partly because it was desperate to see sovereignty pass from the Americans to the 
Iraqis, and partly because democratic elections were bound to usher the numerically 
dominant Shi’ite community into power.60 When elections did take place, the 
chairman of Iran’s commanding Guardian Council declared Iran to be happy with 
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‘the elections and the victory of the...Islamist alliance,’ adding that ‘a stable Islamic 
rule is being established’ in Iraq61. The Iranian strategy was to back a wide variety 
of Shi’ite Islamist political parties,62 thereby assuring influence within the Iraqi 
government regardless of the outcome of elections.
63
 By ‘betting on a variety of 
horses’64 the Iranians also positioned themselves as effective power brokers in post-
election skirmishes over the distribution of posts in the new government. Whether it 
was by persuasion, intimidation or bribery, the Iranians were ‘very active’ when it 
came to influencing government formation processes to their advantage.
65
 A cable 
sent from the US embassy in Baghdad reported that ‘unchecked IRGC-QF [Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Command-Quds Force] and other Iranian patronage ensures 
that the Shia political spectrum is conclusively dominated by political parties that 
are at least sympathetic, if not entirely beholden, to their financial benefactors.’66 
One senior Iraqi diplomat, when comparing the relative effectiveness of Iran and the 
US on the political scene, quipped that the US has ‘no carrots or sticks’ and that Iran 
at least ‘has carrots.’67 He wanted to wait until a more private meeting before 
discussing Iran’s ‘sticks.’ Maintaining their focus on the relative advantage of 
dealing with Shi’ite, rather than Sunni, politicians, the Iranians also levelled strong 
pressure on Iraqi Shi’ites to run together on a unified Shi’ite list - so as to avoid 
splitting the Shi’ite vote.68  
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By supporting various Iraqi political actors, the Iranians were not seeking to 
govern Iraq by proxy, but simply to ensure that they had a hand in the big decisions 
that would affect their interests.
69
 As one senior Iraqi diplomat put it, Iran was not 
dictating Iraqi policy ‘at a micro level,’ but was ensuring that ‘the major parties’ in 
Iraq avoided making decisions that would be considered ‘objectionable for Iran.’70 It 
was, therefore, getting the right people into power that was key to safeguarding 
Iran’s interests. Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari warned that ‘regional countries’ 
were trying to influence ‘the form of the next government, and who will head the 
government,’71 and believed that Qasim Suleimani, commander of Iran’s elite Quds 
Force, had virtually a final say on who could emerge as Prime Minister in Iraq.
72
  
Backing competing actors in Iraq insured Iran against most electoral 
eventualities, but it also played into a policy of keeping Iraq weak and fractious.
73
 
The logic was that an internally divided and weak Iraq would be unlikely to pose a 
threat to Iran. The idea of an Iraq with strong regions and a weak central government 
was particularly attractive to Iran, because without a strong federal government Iraq 
was unlikely to wage war, whilst a strong Shi’ite southern region close to the border 
with Iran could prove a lucrative source of revenue and a realm of enhanced 
influence. It was widely suspected that the SCIRI plan to create a federal Shi’ite 
super-region in southern Iraq, for instance, was backed by Iran.
74
 In an interview 
with CBS, US General John Abizaid said that he believed ‘people within the Iranian 
government’ were pursuing a ‘Lebanon-like solution to Iraq’ that would be 
characterised by a ‘weak central government.’75 The pursuit of this policy goal was 
tricky, however, because although Iran benefited from a weak Iraq, it recognised 
that preventing a wholesale breakdown of Iraq was also critical to Iranian security.
76
 
The last thing Iran wanted was an independent Kurdistan emboldening Kurdish 
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separatists in Iran, and a radicalised Sunni political entity threatening to wreak 
violence on the Shi’ite theocracy. So a balance had to be found between encouraging 
a level of internal Iraqi political division whilst nevertheless preventing an all out 
disintegration of the Iraqi state. As one former American diplomat put it, Iran 
wanted to ‘ensure Iraq didn't become powerful’ but that it ‘neither disintegrated into 
chaos or civil [war].’77 Iran has got that balance wrong on a few occasions, and has 
tended to recalibrate its activities accordingly.
78
 
 Iran was a big supporter of Prime Minister Ja’fari, and reportedly lavished 
millions of dollars in political funding on him in the lead-up to Iraq’s January 2005 
parliamentary elections.
79
 Ja’fari had spent time as a political exile in Iran before 
moving on to London, and was quick to rebuild relations with the country as his 
political star ascended in post-invasion Iraq. In July 2005 Ja’fari announced that 
Iraq’s ‘Iranian brothers’80 would be donating $1 billion to Iraq to promote religious 
tourism, and to build schools, hospitals and libraries,
81
 and he turned a blind eye to 
Iran’s role in fomenting violence in the country. Prime Minister Ja’fari also moved 
to strengthen intelligence ties with the Iranians, establishing a new unofficial 
intelligence agency headed by a pro-Iranian figure who allegedly shared information 
about American positions with Iranian-backed Sadrist fighters.
82
 For the Iranians the 
partnership with Ja’fari worked well, and they threw their support behind him for a 
second term as Prime Minister.
83
 Although one advisor to Prime Minister Ja’fari 
described Iran's strategy as simply predicated on the mantra: ‘the Shi’a must not lose 
control of Baghdad come what may,’ it seemed Prime Minister Ja’fari had been a 
good bet and the Iranians would be sorry to see him go.
84
 
A wide range of Iraqi political parties conducted independent relationships 
with the Iranians, including parties who were in the coalition government but 
                                                          
77
 Former American Diplomat, 'Interview with the author conducted on condition of annonymity'. 
78
 For example after intra-Shi’ite political violence got out of hand, Quds Force leader Qasim 
Suleimani forced leaders to reconcile at a meeting in Tehran. Eisenstadt, Knights, and Ali, 'Iran's 
Influence in Iraq',  4. 
79
 According to American intelligence reports, cited in Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside 
Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, 142. 
80
 Cited in Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis, 94. 
81
 Edward Wong, 'Iraq Dances With Iran While American Seethes', The New York times, 31st July 
2005. 
82
 Gordon and Trainor, The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. 
Bush to Barack Obama, 221. 
83
 Woodward, State of Denial, 446. 
84
 Former Senior Adviser to Prime Minister Ja'fari, 'Interview with the author conducted on condition 
of annonymity'. 
107 
 
outside of the executive. The weakness of the Iraqi executive created an 
environment in which different corners of the government were able to conduct their 
own independent relationships with the Iranian government, often outbidding each 
other to prove their utility to this foreign power. Fully aware of these competing 
relationships with Iran, Prime Minister Ja’fari privileged the security of his own 
regime over national security considerations in pursuing his own relationship with 
Iran. Despite being conscious of the highly damaging role that Iran was playing in 
his country, Prime Minister Ja’fari did not seek to do anything to temper Iran’s 
support for violent actors inside Iraq. Rather, the Prime Minister assiduously sought 
out Iranian support for his own regime, in an attempt to ward off challenges to his 
power by domestic political rivals. This meets the expectations set out in my 
conceptual chapter; by virtue of its weakness the central government both lost its 
authority over foreign policy and allowed considerations of regime security rather 
than national security to drive its foreign policy choices. 
Fuelling Iraq’s Militias 
In a somewhat essentializing analogy, a former senior member of Prime Minister 
Maliki’s government said that ‘Iranians could sit [for] twenty years weaving a small 
piece of carpet,’ and that their patience, persistence and hard work paid dividends.85 
When it came to building intelligence networks in Iraq, the Iranians had indeed been 
diligent and thorough, establishing a base of informants and operatives across 
southern Iraq over the twenty years prior to the US invasion.
86
 These networks 
would stand the Iranians in good stead when it came to leveraging their influence in 
Iraq’s increasingly violent political landscape. In addition to supporting the political 
process, the Iranians were also committed to aiding the violent activities of Iraq’s 
burgeoning militias. Though the primary aim of Iranian-backed violence was to 
‘bleed the US into leaving’87 and to deter any future attacks on Iranian soil, it also 
afforded the Iranians an additional lever of influence it could bring to bear on Iraq’s 
political process. The scale and intensity of Iranian operations in Iraq underwent a 
significant shift in 2005. This is partly a reflection of the increasingly permissive 
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environment on offer in Iraq – with the coming to power of a pro-Iranian political 
elite, and an increasingly volatile domestic scene with which the US coalition was 
struggling to cope – and partly a response to changes in Iranian domestic politics. 
On the 3
rd
 August 2005 a neo-conservative former member of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, assumed the Iranian 
Presidency, and soon afterwards Iran began to pursue a much more ‘pro-active’ 
policy in Iraq.
88
 The election of Ahmadinejad shifted the balance of power in the 
Iranian government away from ‘accommodationists,’ who wanted rapprochement 
with the Western powers, towards hawks committed to maximising Iran’s strategic 
advantage in the face of faltering US power in Iraq.
89
 Iran’s Iraq policy was not 
directly managed by the presidency; in fact, Quds Force commander Qasim 
Suleimani was arguably more influential than the President when it came to Iraq,
90
 
but the accession of Ahmadinejad nonetheless extended the parameters within which 
the IRGC was allowed to act, and in the following years the IRGC would take full 
advantage of this latitude.
91
  
The IRGC, or more specifically the Quds Force, worked with a number of 
Iraqi Shi’ite militias including Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, SCIRI’s Badr 
Brigades, as well as with sections of the Fadhila and Da’wah parties. Of course the 
Badr Brigades, having been founded in Iran, were continuing a long-standing co-
operation with the IRGC. Muqtada al-Sadr, on the other hand, was a young cleric 
who was relatively unknown until he was accused of orchestrating the murder of 
pro-American cleric Abdul Majid al-Khoei in Najaf in April 2003.
92
 Muqtada’s 
father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, was a populist leader of the Iraqi 
Hawza, which is one of the two major centres of Shi’ite clerical learning in the 
word, who was elevated by Saddam for his Iraqi nationalist credentials. As 
Mohammad al-Sadr grew in popularity, however, he became less and less willing to 
endorse Saddam’s regime and was eventually assassinated along with two of his 
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sons in 1999.
93
 Muqtada was also the nephew and son-in-law of renowned Shi’ite 
thinker Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr. An iconic figure in modern Shi’ism, Baqir al-Sadr 
was an early leader of the Da’wah party and an accomplished writer and philosopher 
who was brutally murdered by the Ba’athist regime in 1980.94 Combining his skills 
as an orator and drawing on the credibility afforded by his impressive family 
connections, Muqtada was quick to activate a vast network of support within lower-
class Shi’ite communities.95 As the Iraqi government failed to provide local services, 
Muqtada and his supporters stepped in, offering ‘their own municipal, educational, 
medical and social services.’96 In April 2003, for example, the Mahdi Army 
commandeered power stations in Sadr city from the CPA and started providing 
electricity to the locality twenty-four hours a day, lending the Sadrist movement 
credibility and popular support.
97
 Restoring law and order was also a priority for the 
Sadrists; Muqtada’s deputy for Baghdad, Sheikh Muhammad Fartusi, described how 
the Sadrists addressed the suffering of the people: ‘The first thing we did was to 
reassure people that the area is secure and stable, then restore social services, traffic, 
power, then restore law and prevent people from looting and stealing.’98 The lack of 
access to state-administered justice also led Muqtada’s movement to appoint its own 
judges to preside over local disputes, and in October 2003 Muqtada even formed an 
alternative government ‘comprising the ministries of justice, finance, information, 
interior, and foreign affairs.’99 
Iran was very attracted to Muqtada’s social provision formula for wooing 
disenfranchised Shi’ites, it being highly reminiscent of the approach of Iranian-
backed Lebanese Hezbollah. And despite Muqtada’s archly anti-Iranian rhetoric,100 
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they keenly sought out a partnership with their ‘Hezbollah of Iraq.’101 Because 
Muqtada himself did not have the educational stature necessary to pass religious 
judgements, he needed the backing of a more senior cleric, and for that he turned to 
Grand Ayatollah Ha’iri. A student of Muqtada’s father, and an Ayatollah whose 
‘radical positions’ challenged ‘the hegemony of the four other Grand Ayatollahs 
living in Najaf,’ Iran-based Ha’iri was a natural choice for Muqtada. In May 2003 
Muqtada travelled to Iran to meet with Ayatollah Ha’iri, and the trip gave Qasim 
Suleimani, commander of the Iranian Quds Force, an opportunity to meet and 
establish relations with the young Iraqi cleric.
102
 Iran would quickly become a 
substantial backer of the Sadrist movement, as Muqtada realised that he could not 
afford to go without Iranian weapons and military expertise in his escalating fight 
against occupying US forces.
103
 Iranian funding was soon flooding into the arm of 
the Mahdi Army that focused on targeting US troops,
104
 with one source in April 
2004 estimating that over $80 million had been channelled to the group in the 
preceding months.
105
 Iran also provided Sadr supporters with military training at 
camps established on the Iran-Iraq border, teaching them how to conduct guerrilla 
warfare, produce bombs and conduct espionage.
106
 In 2004, when the Sadrists 
overran Najaf, occupying the Imam Ali shrine and facing off US troops reluctant to 
damage the holy city, the Iranians directly supported the Sadrists with weapons and 
personnel.
107
 The Iranians were, however, constantly in pursuit of new avenues of 
influence in Iraq. Despite their material backing of the Sadrist occupation of the 
Shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf, they also reached out to the Allawi government 
offering to ‘resolve the issue within 6 hours’ if the go-ahead was given.108 Prime 
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Minister Allawi was outraged by the Iranian attempt to become interlocutors in a 
conflict partly of their own making and rejected the offer, but the incident 
demonstrates the multiplicity of Iranian tactics in Iraq. In addition to supporting 
Sadr’s violent activity in Iraq, the Iranians also mediated a path for Sadr into 
mainstream Iraqi politics. They encouraged Sadr to participate in Iraq’s 
parliamentary elections, coached Sadrist candidates, and pressured the Iraqi 
government to integrate the Mahdi Army into the military and state police forces.
109
 
Indeed it would be Sadrist support for Iran-backed Ibrahim al-Ja’fari that would 
enable the latter to emerge as premier after the January 2005 elections,
110
 despite the 
supposed Sadrist rejection of politics under occupation.  
Whether it was in support of Sadr’s Mahdi Army or one of its other Iraqi 
clients, Iran devoted vast resources to its operation in Iraq. Estimates of Iran’s 
spending on its activities in Iraq vary considerably; one Iranian defector claimed that 
Iran was spending $70 million a month on its activities in Iraq,
111
 whilst the US 
embassy put this figure at a much lower $100-200 million a year.
112
 In a press 
conference on 2
nd
 July 2007, US Brigadier General Kevin Begner said that Iran’s 
Quds Force had been channelling up to $3 million a month to Iraqi militias, and that 
Iran had been using Lebanese Hezbollah to train these militias and to facilitate 
weapons transfers to them.
113
 Some cells were paid for their successes, between 
$4,000 and $13,000 was on offer for the successful targeting of US forces with 
roadside bombs and rockets.
114
 And with the increasing representation of Shi’ite 
Islamists in the Iraqi government, the line between Iranian patronage for politics and 
for violent ‘resistance’ was increasingly blurred. One American intelligence report 
in 2005 complained that SCIRI, the dominant party in the new Iraqi government, 
had received over $100 million from Iran of which $45 million was allocated to its 
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militant arm, the Badr Bridges.
115
 SCIRI, it seemed, had two very different faces: 
the one it presented to Iran and the one it presented to America. The US dealt with 
SCIRI’s articulate and suave Adel Abdul-Mahdi and Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, whilst 
Iran dealt with Badr Brigades chief and tough man Hadi al-Ameri.
116
 
Weapons were available, and could be produced, inside Iraq, but Iran was to 
prove vital in enabling the spread of deadly EFPs (explosively formed penetrators) 
in the Iraq conflict. EFPs, which were manufactured in Iran and smuggled to Iraq, 
were four times more lethal than regular IEDs
117
 (improvised explosive devices) 
because of their ability to slice through heavy armour and to explode inside the 
military vehicle.
118
 EFPs began to make their way into Iraq in 2004 and 2005, and 
by 2006 around fifteen EFPs were detonated or found and dismantled every 
month.
119
 In addition to the EFPs, which were responsible for deaths of hundreds of 
US soldiers in Iraq,
120
 Iran was also smuggling 122 millimetre mortars and C-4 
explosives across the border which were being used in assaults against coalition 
forces.
121
 In one particularly dramatic press briefing, US military personnel 
presented physical evidence of Iranian-made weaponry, including EFP launchers, 
mortar shells and rocket-propelled grenades, on a table in the briefing room.
122
  
From 2005 Iran began training Iraqi militias in the use of EFPs, mortars and 
the tactics of guerrilla warfare, including how to carry out targeted assassinations.
123
 
Apparently in order to give their Iraqi presence an Arab face, Iran deployed 
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Hezbollah to run much of its ‘sophisticated’ and ‘well-organized training program,’ 
which usually took place in Iranian territory.
124
  
Iran’s success in smuggling weapons and personnel in and out of Iraq was 
partly down to its extensive intelligence network inside Iraq and its well-developed 
‘underground military infrastructure’ in the country.125 With an embassy in Baghdad 
and consulates in Basra, Karbala, Erbil and Suleymaniyah, Iran uses its formal 
diplomatic structure in Iraq to facilitate its intelligence presence in the country. Both 
Iranian Ambassadors posted to Iraq since 2003 were former operatives in the Quds 
Force;
126
 Hassan Kazemi Qomi presided over the Iranian embassy until 2010, when 
Hassan Danaifar took over. Hassan Danaifar’s trajectory is a particularly interesting 
one. He was actually born in Iraq, but exiled to Iran in Saddam Hussein’s campaign 
to rid Iraq of ‘ethnic Persians.’ Once in Iran he joined the Quds Force, an elite arm 
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and assumed responsibility for operation 
of the IRGC forces during the Iran-Iraq war. Aware of the intimate links between 
the Iranian diplomats in Iraq and Iranian intelligence, the US attempted to declare 
several Iranian diplomats persona non grata in Iraq, but backtracked fearing Iranian 
retaliation.
127
 Through their association with Badr members assigned to Iraqi 
intelligence agencies, many of whom have dual Iraqi-Iranian citizenship,  the 
Iranians have also been able to infiltrate Iraqi state intelligence.
128
 A former Badr 
intelligence officer, known as Engineer Ahmed, became notorious when it was 
discovered that in his new assignment in the Ministry of the Interior’s Intelligence 
Department he was running a secret underground prison in which many former 
pilots who had participated in the Iran-Iraq war were being held.
129
 The incident 
raised questions about whether Iran was using Iraq’s security and intelligence 
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apparatus to pursue a ‘revenge agenda’ inside Iraq for its previous suffering at the 
hands of its neighbour.
130
 Meanwhile, a diplomatic cable dispatched by the US 
embassy in Baghdad recorded the Ja’fari government’s ‘close, co-operative 
relationship’ with Iranian intelligence and a follow up cable reported that Ja’fari was 
floating plans to set up a new intelligence agency headed by a close associate of 
Iran.
131
 Iran also used a number of alternative methods to strengthen its intelligence 
apparatus in Iraq. A generous financier of religious students, it is reported that up to 
one third of the two thousand Iranian religious students in Iraq’s holy cities have 
links with Iranian intelligence.
132
 And where sympathy for the Iranian cause has 
been lacking in Iraq, Iran has thrown money at the problem, lubricating its work 
with an ample supply of payoffs for local facilitators.
133
 
More controversially, Iran has also been accused of supporting Sunni 
militant groups including al-Qaeda affiliates, despite their targeting of Shi’ite 
civilians.
134
 The radical Sunni group Ansar al-Islam, based in Iraqi Kurdistan, fled to 
Iran on the eve of the US invasion and appears to have been given refuge there. 
Many are later believed to have returned to Iraq to participate in the post-war 
violence.
135
 Iran also seems to have ‘tolerated an al-Qaida presence in Iran,’136 and 
allowed its Syrian ally to enable the transit of extremist Sunni fighters over the 
border into Iraq.
137
 Some Sunni politicians are convinced that Iran uses radical 
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Sunni groups, who target those involved in the political process, to assassinate Sunni 
rivals to Iranian-backed politicians.
138
 It is widely believed amongst parts of the 
Sunni population that Iranian operatives were behind the fateful destruction of the 
al-Askari mosque in Samarra, because it was a ‘sophisticated operation’ that 
required the systematic ‘planting [of] some 400 pounds of explosives’ which would 
have taken twenty men four hours to complete.
139
 Of course it is extremely difficult 
when it comes to these allegations to distinguish between fact and the expression of 
anti-Iranian prejudices, which are prevalent in Iraq. It is, however, possible that Iran 
did use its clients in Iraq to ‘stoke sectarian tensions;’ indeed some Mahdi Army 
militiamen claimed that Iran had paid them to attack other Shi’ite groups ‘in the 
hope that al-Qaeda would be blamed, thereby reigniting flagging sectarian 
violence.’140 Indeed, whether or not Iran wanted to be involved in Iraq’s sectarian 
war, when its Shi’ite clients turned their arms on Iraqi Sunnis, Iran became a player 
nonetheless.
141
 
Iraqi state weakness allowed a host of sub-state actors to conduct 
independent relationships with Iran in competition with the Iraqi executive. The 
Iraqi state’s inability to provide security and other public goods at a local level 
empowered sub-state actors who sought material and financial support from 
neighbouring Iran. The violence engaged in by these actors further de-legitimised 
the Iraqi state, which was clearly unable to deliver security to its citizens, in addition 
to spurring on the creation of ever more local militias. This cycle of internal 
violence in Iraq was fuelled in part by Iranian intervention and was allowed to 
continue because many Iraqi politicians were incentivised to maintain favourable 
individual relationships with Iran. Foreign policy making had become diffuse in 
Iraq, and the failure of the Iraqis to form a single foreign policy front rendered them 
extremely vulnerable to Iranian intervention that was ultimately detrimental to Iraq’s 
national security. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
violence on the presence of US troops and said ‘the US and Britain will eventually have to leave Iraq 
with a bitter experience.’ Cited in Cordesman, Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict, 214.  
138
 Iraqi MP Abdulla al-Jabori, who has survived several assassination attempts, claims that although 
those who tried to kill him were Sunnis they were being paid by Iran. Such a claim clearly fits into 
this MP’s political agenda, so should be treated with healthy scepticism, but there is no evidence one 
way or the other. Abdulla al- Jabori, 'Interview with author', (Amman, 2013). 
139
 Cordesman, Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict, 251-2. 
140
 Eisenstadt, Knights, and Ali, 'Iran's Influence in Iraq',  11. 
141
 The Iranian-backed Mahdi Army would become one of the main protagonists in the sectarian 
violence against the Sunni community during the civil war.  
116 
 
Shutting Down Mujahedin-e Khalq 
Iranian influence in Iraq has had its limits, however, particularly because during this 
period the US was still deeply involved in Iraqi politics and held a lot of its own 
leverage over the heads of Iraqi politicians. Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) is an Iraq-
based Iranian opposition group renowned for its internally abusive and cult-like 
practices,
142
 and for its violent attacks against the Iranian regime. It was founded as 
a Marxist-Islamist movement that participated in the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, 
but in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution it was shut out of power. Its violent 
activities led to it being expelled from Iran, and its alleged assassinations of 
American citizens resulted in its designation as a terrorist organisation. Initially they 
took refuge in France and then in 1986 the core membership moved to Iraq. Saddam 
Hussein sponsored the organisation and they fought alongside Iraq in the Iran-Iraq 
war, thereby losing most of their domestic Iranian support. Suspected of helping 
Saddam to suppress popular uprisings in Iraq in 1991, the MEK is also widely 
despised in Iraq.
143
 In the aftermath of the US invasion, the MEK were, therefore, in 
a very vulnerable position. In May 2003 coalition forces made the controversial 
decision to accept a ceasefire with the MEK, and its 3,800 members were moved to 
an ‘assigned residence’ at Camp Ashraf where they were protected by coalition 
troops.
144
  
Dismantling the MEK is one of Iran’s core foreign policy aims, and its 
continued protected status in post-war Iraq has been ‘a source of persistent anxiety 
for Tehran.’145 Weeks before the US invasion, Iran had offered to put all its strategic 
assets on the table – its nuclear programme, its support of Hezbollah, its al-Qaeda 
prisoners and its opposition to the Arab league peace deal – in return for the 
handover of the MEK and an end to hostile US behaviour towards Iran.
146
 For the 
relinquishing of the MEK to be included in such a high level deal indicates just how 
seriously Iran takes the threat presented by the organisation. 
                                                          
142
 Research conducted by Human Rights Watch documented many of the MEK’s abusive practices 
including forced divorces, solitary confinement, mental and physical abuse, torture and preventing 
members from leaving the organization. Human Rights Watch, 'No Exit: Human Rights Abuses 
Inside the MKO Camps', (2005). 
143
 Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace, 304. 
144
 Jeremiah Goulka et al., The Mujahedin-e Khalq: A Policy Conundrum (Washington D.C.: RAND 
National Defense Research Institute, 2009) xiii. 
145
 Milani, 'Iran's Strategic Objectives in Post-Saddam Iraq', 92. 
146
 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 245-6. 
117 
 
Perhaps because of its strategic value to Iran, the US has completely refused 
to allow the MEK to be forcibly returned to Iran despite the latter’s promise that 
rank and file MEK members will not be prosecuted and in spite of evidence that the 
273 MEK members who have voluntarily returned have not been mistreated.
147
 In 
June 2003 MEK leader Maryam Rajivi was arrested in France, triggering a furious 
response from US Senator Sam Brownback who accused France of doing ‘the 
Iranian government’s dirty work.’148 The arrested members were subsequently 
released.  
The Iranians have tried every which way to pressure Iraqi governments into 
shutting down the MEK camps but, despite Iraqi sympathy with the Iranians,
149
 the 
US has been unmovable on the issue and the Iranians were unable to move against 
the MEK until the US handed over control of internal Iraqi security to Iraqi forces in 
2009.
150
 The MEK affair has been a test of wills between the Iranian and the 
American governments, with each using their respective influence over the Iraqi 
state against each other. The weakness of the Iraqi state gave both the US and Iran 
enormous leverage over the Iraqi political system, but ultimately Iran’s inability to 
pressurise a receptive Iraqi government into acting against the MEK demonstrates 
that the US was still by some distance the most powerful of the foreign actors in Iraq 
at the time.
151
 
Iran and the Iraqi Foreign Ministry 
The close relationship between the Iraqi government and Iran has led the Iraqi 
Foreign Ministry to pursue a close and affable relationship with Iran. At the UN, for 
instance, Iran and Iraq have a very close working relationship, especially since 
senior SCIRI member Hamid al-Bayati was installed as Iraq’s representative to the 
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UN in 2006. Iraq cannot always vote with its neighbour at the UN, usually because 
of US or Arab League pressure, but where it cannot support Iran it will tend to 
abstain rather than voting against the country.
152
 Iraq’s representation at the UN 
appears to share all its notes from bi-lateral meetings with other countries with the 
Iranian representative, and on occasion the Iranians have been accused of using 
underhand tactics to trick the Iraqi representation to the UN into voting with Iran 
despite clear instructions from the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to abstain from the vote.
153
 
Such unusual diplomatic behaviour has gone unchastised, however, because of the 
depth of the relationship between Baghdad and Tehran. Where outstanding 
diplomatic issues between the two countries have been resolved, they have tended to 
come down slightly in favour of the Iranians. From the earliest days of the post-
invasion Iraqi government, Iran pushed Iraq to recognise the 1975 Algiers 
Agreement which demarcated Iran and Iraq’s land and river borders.154 The 
agreement, which was first signed between the Iranian Shah and a pre-Presidential 
Saddam Hussein, had been broken by both countries before being reinstated in 1990 
by Saddam, who was desperate for Iranian passivity in the face of his invasion of 
Kuwait.
155
 Iraq’s interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi said that the Iranians had 
pressured him to ‘re-implement the 1975 agreement signed between Saddam 
Hussein and the Shah of Iran,’ but that he did not believe the agreement as it stood 
was in Iraq’s best interests, and so refused.156 A senior aide to Ja’fari told how the 
Prime Minister almost affirmed the 1975 accords by accident on a visit to Iran. The 
aide said that he was not comfortable with re-invoking the 1975 agreement as the 
Iranians had requested because it ‘accepted what the Shah had forced on us,’ but that 
the Prime Minister told him to go with whatever Foreign Minister Zebari thought. In 
the end Prime Minister Ja’fari saw the communiqué ‘endorsing whatever had been 
agreed between the Shah and Saddam’ and refused to read it out, declaring that ‘the 
Iraqi Parliament should approve this.’157  
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Though there now appears to be a recognition of the 1975 accord by the Iraqi 
government,
158
 the demarcation of borders is still one of the most important issues in 
the Iran-Iraq diplomatic relationship and continues to be a matter for negotiation 
between the two countries.
159
 Foreign Minister Zebari described continuing 
negotiations over borders as one of the ‘main tenets’ of his relationship with Iran’s 
foreign service, detailing how environmental changes were affecting river borders 
and ‘depriving me [Iraq] of many, many rights.’ The issue also sparks furious 
debates in the Iraqi parliament between those who want to resolve the issue 
amicably and those who see Iraq’s willingness to compromise on its interests as 
evidence of nefarious Iranian influence in Iraq. One parliamentarian from an anti-
Iranian Sunni bloc complained that some of Iraq’s political parties had an ‘alliance’ 
and ‘relations with the Tehran government’ and that they ‘sympathized 
with...Iranian aggression against Iraq’ and were willing to support Iran even by 
undermining Iraqi sovereignty.
160
 For Foreign Minister Zebari, emphasizing his role 
in matters pertaining to the ‘national interest’ is one way in which he highlights his 
legitimacy, professionalism and credibility as a foreign policy actor, especially in 
contrast to alternative foreign policy actors, including the Prime Minister and 
parliamentarians. Zebari declares that Iraqi members of parliament try to interfere 
with foreign policy matters in order to ‘show off’ and to give themselves a ‘false 
sense of outreach’, and accuses them of being ‘extremely unhelpful to the interests 
of their country’.161 Zebari similarly depicts Prime Minister Maliki as emotional, 
paranoid and somewhat sectarian in his approach to foreign policy, and describes 
himself as patiently guiding the Prime Minister towards making choices that better 
reflect Iraq’s national interest. In this way Zebari seeks to present himself as the pre-
eminent Iraqi foreign policy actor; in his own words Zebari says ‘you should not be 
entrapped [into thinking] there are many actors…the one who is in charge is the 
foreign ministry.’162 
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 Another very controversial aspect of the Iran-Iraq diplomatic relationship 
deals with the aftermath of the astoundingly destructive eight-year Iran-Iraq war. 
Because Saddam was the initial aggressor in this war, the Iranian government has 
sought an apology, recognition of responsibility and the payment of war reparations 
from the Iraqis, a principle that is fiercely resisted by much of the Iraqi 
population.
163
 This has not, however, stopped some Iraqi politicians from attempting 
to endear themselves to Iran by accepting responsibility for the war. In 2005, Sunni 
Defence Minister Sadoun al-Dulaymi said, ‘I have come to Iran to ask for 
forgiveness for what Saddam Hussein has done,’164 and the late leader of SCIRI, 
Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim ‘went so far as to state that Iraq should accept the principle of 
paying reparations to Iran.’165  
The extent of the political ties between Iran and a range of Iraqi politicians 
has compromised the ability of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to identify and act 
according to the Iraqi national interest. Diplomats are subjected to pressure on the 
part of pro-Iranian politicians, and some make calculations based not on the Iraqi 
national interest, but on the basis of the material and career-enhancing rewards that 
may come from supporting a pro-Iranian politician. The level of Iraqi state weakness 
has, therefore, not only made it possible for diplomats to work intimately with a 
foreign country without being penalised, but has also rewarded them for doing so. 
Soft Power 
Iran has been less successful in its exercising of soft power in Iraq. The 2003 
invasion liberated the Iraqi Hawza, and there has been an eruption of activity in 
Najaf with billions of dollars and tens of thousands of students flooding into the city 
ever since.
166
 Najaf is fast returning to its traditional position as the pre-eminent seat 
of Shi’ite scholarship in the world, after Qom in Iran had been able to usurp that 
position during the Ba’athist years. Iran’s brand of active clericalism has been firmly 
overtaken by the quietist approach exemplified by Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Sistani, 
who has proven to be the world’s most popular Shi’ite religious authority. Although 
                                                          
163
 Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi says that he ‘rejected’ the Iranian demand for ‘compensation 
for the [Iran-Iraq] war’ in 2004. Allawi, 'Interview with author'. 
164
 BBC, 'Former Enemies Iran and Iraq Say They Will Launch Broad Military Co-Operation 
Including Training Iraqi Armed Forces' (7th July 2005). 
165
 Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace, 304. 
166
 Abbas Kadhim, 'The Hawza and Its Role in Post-War Iraq', Iraq Studies Workshop (Boston 
University, 30th November 2012). 
121 
 
Iran has ‘spent prodigious sums of state monies to fund the activities of politicized 
clerics associated with Qom,’167 Iran is unlikely to be able to make much progress 
until the death of Ayatollah Sistani, at which point it is suspected they will try to 
influence the process of selecting the next Iraqi marja’.168 
The antagonism of the Iraqi general public towards Iran has also been 
difficult for Iran to overcome, and its efforts to establish Arabic-speaking TV and 
radio channels in Iraq have also struggled to shift Iraqi perceptions of Iran.
169
    
Economic Ties 
Iran has benefited an extraordinary amount economically from its strong relations 
with the post-war Iraqi political milieu. Iranian exports to Iraq, which are often 
subsidised, have provided a much-needed source of revenue for the Iranians whilst 
undercutting Iraqi producers and stymieing Iraq’s own economic development.170 
Iran also manages an extensive oil smuggling operation between Iran and Iraq with 
the co-operation of local Iraqi officials.
171
 In addition to the ubiquitous presence of 
Iranian traders in southern Iraq, 40 thousand Iranian pilgrims flood into Iraq each 
month, and Iranian currency is widely in use in southern Iraq.
172
 Although the 
pilgrim trade is critical to the economy in towns like Najaf and Karbala, it is also the 
case that Iraqis are gaining only a fraction of the potential economic benefit because 
a massive Iranian-run service industry caters to the pilgrims in Iraqi territory and 
repatriates the profits back to Iran.
173
 Iran is adept at distributing largesse through an 
extensive network of charities and NGOs including Iran’s Red Crescent, The Imam 
Relief Committee and the Persian Green Relief Institute, but it has been accused of 
leveraging such funds for political benefit.
174
 Similarly, Iran has been suspected of 
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cutting off its electricity supply to Iraqi provinces as a form of punishment for the 
political transgressions of local politicians.
175
 
Iranian Relations with Kurdistan 
Iraq’s Kurds have drawn on Iranian support at numerous points in their long struggle 
for independence from Baghdad. Although the Shah of Iran’s betrayal of the Kurds 
in 1975 was one of the many great tragedies in Kurdish history, Kurds also 
remember positive moments in their relationship with Iran – including Iran’s 
willingness to allow 1 million Kurdish refugees to enter Iran when Saddam Hussein 
was ruthlessly suppressing the 1991 uprisings.
176
 But, of Kurdistan’s two major 
political parties, it is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that has the stronger 
relationship with Iran. Perhaps it is merely down to the position of its headquarter, 
the city of Suleymaniyah, on Iran’s border – but the PUK has both drawn on Iranian 
support more frequently and has been subject to greater Iranian pressure than the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). During the fractious civil war that took place 
between the PUK and KDP in the mid-1990s, Iran was invited in by the PUK to help 
push back KDP advances. The KDP meanwhile deployed Saddam Hussein’s 
firepower against its fellow Iraqi Kurds in this little discussed period of Kurdish 
history.  
Iraqi Kurdistan has experienced de facto independence since the 
internationally enforced no-fly zone came into effect in the aftermath of the first 
Gulf War, and the region was a great deal ahead of the rest of Iraq by 2005 in terms 
of its political and economic development. As Iraq began to descend into civil war, 
the Kurdish region was going from strength to strength. The Kurdish regional 
government was normatively strong, being the product of a decades long struggle 
for self-determination, and was considerably more successful than the Iraqi 
government in its delivery of basic public goods. The civil war in central Iraq 
enabled the Kurds to become increasingly independent in all aspects of governance, 
including in foreign affairs. In 2006 the KDP and PUK merged their previously 
separate administrations into a single, central Kurdish government and were far 
stronger for it. Also in 2006, as the Iraqi Foreign Ministry was paralysed by the 
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fighting in Baghdad, the Kurds established a Department of Foreign Relations to 
develop a Kurdish foreign policy and to oversee Kurdistan’s burgeoning collection 
of foreign representations.   
Whilst Iran was able to throw its weight around in a very weak Iraqi capital 
in 2005 and 2006, Iraqi Kurdistan was able to conduct relations with Iran in a 
slightly more dignified way. Of course Iran is an extremely powerful player in 
Kurdish politics, not least because as a landlocked region, Kurdistan is entirely 
dependent on good relations with Iran and Turkey for its economic survival.
177
 
Nonetheless, the Kurdish government enjoyed higher levels of both functional and 
normative legitimacy as compared with Baghdad, and was thus able to stand a little 
taller in the face of Iran’s might.  
Political figures in Iraq like to say that ‘Iran has more influence in 
Suleymaniyah than Najaf,’178 but the vectors of possible influence in a rising 
Kurdistan were fewer than in a disintegrating Baghdad. For both Iran and for the 
Kurds the relationship has been about picking the right battles. The Kurds have been 
willing to turn a blind eye to Iranian bombing of the Iranian-Kurdish opposition 
group Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê’s (PJAK) positions in rural Kurdistan, but 
have drawn a line when it comes to the targeting of peaceful Iranian Kurdish 
opposition groups operating in the region’s cities.179 Iran has, meanwhile, tolerated a 
far greater level of Kurdish independence than it is comfortable with, on condition 
that the Kurds do not support any moves to completely withdraw from the central 
Iraqi government. One Kurdish Minister said that when the PUK floated the idea of 
withdrawing support from an Iran-backed government in Baghdad, Iranian Quds 
Force Commander Qasim Suleimani responded that it would certainly be a shame if 
ten more groups like Ansar al-Islam were to show up in Kurdistan.
180
 The 
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insinuation was that Iran would allow or even enable extremist militants to strike at 
targets within the Kurdish region to punish the Kurds if they withdrew support from 
the Iraqi government.  
Policing the border between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan is, however, a two-way 
street, with effective border policing being valuable to both parties. After all, both 
have spoilers seeking to use the border lands to launch attacks.
181
 Cross border trade 
with Iraqi Kurdistan has also become a source of goods for an Iran that is restricted 
by sanctions. The import of fuel and technological equipment across the border from 
Iraqi Kurdistan has been particularly important to Iran.
182
   
Although the central Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) recognises its 
relationship with Iran to be one of its two most strategically valuable 
relationships,
183
 there is evidence that the PUK administration in Suleymaniyah has 
a closer partnership with Iran than the KRG does as a whole. One prominent Sunni 
financier claimed that PUK leader Jalal Talabani was ‘100% with Iran’ and enjoyed 
closer relations with Iran than the Iraqi Shi’ite politicians,184 whilst Kurdish 
opposition group Goran complained that the PUK was merely ‘an extension of 
Iran’s foreign policy.’185 Suleymaniyah shares 1,500km of border with Iran, much of 
its food is imported over it, and Iranian tourists offer Suleymaniyah an important 
source of revenue.
186
 One PUK official also commented that the PUK was 
committed to ‘tread carefully’ in its relationship with Iran because although Iraqi 
Kurdistan could not be defeated by the Iraqi army, the Iranians could ‘kill us, 
economically and militarily.’187 Although PUK politicians do not admit to this, it is 
also possible that their relationship with Iran continues to be seen as a source of 
leverage for the PUK in its continuing low-level competition with the KDP, not least 
because of the very strong relations between the KDP and the Turkish government.  
Iraqi state weakness enabled the federal Kurdish region to conduct its foreign 
relations almost entirely independently of Baghdad. The KRG even established an 
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unconstitutional Department of Foreign Relations to manage its diplomatic affairs. 
The federal region, though part of the structure of the new Iraqi state, was 
empowered beyond its constitutional remit by the weakness in Baghdad and it took 
advantage of that to challenge the foreign policy authority of the central 
government. The KRG, and in particular the PUK, has provided Iran with yet 
another vector of influence in internal Iraqi affairs, and is further evidence that state 
weakness empowers sub-state actors in the field of foreign policy. 
The End of the Ja’fari Government 
Once Prime Minister Ja’fari’s transitional government had written a constitution and 
squeezed it past a public referendum, it was time for new parliamentary elections. 
After a disastrous year in which Iraq had fragmented faster and more dangerously 
than at any point before, the Americans were adamant that Ja’fari should not be 
returned to power. Ja’fari had not only been ‘unready to take on the Shi’ite 
militias,’188 he had come to tie his political fortunes to their success. It is possible 
that Ja’fari in fact sympathised with the Sadrist cause. He had been opposed to the 
US invasion of Iraq, calling it an invasion that ‘attacked all dignities’; he believed 
that the Sadrist trend had emerged from ‘the heart of suffering’ and was frustrated 
that the US refused to understand the roots of the Sadrist cause.
189
 Whether it was 
out of ideological affinity or political expedience, Ja’fari secured the backing of both 
Iran and the Sadrists for a second term.
190
 For their part, the Americans came to the 
decision that Muqtada al-Sadr had become a political ‘crutch’ for Prime Minister 
Ja’fari and they decisively withdrew their support from any political settlement that 
would return him to power.
191
 US Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad told Shi’ite 
leaders that President Bush ‘doesn’t want, doesn’t support, doesn’t accept’ the return 
of the ‘weak’ and ‘sectarian’ Ja’fari to power.192 The Americans even indirectly 
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involved Shi’ite clerical leader Grand Ayatollah Sistani in its operation to dump 
Ja’fari, sending him a presidential letter that articulated America’s desire to ‘work 
with someone who had the support of all Iraqis.’193 In his reply, Ayatollah Sistani 
seemed on board with the US plan. Prime Minister Ja’fari dragged his feet in the 
government formation process, reluctant to let go of power. Finally, in early April 
2006, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Ja’fari and frankly told him 
that it was ‘time to step aside,’ and by 20th April Ja’fari had indeed stepped aside, 
making way for a new Iraqi government.
194
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that the severe deficit of normative and functional 
legitimacy experienced by the Ja’fari government undermined its ability to 
monopolize foreign policy making in Iraq and to protect Iraqi national security.  
 Though some have questioned whether Iraq did in fact experience civil war, 
according to the scale and nature of violence in the country during this period Iraq 
can be said ‘by any reasonable definition’ to be have been ‘in the midst of a civil 
war.’195 As the cycle of violence and revenge violence escalated, Iraq ‘was 
imploding.’196 The inability of the government to provide security and public goods 
– and its widespread participation in the sectarian violence – ceded legitimacy and 
power to local militias, parties and vigilante groups who could provide these things 
at a local level. The Sadrists were organising garbage collections, they were 
providing electricity and schooling and security patrols. When the Sadrists talked to 
Iran they were, therefore, empowered by their clear local support and de facto 
jurisdiction. In the absence of state control, sub-state actors were able to become 
purveyors of foreign policy. The Sadrists even set up their own alternative 
government, including a Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
197
 Sunni groups reached out 
to the Arab world, imploring them to intervene to stop the decimation of Iraq’s 
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Sunni population, whilst factions running particular floors of the Ministry of Interior 
building could conduct their own independent relationships with Iran. 
Not only were Iraq’s sub-sate actors empowered as foreign policy actors, but 
Iraq’s security vacuum also yielded opportunities for foreign powers to pursue their 
own national interests in the country.
198
 For Iran, Iraq had long been a country of 
immense strategic importance and as a result was worth a great deal of investment in 
this particularly opportune moment. To guarantee that its long-term interests in Iraq 
would be protected, the Iranians pursued multiple, often contradictory, strategies; 
creating a brand of guerrilla warfare ‘that combines electioneering, smart 
information/media strategy, economic involvement and social services with a 
diplomatic, military and civil presence.’199 Though Iran failed to persuade the Iraqi 
public that it was a positive force in the country, Iran did manage to co-opt an wide 
array of political actors in Iraq and was successfully able to secure its diplomatic 
interests.  
At the height of Iraq’s sectarian civil war it became clear that ‘aggressive 
IRCG activity detrimental to US interests’200 was achieving one of Iran’s major 
goals, namely to unsettle the American ‘occupation’ of Iraq. When Iraqi politicians 
implored Iran to help them reduce the scale of the civil conflict, Iran’s Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khamanei replied that it was the foreign troops who were to 
blame, declaring that ‘the presence of foreign troops is damaging for the Iraqis, and 
the Iraqi government should ask for their departure by proposing a timetable.’ 
Khamanei was confident that ‘the US and Britain will eventually have to leave Iraq 
with a bitter experience.’201 Indeed the Baker-Hamilton Report, which conducted a 
review of Coalition policy in Iraq, concluded that ‘given the ability of Iran… to 
influence events within Iraq…the United States should try to engage them 
constructively.’202  
The reality of Iranian influence in Iraq led some Sunni politicians to implore 
Arab states to interfere more in Iraqi politics, to provide a counterbalance to Iran. In 
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an extraordinary approach to the conduct of foreign affairs, Iraq’s Ambassador to 
the Arab League responded to complaints from the Gulf states about the level of 
Iranian influence in Iraqi politics saying, ‘why leave it to Iran then? Why not come 
and influence also?’203 With a collapse of the central government’s capacity to 
secure the country and to provide public goods, Iraq was open for foreign 
interference. 
 This period demonstrates the clear relationship between Iraqi state weakness 
and the empowerment of sub-state actors in the foreign policy arena. A range of 
Iraqi political parties, militia groups, and the Kurdistan Regional Government all 
conducted their own, independent relations with Iran in a bid to use Iranian power to 
gain influence against their domestic political rivals. The result was a significant 
weakening of Iraq’s ability to define and pursue its own national interest vis-à-vis 
Iran. Iraq, meanwhile, was vulnerable to Iran’s vigorous and multi-pronged pursuit 
of its own interests in the country. It was only the deep-seated antagonism towards 
the Iranians on the part of the Iraqi public, and the presence of US forces and 
American political leverage on the Iraqi political scene, that was able to 
meaningfully limit the extent of Iranian gains in civil war Iraq. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: TURKEY AND A STABILISING 
IRAQ 
 
Introduction 
This chapter argues that the poor functional and normative legitimacy enjoyed by 
the early government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki allowed the emergence of 
the Sunni tribal Awakening Councils as powerful sub-state actors who worked in 
conjunction with the US despite the objections of the Iraqi government. However, 
the success of these Councils, along with the increasing willingness of the Maliki 
government crackdown on Shi’ite militancy, led to a reduction of violence. This 
stabilization process prompted neighbouring Turkey to seek out a stronger economic 
relationship with Iraq. The weak state framework would expect that this rise in Iraqi 
government strength would led to a concomitant weakening in the ability of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), as a sub-state actor, to conduct foreign 
policy. This period, however, witnesses a flourishing of the KRG’s relationship with 
Turkey to the extent that Turkey seems prepared to jeopardize its relationship with 
the central government in Baghdad to maintain its relationship with the KRG. This 
calls into question the extent to which the weak state framework is able to make 
provisions for the unique ability of a regional government to build up long-term 
institutional strength that can become insensitive to changes in the central 
government.  
 The period between 2007 and 2009 was extraordinarily tumultuous. Iraq 
elected a new government, but the Premier himself was chosen in a relatively 
undemocratic backroom scuffle in which the Americans wielded a great deal of 
political influence. In his early days in power, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki failed 
to establish significant functional or normative legitimacy in the Sunni community 
as he continued his predecessor’s policy of allowing Shi’ite militias free reign. Iraqi 
Sunni communities began to look to local tribal groups for security, because they 
felt increasingly threatened both by Iraqi government forces and by existing 
extremist Sunni militants. These tribal groups, many of whom had previously 
decried the illegitimacy of US forces in Iraq, turned to the US for support and 
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protection against Iraqi government forces. The so-called Awakening Councils can 
be seen as sub-state actors challenging the authority of the state over foreign policy. 
Empowered by their local communities and fearful of a government that not only 
failed to provide security but was itself a violent actor, these tribal councils worked 
directly with the Americans to protect Sunni populations as well as to protect and 
enrich themselves.  
Afraid that his regime security was increasingly being challenged by other 
Shi’ite actors, Prime Minister Maliki chose to work with the US troop surge to crush 
the Shi’ite militias, which led to a dramatic fall in the level of violence. As the Iraqi 
state began to recapture a measure of normative and functional legitimacy, it became 
an increasingly attractive foreign policy partner and embarked on a new relationship 
with neighbouring Turkey. The relationship, however, did not stay positive for long. 
As the Kurdish region aggressively pursued a favourable relationship with Turkey, 
the latter was forced to effectively chose between dealing with the Iraqi state or the 
Kurdish region. Turkey chose to deal with the Kurdish region, raising questions 
about the relative functional capacity of the Kurdish Regional Government as 
compared with the Iraqi central government. It is possible that Turkey found the 
Kurdish region a more productive partner than the Iraqi state because, despite it 
lacking formal-legal sovereignty, it boasts a strong local government that is highly 
legitimate, and it can better deliver on its agreements with the Turkish state. 
Maliki Comes to Power 
The interim government of Prime Minister Ja’fari oversaw the drafting and 
enactment of Iraq’s new constitution and shortly afterwards came to the end of its 
mandate. Elections for a new Iraqi government were held on 15
th
 December 2005 
and, unlike the elections in January 2005, there was extensive participation from all 
Iraq’s ethno-sectarian communities. The same grand Shi’ite coalition that had won 
the previous elections once again won a plurality of seats, coming in with 47% of 
parliamentary seats, whilst Sunni and Kurdish parties garnered 21% of the seats 
apiece.
1
 The winning coalition was quickly bedevilled by internal machinations over 
who should emerge as the new Prime Minister, with Sunni and Kurdish politicians 
weighing in on behalf of their preferred candidates.  
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The majority opinion in the US administration was that Ja’fari should not be 
allowed to return, but deciding on a figure with which to replace him was more 
difficult. The US wanted a partner in Iraq who would be stronger and more effective 
than Ja’fari had been, but was also adamant that the new Prime Minister should not 
be beholden to Iran, as Ja’fari was perceived to be. Senior SCIRI member Adel 
Abdul Mahdi was one possible contender, but fears were raised about his deference 
to the pro-Iranian SCIRI leadership,
2
 and diplomatic opinion was split over his 
candidature.
3
 It was also reported that Prime Minister Ja’fari had refused to step 
down unless the premiership remained within the Da’wah party, leaving SCIRI’s 
Adel Abdul Mahdi out in the cold.
4
 One favoured Da’wah party candidate, Ali al-
Adeeb, was passed over for his ‘suspected Iranian ties,’5 after reportedly being 
humiliated at a Da’wah Party gathering for having an Iranian father.6 The man who 
confronted Ali al-Adeeb was Nouri al-Maliki, a relatively unknown Da’wah Party 
functionary who would become America’s favoured candidate for Prime Minister. 
In an embassy cable US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad wrote that Maliki was one 
of the Iraqi government’s ‘most tireless operators’ and that his militant anti-
Ba’athist credentials and ‘deep unease’ about Iran’s role in Iraq made him a good 
prospective Iraqi leader.
7
 When he was approached by the Americans about taking 
on the premiership, Nouri al-Maliki eloquently talked about the need to reconcile 
Iraq’s warring sectarian communities, about the importance of restoring the Iraqi 
government’s ability to provide basic services and about the urgency of re-
establishing control over the violence within the capital.
8
 He quickly won the 
confidence of the US administration, and once Ambassador Khalilzad determined 
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that senior Kurdish and Sunni politicians were on board with the nomination, Nouri 
al-Maliki was on his way to being Iraq’s next Prime Minister.9  
The role that the US played in the selection of the Iraqi premier raises 
questions about the sovereignty of the Iraqi state, the power of the Iraqi electorate 
and the relative influence of the Iranians as compared with the Americans in Iraqi 
politics. The proportional representation electoral system instituted by the CPA in 
Iraq meant that elections would not return decisive victors,
10
 and that in the 
inevitable post-election horse trading there was ample opportunity for foreign 
powers to influence negotiations. Despite Iran’s extensive presence in Iraq during 
2006, the US administration was able to insert its favoured candidate into the 
premiership because it was heavily and forcefully engaged with the post-election 
process, and was willing to expend political capital bringing together an 
administration that it believed would serve its interests. Arguably the Iraqi people 
had very little input into the political process at this point. Fearful of the violence 
being unleashed in their neighbourhoods, Iraqis voted overwhelmingly along 
sectarian lines in the belief that greater representation of their communities in 
parliament might afford them greater protection.
11
 But Iraqis were voting for 
faceless lists of candidates in a closed list system, and were unable to judge the 
candidates based on their merits, reputation and local track record.
12
 The notion that 
Nouri al-Maliki’s route to the premiership began with a conversation with US 
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad would be deeply uncomfortable for most Iraqis, and 
speaks to the level of US involvement in Iraqi politics in the years that President 
Bush was in office.
13
 In the aftermath of the parliamentary elections in 2010 the 
Americans would famously lose out to the Iranians when it came to determining 
who would emerge as premier, which was partly a result of the Obama 
administration’s relative disengagement from the Iraqi political process at that stage.  
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The inauguration of Prime Minister Maliki on 20
th
 May 2006 was not to be 
the panacea that the Americans hoped it would be. US political and military strategy 
rested on the assumption that a normalisation of the Iraqi political process would 
provide a basis for political reconciliation and an end to violence in the country, but 
Iraq’s civil war only escalated in the months following Prime Minister Maliki’s rise 
to power.
14
 The new Prime Minister was cautious about taking any bold steps that 
might cost him political support. Although Maliki had told Condoleezza Rice before 
becoming prime minister that ‘all will be lost if we can’t demonstrate we can 
govern,’15 in his first months in office he was ‘diffident, quiet, nervous,’ and deeply 
suspicious of those around him.
16
 Deputy Foreign Minister Labeed Abbawi said that 
in terms of his level of control over the government, Maliki’s first term was ‘not 
different from Ja’fari.’17 Just five months into his term in office, the US was already 
losing faith in Maliki. In October 2006 Condoleezza Rice returned from a trip to 
Iraq ‘discouraged with Maliki and the other leaders’ who seemed ‘determined to 
fight a sectarian war.’18 Maliki was hampering US military efforts to reduce militia 
violence by refusing to allow attacks against Shi’ite militias.19 When one such raid 
against the Mahdi Army did occur, Maliki made a TV appearance denouncing the 
operation and promising that it would not ‘happen again.’20 National Security 
Adviser Stephen Hadley met with Maliki in October 2006 and concluded that the 
Prime Minister was either ‘ignorant’ and incompetent, or was actively 
‘misrepresenting his intentions’ to the US.21 Leading US military figures were 
convinced that Maliki was deliberately stymieing their success in pursuit of his own 
sectarian agenda.
22
 Charges of Maliki’s sectarianism are widespread across the Iraqi 
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political spectrum and in diplomatic circles.
23
 Though Maliki was not necessarily 
anti-Sunni in any ideological or theological sense, he often suspected Sunnis of 
being Ba’athists or as terrorists, and therefore as the primary threat to his 
government and to Iraqi national security.
24
 
Of course Prime Minister Maliki was coming into an extremely difficult 
position; leading a country under foreign occupation and in the midst of a raging 
civil war was no easy task, and some American officials advocated giving him more 
than a few months in the job before declaring him a failure.  
Continuing Violence in Iraq 
Sectarian violence was rapidly escalating in Iraq, and was increasingly 
overshadowing insurgent activity as the biggest threat to Iraq’s survival.25 In May 
and June 2006, as Prime Minister Maliki came to office, an estimated 5,818 Iraqi 
civilians were violently killed,
26
 many of them surfacing in morgues with gunshot or 
drill wounds to the head, burns on their bodies, eyes gouged out or bearing other 
signs of torture.
27
 The violence inflicted on civilians came in many forms, including 
kidnappings and executions as well as drive-by shootings, killings at check-points 
and indiscriminate bomb attacks.
28
 Even after the killing of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s 
leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and the subsequent capture of 759 suspected 
insurgents, violence continued unabated.
29
 Internal displacement became an 
increasing problem as people fled areas in which their sect formed a minority, and a 
record number of refugees left Iraq for neighbouring Syria and Jordan.
30
 Baghdad’s 
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districts became increasingly homogenised sectarian enclaves defended by locally 
organised militias and vigilante groups.
31
 The Iraqi economy, meanwhile reached 
‘its weakest point since the invasion’ as food prices soared, fuel became even more 
scarce
32
 and unemployment levels reached up to 60%.
33
 
In June 2006 Prime Minister Maliki tried to launch a national reconciliation 
initiative which was quickly mired in controversy. In trying to make the initiative 
more politically palatable, Maliki watered down the amnesty provisions so much 
that active militants would most likely not qualify for amnesty – thereby somewhat 
defeating the purpose of the proposal.
34
 An enormous joint troop deployment of US 
and Iraqi troops on the streets of Baghdad also did nothing to restrain the sectarian 
violence, as the average of almost twenty-four attacks a day in Baghdad remained 
unchanged after the operation.
35
 The Mahdi Army, which was one of the main 
perpetrators of sectarian violence, was increasingly untouchable with thirty seats in 
parliament, control of six ministries and the tacit protection of the Prime Minister.
36
 
Meanwhile, US military commanders in Iraq pressed on with plans to ‘handover’ to 
Iraqi forces despite the escalating violence and clear evidence of the unsuitability of 
elements in the Iraqi military and police.
37
 
The ‘Awakening’ 
Sunni tribal leaders had made efforts to reach out to American forces on a number of 
occasions before 2006, with little success. Back in October 2003, military 
intelligence officers established that local tribal sheikhs were open to the idea of 
working with the Americans to bring stability and prosperity to their localities. A 
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plan was written up for eighteen tribal leaders to be given weapons, vehicles and 
money to police their own areas. But the proposal was rebuffed by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, who did not see it as a necessary or important addition to 
existing US strategy.
38
 In 2005 a group of tribal sheikhs, some of whom had 
previously participated in attacks against coalition forces, turned against al-Qaeda 
and encouraged their members to participate in the electoral process and to join the 
local police forces. Known as the Anbar People’s Council, they established contact 
with the local American commander, but received no support after coming under 
sustained attack from al-Qaeda. A month later the council had been decimated, with 
fully half of its leadership murdered and the remainder fleeing for their lives.
39
 A 
vicious cycle ensued whereby a lack of successful US engagement with Sunni 
provinces enabled militant groups to strengthen, pushing the Americans to retreat 
further into their heavily fortified bases. Periodic US raids on al-Qaeda positions in 
Anbar province would be fiercely counter-attacked and would exact high casualty 
rates on US soldiers without achieving lasting gains. Meanwhile towns lay in ruins, 
ravaged by the fighting, with barely any functioning services, and without even a 
working communications infrastructure.
40
 The Intelligence Chief of the US Marines 
summed up the state of affairs saying, ‘the political and military situation has 
deteriorated to a point that MNF [Multi-National Forces] and ISF [Iraqi Security 
Forces] are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency.’41  
In the early summer of 2006 Colonel Sean MacFarland arrived in Ramadi, 
the capital of the Anbar province, determined to take some risks in pursuit of 
success in the city.
42
 A new relationship between McFarland’s brigade and three 
tribes in the regions around Ramadi was cautiously forged, starting with co-
operation in a recruitment drive for local police.
43
 al-Qaeda responded viciously, 
bombing police stations and assassinating tribesmen, but the Americans stood by the 
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tribesmen, offering solid military, financial and moral support and demonstrating 
their commitment to their new partners.
44
 The al-Qaeda attacks backfired, 
strengthening the relationship between the Americans and their tribal partners, and 
driving new tribes to join the arrangement.
45
 By September 2006, twenty-five of the 
thirty-one tribes in the Anbar region had joined the partnership with the coalition 
forces, with an estimated 30,000 armed men at their disposal.
46
 According to Col. 
MacFarland the so-called ‘Awakening’ was ‘incredibly effective’ in that ‘whenever 
a tribe flipped and joined the Awakening, all attacks on coalition forces in that area 
would stop,’ and if an attack were to happen ‘the sheikh would basically take 
responsibility for it and find whoever was responsible.’47 The US military estimated 
that there was a 40% fall in attacks in the Anbar province by the end of 2006.
48
 
These successes in Anbar continued to build throughout 2007 as more and more 
tribes joined the Awakening movement, police recruits flooded in to protect their 
local areas and violence against Iraqi and coalition targets continued to fall. 
According to General Petraeus, ‘monthly attack levels in Anbar...declined from 
some 1,350 in October 2006 to a bit over 200 in August [2007].’49 The dramatic 
turnaround of Anbar made waves in the military and led to the formation of similar, 
neighbourhood watch type vigilante groups known collectively as the ‘Sons of Iraq’ 
in Amiriyah, a Sunni dominated district of Baghdad, and in the provinces of Diyala 
and Salah al-Din. 
The Awakening as Sub-State Foreign Policy 
The US had a unique position in Iraq after the dismantling of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority, which is when it ceased to be an occupying power in Iraq. 
Although its extensive troop presence afforded the US a unique vector of influence 
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in Iraq, it was the Iraqis rather than the US who were actually administering the 
country. By 2007, the elected Iraqi government was increasingly established with its 
own political agenda and set of interests that often conflicted with those being 
pursued by the Americans.
50
 Fundamentally, US forces in Iraq were answerable to 
the US congress, which in turn was accountable to the American public – not to the 
Iraqi public. In a key brainstorming session on Iraq strategy, Pete Pace, Vice-
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reminded participants that, ‘the immediate 
center of gravity is the US public.’51 The US project in Iraq was hamstrung from the 
beginning by sensitivity to American election timetables, by its dogged focus on the 
arbitrary Congressional benchmarks measuring success in Iraq, and by its reluctance 
to consider policy directions that were politically unpalatable at home.
52
 In one 
illustrative incident, Deputy Defence Secretary Gordon England told Iraqi National 
Security Adviser Mowaffak al-Rubaie, ‘If the Congress doesn’t see you as 
progressing, we don’t get the money, we can’t help you, and it’s over.’53 US 
interests in Iraq were, at a fundamental level, different to those of Iraqis – even if 
they had the same short-term goals – and by 2007 the Iraqi government was 
beginning to establish a modicum of political and military independence from the 
Americans. It is, therefore, useful at this stage to think of US-Iraqi relations as a 
form of foreign relations – much as it is a unique relationship. 
If this is our starting point, the Awakening/Sons of Iraq movement can be 
seen as a foreign policy relationship between the US and a series of sub-state actors 
in Iraq. The tribes that participated in the Awakening were so successful in bringing 
local violence under control because they enjoyed legitimacy in their areas in a way 
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that the central Iraqi government did not. The state’s inability to provide security, to 
funnel public goods and services to these areas and its failure to speak about the 
Iraqi nation in a way that resonated with the locals meant that the Americans needed 
to work with local tribal power brokers in order to have an impact on the ground. 
There is evidence that ministries and local governments deliberately starved Sunni 
dominated areas of basic public goods and services including health and education 
services, fuel and cooking gas. One American captain who set up a local Awakening 
group said that the ‘sectarian nature of the Shi’ite dominated local government 
structures...made it very difficult to build legitimacy in the eyes of the Sunnis who 
were being marginalized by their local government.’54 It was also difficult for the 
nationally organised Iraqi army to operate effectively in the regions because of their 
lack of local capital. As Carter Malkasian writes, ‘no matter how much advising, 
training, or equipping’ the Americans offered the Iraqi army, it could not establish 
the local legitimacy it needed to avoid being seen as a hostile force of outsiders.
 55
 
Although the relative power and relevance of Iraq’s tribes has waxed and 
waned in different periods of Iraqi history, they have been resurgent in the Iraqi 
social landscape since 1991. In the aftermath of the failed invasion of Kuwait and 
the huge domestic uprisings that followed, Saddam Hussein embarked on a re-
tribalisation policy to better exert his authority across Iraq. The relevance of the tribe 
only increased after the fall of the Ba’athist regime in 2003 as state capability 
receded and people became increasingly reliant on local networks for the provision 
of security, employment and basic services.
56
 Sunni dominated tribes in the Anbar 
region were initially opposed to the US occupation, and many of them lent tacit or 
active support to various militant groups who attacked coalition forces. As al-Qaeda 
became an increasingly dominant force in the Sunni insurgent landscape, however, 
things began to change. The viciousness of al-Qaeda affiliates, their trampling over 
local customs and their willingness to inflict extreme violence on innocent Iraqis 
alienated many of the tribes which began reaching out to the Americans.
57
 
Eventually, once American military strategy had spectacularly failed in Iraq, spaces 
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opened up in military circles that were more receptive to exploring new options, and 
thus the Awakening began.  
The Americans did not seek permission from Prime Minister Maliki for the 
Awakening or Sons of Iraq projects, and indeed there was a deep fear and scepticism 
of the project in the Shi’ite dominated government.58 The Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI, which was the biggest party in the coalition 
government, expressed unwillingness to reconcile with those Sunnis who had 
latterly been part of the insurgency and who they saw as ‘Saddamists’ in any case.59 
As for Prime Minister Maliki, his absolute priority was to regain control over 
Baghdad and then the periphery, preferably with Iraqi troops directly under his 
command.
60
 As for dealing with insurgents, Maliki appeared to want to ‘kill them 
all’ using troops from the Shi’ite dominated Iraqi army – an approach that would 
have vastly inflamed the situation and prevented the Awakening movement from 
ever taking off.
61
   
Of course the reluctance to support the Awakening experiment reflected the 
ongoing civil war between the two communities which had not reached a point of 
reconciliation. Indeed, the fact that Sunni tribes were prepared to work with the 
Americans did not mean that they embraced the Iraqi government. On the contrary, 
many Sunni tribesmen began to work with the Americans because they realised that 
it was the Iraqi government, rather than the Americans, who posed the biggest threat 
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to their security.
62
 Lieutenant Colonel Gian Gentile who was responsible for the 
Sunni dominated Amiriyah district of Baghdad, said the Sunnis he encountered were 
convinced that ‘this is a sectarian government out to crush them.’63 Fears circulated 
that, by arming Sunni groups opposed to the government, the Americans were 
simply creating more militias that would go on to fuel the continuing civil war.
64
 
Counterinsurgency critic Douglas Porch argues that the US was arming the Sons of 
Iraq to defend themselves against the US-backed Shi’ite-dominated security forces, 
‘in short, arming civil war, not nation building.’65 A senior adviser to Prime Minister 
Maliki posed the question, ‘we have enough militias in Iraq that we are struggling 
now to solve the problem. Why are we creating new ones?’66 The fact that many of 
these former insurgents were also being paid by the US army also infuriated a 
number of people in the Shi’ite political sphere, and raised questions about whether 
the Americans intended to reverse Iraq’s new political settlement.67   
Prime Minister Maliki can be pragmatic, however, and is adept at seeing 
political opportunities in the most unfavourable environments. The defeat of al-
Qaeda in Sunni areas was, after all, good news for the Maliki government
68
 – as was 
the emergence of a new political class of Sunni tribal leaders who might be 
amenable to future partnerships in the power-sharing political system.
69
 It was soon 
noticed that Maliki was making personal phone calls to Anbar Awakening leader 
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Abd al-Sattar al-Rishawi
70
 and that a number of other leaders were declaring 
themselves to be very content with Maliki’s co-operation.71 The Prime Minister was 
also willing to integrate substantial numbers of Awakening members into local 
police and even military forces – albeit not to the extent that was desired – while 
Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih diverted some reconstruction resources to 
Anbar.
72
 Of course as a Sunni dominated, resource poor, rural area, the Anbar region 
was a low-cost place for the Prime Minister to endorse the Awakening. The 
movement would become much more controversial as it expanded during the troop 
surge into Sunni areas in Baghdad and to confessionally mixed urban areas, and 
indeed even if support was forthcoming from the very top of government it was not 
easy to convince the rank and file of the Shi’ite militias that arming Sunnis was a 
good idea. In a striking vignette, one US captain noted in a letter to his father that 
one of the tricky things about engaging with the Sons of Iraq in Baghdad was that if 
one of them was injured they could not be taken to the hospital, because the health 
facilities were run by Sadrists who were still murdering Sunnis brought in for 
treatment.
73
  
In sum, although the Maliki government made the best of the early 
Awakening movement, the Awakening itself was the product of a foreign policy 
relationship between the US and a set of sub-state actors in Iraq who had been 
empowered by the failure of the Iraqi government. By funding and arming this 
group without the consistent involvement and permission of the Iraqi government, 
the Americans were strengthening an actor in the Iraqi civil war that in 2006 had 
been definitively on the losing side. The Awakening movements, though they 
certainly saved lives in the short term, failed to address fundamental questions of 
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political and sectarian reconciliation and the division of power and resources 
between Iraq’s warring communities.74 
The Surge, Crackdown on Shi’ite Militias and Stabilisation 
The escalating civil war, particularly in Baghdad in 2006, forced President Bush to 
finally break with his top generals in Iraq and to try a new approach to stabilizing 
Iraq.
75
 A small but influential school had been advocating for a troop surge. These 
included Stephen Hadley, Brett McGurk and Meghan O’Sullivan from the National 
Security Council, Chuck Robb from the Iraq Study Group, retired General Jack 
Keane and military historian Fred Kagan. The Surge would infuse five battalions 
worth of troops into Iraq on a temporary basis, to be used primarily to stabilise 
Baghdad. By December 2006 the Surge had been given the go ahead, and 20,000 
troops were drafted into Iraq over the next six months to add to the existing 134,000 
already in Iraq.
76
 Once again the decision to go ahead with the Surge was made 
without input from Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The Prime Minister was 
ambivalent about the plan.
77
 On the one hand he was committed to crushing the 
ongoing violence in the country, but he was also keen to be at the helm of those 
efforts and was worried about the political costs of allowing a large increase in US 
troop numbers.
78
 A core part of the Surge strategy was to go after Shi’ite militias 
that had hitherto been relatively protected by the Iraq government. It appears that 
Prime Minister Maliki signed onto this idea, perhaps because he was feeling 
increasingly under threat and alienated by the Shi’ite militias.79 The Surge did lead 
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to a massive escalation of attacks against Shi’ite militias, with an average of one 
thousand members of the Mahdi Army being arrested every month between 
February and August 2007.
80
 The weakened Mahdi Army was then attacked on the 
order of Prime Minister Maliki in March 2008 in a surprise assault that infuriated the 
US military
81
 but enormously bolstered Maliki’s popularity.82  
By 2009 the number of civilian fatalities in Iraq had fallen to its lowest point 
since the invasion.
83
 This was partly down to the completed ethnic cleansing of a 
number of mixed neighbourhoods, especially in Baghdad,
84
 but also because of the 
government’s willingness to attack Shi’ite militants, the Awakening’s success 
against al-Qaeda and the activities of the additional American troops.
85
 The 
increasing stability enabled the Iraqi government to engage in significantly more 
capital expenditure in 2008 and 2009 than it had been able to do in the preceding 
two years.
86
 Although achieving satisfactory public services was some way off, 
there were impressive improvements in a short space of time. Between 2008 and 
2009, public access to sewage sanitation increased from 8% to 20%; access to clean 
water increased from 22% to 45%; access to public health increased from 10% to 
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30%; and access to trash services increased from 18% to 45%.
87
 In March 2009, 
electricity provision in Baghdad reached its highest point since the invasion and 
there was growing public confidence that security gains had been made.
88
 Although 
challenges remained, with corruption in the Iraqi public sector reaching an all time 
high,
89
 the improvements attracted a rush of foreign direct investment into the 
country and buoyed the Iraqi public with a new optimism about starting the process 
of healing of the country.
90
  
Turkey 
Re-Engaging with Iraq 
Turkey’s interest in a stabilizing Iraq was piqued in 2008 and 2009, and the 
government pursued a series of initiatives to develop strong diplomatic and 
economic relations with its southern neighbour. In 2008 the High Level Strategic 
Cooperation Council was formed between the two countries in order to ‘evaluate 
and enhance bilateral economic and trade relations.’91 The following year Prime 
Minister Erdoğan visited Baghdad and stayed the night along with his wife and 
twelve ministers from his government. He signed off on forty-eight agreements with 
Iraq on a diverse range of issues, from energy and economic co-operation to trade 
and investment. In a sign of tense relations to come, a number of Turkish diplomats 
have commented that ‘nothing came out of’92 these agreements despite them 
reflecting solid and mutually beneficial ‘technical work.’93 Nevertheless economic 
relations between Turkey and Iraq quickly gathered speed, as Turkish companies 
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dominated Iraq’s booming reconstruction industry and won tenders to undertake 
lucrative infrastructure projects.
94
 
There had been little political engagement between the Turkish and the Iraqi 
governments up to this point.
95
 Despite the significant strategic value of its 
relationship with Iraq, Turkish involvement with the country was hamstrung by its 
opposition to the Iraq war and particularly by its refusal to allow US troops to use 
Turkish soil during the invasion.
96
 Turkish diplomats complain that they were frozen 
out of Iraq by the Coalition Provisional Authority,
97
 and that US hostility to Turkey 
during this early period ‘slowed our involvement.’98 It is also possible that the 
Turkish government was reluctant to publicly engage with Iraq under occupation 
and during the civil war for fear of appearing to support the US project in Iraq. Once 
Iraq was stabilizing and had a government increasingly independent of the US, 
however, recalibrating its relationship with Iraq became more politically palatable in 
addition to being more economically attractive.
99
     
Cross-Border Raids and the Iraqi Government 
Another reason for Turkey’s increasing engagement with Iraq was the growing 
ferocity of anti-government PKK
100
 violence emerging from Iraq’s northern 
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territories. Although Turkey and the PKK have skirmished in the territories 
bordering northern Iraq and southern Turkey since the 1990s, there was an upsurge 
of violence in 2007 after a series of PKK attacks launched from border areas killed 
over 50 Turks.
101
 The attacks were roundly condemned by the Americans, by the 
Iraqi government and by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), and the Iraqi 
Defence Minister Abdel Qader Jassim al-Obeidi drafted a series of proposals to 
tackle PKK units based in Iraqi territory.
102
 Prime Minister Erdoğan, however, 
declared that ‘Turkey has no patience left’ with time wasting mechanisms and 
appeared adamant that the attacks should be responded to with overwhelming 
force.
103
 100,000 Turkish troops were massed on the Iraqi border along with tanks, 
artillery and warplanes even as Iraqi lawmakers implored the Turks not to mount a 
cross-border military operation.
104
 Over the next few months the Turkish army 
launched a series of offensives in Iraqi territory without informing or obtaining 
permission from the Iraqi government but with the tacit support of the American 
government. Even as the Iraqi parliament condemned the attacks as ‘outrageous,’ 
the Turkish military confirmed that the Americans had allowed access to the 
necessary Iraqi space for the Turks in addition to supplying them with 
intelligence.
105
 Although the Bush administration had tried to encourage a 
diplomatic solution to the PKK crisis, ultimately it supported Turkish military 
action,
106
 perhaps in the hope that supplying the Turkish military with more accurate 
intelligence on PKK positions would help to minimise civilian casualties and 
thereby mitigate tensions with the KRG.
107
   
That the US army in Iraq was allowing a foreign country to conduct violent 
acts in Iraqi territory without the permission of the elected Iraqi government raises 
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some serious questions about Iraqi sovereignty in this period. In practical terms the 
Iraqi government had no air force and therefore little control over its own airspace, 
and was thus unable to physically prevent the attacks from taking place on its 
territory. Militarily, the US army still prevailed in Iraq, and whether it was working 
with the Awakening or co-ordinating airstrikes with the Turks, it seems that the US 
had ultimate control. Indeed one Turkish diplomat admitted that although ‘Iraq was 
never happy’ about the cross-border raids, ultimately ‘Iraq was under occupation’ so 
it did not hugely matter what they thought.
108
 Although the strikes on the PKK did 
not represent a serious threat to Iraqi national security, the fact that they were 
allowed to happen without the consent of the Iraqi government publicly 
demonstrated and reinforced the weakness of the Iraqi state. 
Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government 
The relationship between the Turkish government and the KRG was tense and 
unproductive for years after the 2003 invasion. The Turks were worried that the 
federalist structures laid out in the Iraqi constitution allowed the Iraqi Kurds far too 
much autonomy, and they were deeply fearful of the precedent it might provide for 
the PKK.
109
 As late as April 2007, Turkey’s military chief of staff stated that the 
KRG was the single biggest threat to Turkey’s national security.110 Turkey also 
accused the Iraqi Kurds of actively supporting PKK violence and sought to deny the 
KRG legitimacy by refusing to allow it any official contact with the Turkish 
government.
111
 By 2008, however, a number of factors had collided to produce a 
complete turnaround in Turkish attitudes to the KRG. Turkish diplomats explain that 
Turkey discovered ‘soft power’112 after its failed military campaign against the PKK 
demonstrated once again that there was no military solution to the intractable 
conflict.
113
 This recognition led the Turks to ‘look into normalising relations with 
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the Kurds.’ And as the KRG relationship with Turkey improved, the former became 
increasingly willing to turn a blind eye to the cross-border raids when they did 
occur.
114
 The warming of Erbil-Ankara relations has in fact resulted in the KRG 
putting increased pressure on the PKK to desist from its violent acts and to pursue a 
negotiated settlement with the Turkish government.
115
 For its part the KRG was also 
increasingly aware that good relations with Turkey and Iran could secure its 
economic and political future, particularly in the event of centralizing impulses 
returning to Baghdad. It has been commented that, because of the geography of 
northern Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan simply could not exist without Iranian and Turkish 
acquiescence,
116
 and that the two countries are the KRG’s most strategically 
important relationships.
117
 The KRG has sought to use the lucrative economic 
opportunities on offer in its territory to draw Turkey into a strategic partnership; for 
instance the KRG awarded numerous infrastructure projects to Turkish companies, 
including the contracts to build Erbil and Suleymaniyah airports, and has offered 
Turkish companies tax breaks or tax exemptions.
118
 For energy poor Turkey, access 
to Iraqi Kurdish oil and gas has also been a very attractive prospect that has 
lubricated the new relationship.
119
 An official at one of Kurdistan’s foreign 
representations explained Turkey’s new interest in the region by pointing to Iraqi 
Kurdistan’s oil reserves and mineral wealth, all of which is ‘waiting to be tapped.’120 
Since 2008, relations between Turkey and the KRG have flourished beyond 
the wildest expectations of Washington and Baghdad. Iraqi Kurdistan hosts five 
Turkish banks, over 1,000 Turkish companies, and Turkey has become the KRG’s 
main business partner.
121
 In 2010 Turkey opened a consulate with a trade attaché in 
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the KRG capital Erbil, and political relations between the KRG and the Turkish 
government have become extraordinarily close.
122
 As tensions have escalated 
between the KRG and the Iraqi central government over the extent of Kurdish 
autonomy and jurisdiction over territory and natural resources, Turkish support for 
the KRG has begun to damage its relationship with Baghdad.   
Although Turkey continues to oppose Kurdish independence
123
 and 
constantly reiterates its ‘mantra’ that Iraq must remain territorially integral, it has 
also chosen to ‘stick with Kurdistan’ when points of difference have emerged.124 
This has been infuriating for the US. After it doggedly encouraged a rapprochement 
between the KRG and the Turkish government, it has since been dismayed by the 
subsequent decline in relations between Turkey and Baghdad.
125
 The question being 
asked by many an exasperated US official is: why is Turkey tying itself to Kurdistan 
when Iraq is the much bigger prize?
126
 The answer partly lies in the relative 
institutional strength of the KRG as compared with the central Iraqi government. 
After pursuing a new partnership with Baghdad in 2008, Turkey was frustrated to 
discover that the Iraqi government seemed unable to follow up on and implement 
bilateral agreements.
127
 Frustrated by the rate of progress in Iraq, Turkey quickly 
lost confidence in the good faith of Iraqi politicians and became increasingly 
reluctant to continue its diplomatic engagement with the government.
128
 Iraqi state 
institutions were still wracked by corruption and instability, as the precarious 
coalition government was constantly teetering on the edge of collapse,
129
 and Iraq 
simply did not have the institutional capacity nor the political coherence to deliver 
                                                          
122
 There is some tension within the KRG over the increasing reliance of Iraqi Kurdistan on Turkey. 
The PKK in particular blames the KDP for getting carried away with the rapprochement with Turkey. 
One former PUK official described the Turks’ increasing role in Iraqi Kurdistan as ‘insidious.’ 
Former PUK Official, 'Interview with the author conducted on condition of annonymity', (Erbil, 
2013). 
123
 Head of the KRG Department of Foreign Relations Falah Mustafa Bakr, 'Interview with author', 
(Erbil, 5th March 2013). 
124
 Selcen, 'Interview with author'. 
125
 Cagaptay and Evans, 'Turkey's Changing relations with Iraq: Kurdistan Up, Baghdad Down',  1. 
126
 Iraq Analyst in US Administration, 'Interview with the author conducted on condition of 
annonymity'. American Official, 'Interview with the author conducted on condition of annonymity', 
(Washington D.C., 2013). 
127
 Selcen, 'Interview with author'. 
128
 American Official, 'Interview with the author conducted on condition of annonymity'. 
129
 The Maliki government came the closest it has ever come to collapse in 2007 after almost all his 
coalition partners withdrew from government. The US decided to intervene to prevent the collapse of 
his government after it was decided the instability involved in selecting a new leader would derail 
Iraq’s stabilization process. Former Senior National Security Council Official, 'Interview with the 
author conducted on condition of annonymity'. 
151 
 
on its commitments. Meanwhile Turkey was pleasantly surprised by the efficacy of 
the KRG. Keen to demonstrate its value to Turkey, the KRG offered a fast 
turnaround on its political commitments to Turkey and even established a directorate 
solely to deal with Turkish affairs at the KRG’s Department for Foreign 
Relations.
130
 Even apart from the responsiveness of the KRG, the economy of the 
Kurdish region was growing at an astonishing speed – unhampered by security 
concerns – making it highly attractive to investors and politicians in Turkey alike, 
especially when compared with the volatility of Baghdad.   
Iraq’s complete absorption in battling its civil war empowered the KRG, 
which became a sub-state actor that was capable of conducting high level foreign 
relations with a neighbouring power. Although the KRG also struggled with 
corruption and inefficiency in its institutions, and with disillusionment with its 
political system, it nevertheless maintained a level of public support incomparable to 
that enjoyed by the Iraqi government. Through the civil war years, when Iraq’s 
public services were disintegrating, the KRG was improving electricity production, 
investing in infrastructure, and making itself attractive to foreign investors. For 
Turkey all the promises offered by Iraq had come to nothing, and, although the 
potential offered by the KRG was smaller, the KRG was delivering immediate 
political and economic returns. 
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Turkey’s Relationship with Iraq’s Sunni Leaders 
As part of its effort to pull Iraq back out of civil war, the US repeatedly asked 
Turkey to encourage Iraqi Sunni participation in the political process.
131
 Turkey, 
along with a number of other regional Sunni powers, had watched the escalating 
sectarian violence in Iraq with trepidation and was increasingly willing to play a role 
in empowering the Iraqi Sunni political elite.
132
 Turkey had cultivated strong 
relationships with individual Sunni politicians such as Osama al-Nujayfi, whose 
family connections with Turkey allegedly date back to Ottoman times,
133
 and with 
the sitting Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, and would use its leverage with these 
leading Sunni figures to help facilitate the birth of a new political coalition. Together 
with support from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Turkey helped to broker the Sunni-
dominated Iraqiya coalition that would successfully contest the January 2010 
Parliamentary election. Turkey likely offered Iraqiya financial support, and although 
Iraqiya’s leader former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi denies that he received money 
from Turkey, he suspects that individual politicians in the coalition were being 
funded by Turkey.
134
 Turkey’s political support, however, was likely much more 
valuable than its financial support, given that a great deal of the funds used in 
prominent Iraqi political campaigns are the proceeds of corruption.
135
 One senior 
Turkish diplomat boasted that, although Turkey supposedly practices a foreign 
policy based on the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of others, 
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoğlu was ‘instrumental in forming 
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Iraqiya.’136 A leading member of the US representation in Iraq agreed that Turkey’s 
support of Iraqiya was ‘aggressive’ and possibly played an integral part in its 
electoral success.
137
  
Iraqiya won a plurality of seats, by a margin of two seats, in the 2010 
parliamentary elections, and Turkey, along with a number of other regional 
countries, was ‘extremely jubilant’ at the prospect of the pro-Turkey moderate Ayad 
Allawi becoming Prime Minister.
138
 The aftermath of the elections were, however, 
mired in controversy. Despite having more seats than any other coalition, Iraqiya 
was not given the first opportunity to form a government. Instead, Iraq’s Chief 
Justice ruled that the coalition with the most seats after the election would have the 
first opportunity to form a government. This meant that coalitions could expand to 
absorb MPs that had not run with them in the election, thereby becoming the biggest 
coalition. Months of desperate back-room dealing ensued as the incumbent Prime 
Minister desperately tried to cobble together a coalition large enough to have the 
first chance to form a government. Turkey was outraged and said that it was 
‘Democracy 101’ that Iraqiya should have the first opportunity to form a 
government.
139
 In the extended government formation negotiations, Turkey insisted 
that Ayad Allawi should be Prime Minister,
140
 and strongly objected to allowing 
Prime Minister Maliki a second term in office.
141
 In this coalition forming process 
Turkey was furiously and unsuccessfully trying to compete with Iranian 
influence.
142
 Iran had a far better grip on the Iraqi political scene, however, with 
leverage over a wider range of more relevant political figures. Eventually Prime 
Minister Maliki emerged with the necessary support for a second term, and relations 
between Turkey and the Iraqi Prime Minister have been extremely hostile ever 
since. 
The level of Turkish investment in this Iraqi political process has been 
attributed both to its newly ambitious foreign policy agenda and to its growing 
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sectarian outlook. A number of politicians from different identity groups have 
complained that Turkey has articulated its objection to the Iraqi government in 
unnecessarily sectarian terms,
143
 whilst Turkey’s growing regional influence seems 
to have given it the false impression that it can determine political outcomes in Iraq. 
One American analyst quipped that ‘Turkey has to go through a process like the US’ 
of realizing that being important was not the same as being influential.
144
   
Turkish relations with the Iraqi Sunni political community offer another 
example of the foreign relations of Iraqi sub-state actors. A sub-state actor in Iraq 
was able to receive financial and political support from a powerful foreign country 
to help it contest a domestic parliamentary election. It had access to that power in 
part because the relationship was brokered by the US, which was no longer 
governing Iraq but which was immensely influential in the country. In the aftermath 
of those elections, the race to form a governing coalition was in part a competition 
for political influence between three major powers, the US, Turkey and Iran, and 
was largely divorced from the Iraqi public.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that Sunni tribal Awakening Councils are an example of 
sub-state foreign policy actors building strength in the vacuum created by central 
government weakness. As sub-state militant actors, the Awakening Councils were 
able to build a relationship directly with the US, bypassing the Iraqi government, 
and in doing so were able to successfully deliver security – a key public good – in 
areas where Iraqi security forces had failed. Falling violence in Iraq led to new 
opportunities for foreign relationships focused on economic co-operation. Turkey 
began to take an interest in building a relationship with the Iraqi government with a 
view to taking advantage of the myriad opportunities for Turkish companies to help 
with Iraqi reconstruction and service provision. The strengthening of the Iraqi 
central government did not, however, prevent the KRG from building an 
independent and robust relationship with Turkey. This could perhaps be explained 
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by the continued strength of the KRG’s normative and functional legitimacy as 
compared with that enjoyed by, even a strengthened, Iraq. But it also raises 
questions about whether federalism changes the nature of the weak state dynamic, 
because of the ability of the region to build up institutional strength over time such 
that it becomes increasingly difficult to prevent the region from conducting 
independent foreign relations regardless of the growing legitimacy of the central 
government. 
 The back-room political dealing in 2010 that led to Nouri al-Maliki’s 
retention of the premiership was heavily influenced by the Americans, and raised 
questions about the extent of influence that the Iraqi electorate had over the political 
process. In the early days of the Maliki premiership, sectarian violence raged 
through Iraq unabated, as the Prime Minister was reluctant to allow US forces to 
target Shi’ite militias. The Maliki regime was heavily dependent on Shi’ite support, 
and feared that allowing the targeting of Shi’ite militias would undermine its 
political fortunes. Here we see that regime security considerations are not only 
driving foreign policy, but also drive crucial domestic policy decisions. 
Many in Sunni constituencies identified the Maliki regime with the sectarian 
militias and police forces that were violently attacking their communities, and as 
such the regime had little normative or functional legitimacy in Sunni areas. The 
increasingly wanton and indiscriminate violence perpetrated by al-Qaeda in Sunni 
areas was also deeply alienating for many Sunnis, and legitimacy began to be 
transferred away from local militant groups to traditional tribal federations. These 
tribal groups reached out to US forces and began to work together to fight against al-
Qaeda and its affiliates, who had become a scourge in Sunni areas in addition to 
being the key instigators of the wider Iraqi civil war. These Awakening Councils are 
evidence of the empowerment of sub-state actors that results from the state’s 
inability to capture legitimacy amongst particular segments of the population. The 
tribal groups were credible local partners for US forces, and could make security 
gains in Sunni areas that the Iraqi Security Forces simply could not achieve. The US 
was, therefore, prepared to completely bypass the sovereign Iraqi government to 
fund and arm these new local militias. It is evidence of Iraq’s extraordinary 
weakness at the time that the US was able to create a new class of armed actors 
outside of the security forces, amongst a sectarian group that was opposing the 
government, without the permission or input of the Maliki regime. The US also 
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decided to infuse tens of thousands of additional troops into Iraq based entirely on 
calculations made by Washington about the direction of the conflict. The Iraqi 
government had virtually no say in the fact of the surge, nor was it able to direct the 
additional troops as it saw fit. 
The Prime Minister was, however, becoming increasingly convinced that 
Shi’ite militants posed a threat to his regime security, and so took advantage of the 
Surge to undermine his domestic political opponents. This use of foreign assistance 
corresponds with the expectations of the literature on developing states’ foreign 
policy. States are expected to deploy foreign policy in pursuit of regime security, 
and, in particular, to seek resources from foreign powers in order to crush domestic 
political opponents. The Maliki regime engaged in a spectacular showdown with the 
Mahdi Army, and began to co-operate with the US targeting of Shi’ite militias. The 
result was a swell in popular support for the Prime Minister amongst both Sunni and 
Shi’ite populations. The regime was seen as privileging the pursuit of security above 
sectarian partisanship, and Iraqis desperately hoped that the Maliki regime would 
restore some stability and security to the country. 
As Iraq’s fortunes began to rise, so did its opportunities to engage positively 
with its neighbours. Turkey only developed a serious interest in post-invasion 
Baghdad once security began to return to the capital and possibilities opened up for 
economic and political cooperation. Having recaptured a measure of functional 
legitimacy by improving the internal security situation, Iraq was empowered to 
pursue positive foreign relations. 
Iraq still had some way to go, however, before it could be considered a 
strong state. Its security remained dominated by US forces, and, in a startling 
indication of Iraq’s continued weakness, Turkey was allowed by US air forces to 
bomb PKK targets in Iraqi territory without the permission of the Iraqi government. 
Moreover, the Kurdish region was able to build an extremely strong and productive 
independent relationship with Turkey without any input from Baghdad. Indeed, 
when the strength of Turkey’s relationship with the KRG began to cause 
consternation in Baghdad, Turkey effectively chose the KRG over Baghdad. That 
Turkey was prepared to sacrifice its relationship with Baghdad, which is larger, 
potentially more powerful, and certainly more resource rich than the KRG, was a 
great vote of confidence in the Kurdish region. The region had managed to achieve a 
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level of institutional capability, based on its strong normative legitimacy and its 
impressive functional capacity, that made it a very attractive foreign policy partner.  
As relations with Baghdad soured, Turkey was keen to exert its influence on 
domestic Iraqi politics to ensure that more favourable political partners came to the 
fore. The Iraqi state, however, was no longer as vulnerable as it had been in the dark 
days of the civil war and Turkey achieved little success in its attempt to secure 
leverage on the Iraqi political scene. 
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CHAPTER SIX: NEGOTIATING WITH THE US IN A 
STRENGTHEND IRAQ 
Introduction 
This chapter argues that the contrast between Iraq’s two negotiations over Status of 
the Forces Agreements with the US, the first in 2008 and the second in 2011, 
demonstrates the importance of normative and functional legitimacy and 
institutional capacity in enabling the effective conduct of foreign policy. At the time 
of the first negotiation the Prime Minister was immensely popular because he had 
overseen a dramatic reduction in violence in the country and because he had 
embraced a narrative of Iraqi nationalism that gave people hope that the dark days of 
civil war were behind them. The Prime Minister had also exerted control over the 
increasingly centralised Iraqi state and had diminished both the legitimacy and the 
operating capacity of competing domestic foreign policy actors. As a result the 
Prime Minister was able to conduct highly effective negotiations over the 2008 
SOFA Agreement. But the progress made by the Iraqi state was not to last. As 
endless infighting followed the 2010 parliamentary elections, the outbreak of 
renewed sectarian rhetoric, and the continued poor delivery of public services led to 
a growing disillusionment with the Iraqi political elite. In the 2011 negotiations, it 
was clear that the Prime Minister had lost much of his political capital and was 
unable to deliver the result he wanted. 
Even at the height of his popularity, the Prime Minister was unable to 
effectively challenge the power of the KRG. In this period, the KRG was able to win 
landmark contracts with international oil companies that may have provided the 
region with a medium-term route to independence from Baghdad. This challenges 
the expectations laid out by the hypotheses that frame the thesis. I would have 
expected the stronger Iraqi state to be in a better position to limit the KRG’s foreign 
policy activities. The KRG, however, had established a high degree of independence 
during the civil war, when the central Iraqi government was at its weakest, and it 
proved difficult to roll back the Kurdish overreach once the Iraqi government had 
strengthened. Although the Kurdish region is somewhat constrained in its 
international relations because it is not formally or legally a state, in effect it carries 
out most of the functions of a state. In fact the Kurdish region is in many ways more 
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effective and a better partner to international business than the Iraqi state is, which 
accounts for Iraq’s failure to successfully prevent the KRG from taking control of 
oil resources in its regions and in the disputed areas. 
Iraqi State Strength and Maliki’s Popularity  
By 2009 it was clear that ‘the civil war was over.’1 Iraq’s security forces, together 
with US troops, had finally achieved a near monopoly over violence in the country, 
as severely weakened militias were deprived of legitimacy, separated from their 
constituencies, and forced into retreat.
2
 A semblance of normalcy returned to the 
streets of Baghdad, albeit in the shadow of blast walls and endless checkpoints, and 
Iraq’s wealthy new elites brought flashy cars, high fashion, and fine dining to the 
capital.
3
 The Iraqi public showed signs of confidence and optimism unimaginable in 
the dark days of the civil war, with 81% saying security was getting better, 51% 
declaring that Iraq was going in the right direction, and 46% expecting their personal 
economic situation to improve in the next year.
4
  
Prime Minister Maliki was lauded for overseeing such a dramatic upturn in 
Iraq’s fortunes.5 His ‘triumphant’6 2008 offensive against the Sadrist occupation of 
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 Nir Rosen writes of a visit to Baghdad in the Spring of 2009 that ‘things were changing in Iraq,’ that 
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Basra transformed Maliki into a ‘folk hero’ with cross-sectarian support,7 and the 
subsequent stabilisation and economic flourishing of Basra further fuelled Maliki’s 
escalating popularity.
8
 After debilitating civil war, the Iraqi public was desperate for 
security and stability
9
 and the Prime Minister appeared capable of delivering it. The 
Prime Minister prioritised the build-up of Iraq’s Security Forces, and by 2010 he had 
over 650,000 men in the army and police. In the years since the civil war these 
forces had made ‘enormous strides,’ with sustained training and equipment drives 
significantly increasing their capacity to mount effective operations.
10
 Although 
there were still enormous problems posed by corruption in these forces,
11
 the 
improvement was palpable. The Interior Ministry, under the stewardship of Jawad 
al-Bolani, had also made efforts to purge the Iraqi police force of its worst sectarian 
elements: over 60,000 men and seven of the nine National Police commanders were 
sacked.
12
 Iraqi confidence in the army and police service was bolstered, and in 2009 
the two institutions garnered 73% and 67% respectively in approval ratings.
13
  
The Prime Minister built his political messages around these improvements 
in security, branding his new electoral coalition the ‘State of Law’ and talking 
robustly about strengthening the Iraqi state and continuing to capture and punish 
terrorists seeking to destroy Iraq. As Ned Parker writes, ‘Iraqis wanted strength, and 
Maliki radiated it.’14 The strategy was extraordinarily successful and Prime Minister 
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Maliki’s personal approval ratings rocketed from 25% in 2006 to 66% in 2009.15 
Maliki also sought to woo Sunni voters by branding himself increasingly as an Iraqi 
nationalist,
16
 by seeking to push the Kurdish Peshmerga out of disputed territories,
17
 
and by distancing himself from his Shi’ite Islamist political roots.18 He decided to go 
it alone in the 2010 elections, excluding his Shi’ite Islamist parliamentary coalition 
partners, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), from the new State of Law 
list.
19
 His focus on ‘bread-and-butter’ issues resonated with the Iraqi electorate, 
especially in contrast to ISCI’s continued use of sectarian rhetoric, and the coalition 
performed impressively in the 2009 vote.
20
 
‘Now He’s Too Strong’: Maliki and SOFA Negotiations 
By 2008 the Iraqi state had more power over the country’s foreign policy than at any 
time since the invasion. Militias were on the defensive and could no longer be the 
powerful interlocutors for foreign actors they had been during the civil war. The 
Prime Minister had established himself ‘as the only game in town’21 and foreign 
powers increasingly recognised that if they wanted anything done in Iraq – outside 
of the Kurdish region – going through the Prime Minister would be the most 
effective way to achieve it. Although Iraqi political parties and parliamentarians 
loudly sought to influence foreign policy, the Prime Minister and his loyalists were 
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quickly and effectively expanding their control over it.
22
 A former diplomat who 
worked in Iraq’s representation to the United Nations in New York commented on 
the shift, saying that in 2008 there was ‘a separation’ between the Foreign Ministry 
and the Prime Minister’s office, with the Prime Minister starting to impose policies 
that were at odds with the previous goals of the UN representation.
23
 The head of 
Iraq’s representation to the UN would allegedly take orders directly from the Prime 
Minister’s office, bypassing the Foreign Ministry and contravening protocol, and 
would report back on ‘everything to the Prime Minister’s office.’24 Interviews with 
diplomats in Iraq’s neighbouring countries also reveal that the Prime Minister was 
widely recognised as Iraq’s new power broker when it came to foreign policy; as 
one senior Jordanian diplomat put it, ‘Maliki calls the shots.’25 Indeed, in the months 
following Maliki’s successful offensive against the Sadrists, foreign delegations 
began filtering in to pay homage to the Prime Minister’s newfound grip over the 
country. In August 2008 King Abdullah of Jordan became the first Sunni Arab head 
of state to visit post-invasion Iraq,
26
 in October Syria sent its first Ambassador to 
Iraq since 1979,
27
 and in the same month the Egyptian Foreign Minister and 
Minister of Oil also visited the country.
28
    
By demonstrating his ability to bring security to the Iraqi population Prime 
Minister Maliki had torn legitimacy away from the sub-state actors that had 
competed with him for power in Iraq. The Prime Minister was also able to articulate 
a narrative of the Iraqi state that resonated with a majority of Iraq’s Shi’ites and a 
reasonable proportion of Iraq’s Arab Sunnis, thereby further undermining the 
potential operating space for competitors to his power. His increasingly uncontested 
power and evident legitimacy in Iraq bolstered Maliki’s credentials with foreign 
powers, and made him the pre-eminent Iraqi interlocutor when it came to 
negotiating foreign policy.  
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The extent of Prime Minister Maliki’s control over the negotiation of a 
Status of the Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the US in 2008 is one example of how 
the Prime Minister was able to effectively dominate Iraqi foreign policy. At the end 
of 2007 the Bush administration began looking into establishing a multi-year 
agreement to regulate Iraqi-US relations beyond the end of the Bush presidency. 
After a fierce battle in the US administration about how to handle the drafting of a 
SOFA with Iraq, it was decided that a SOFA negotiating team led by non-Iraq 
specialists would put together an extensive boilerplate SOFA asking the Iraqi 
government for a range of politically unpalatable concessions as a starting point for 
negotiations.
29
 When parts of the proposed document were leaked to the press, the 
public was outraged and thousands of Sadrists took to the streets in protest against 
the agreement.
30
 Prime Minister Maliki skilfully played the situation to his political 
advantage, publicly lambasting the agreement and declaring that he ‘did not realise 
that the US demands would so deeply affect Iraqi sovereignty and this is something 
we can never accept.’31 This public declaration burnished Maliki’s Iraqi nationalist 
credentials and served his domestic political agenda but threw months of 
negotiations with the US into turmoil. 
The Prime Minister wanted to negotiate a SOFA that would that would 
bolster rather than undermine his political power, that would give his government a 
high degree of control over the use of US troops in Iraq,
32
 and that he could sell to 
the 71% of Iraqis who thought of the US primarily as occupiers of Iraq.
33
 In pursuit 
of these goals he exerted a great deal of control over the SOFA negotiating process, 
installing a negotiating team without any authority to make decisions without 
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explicit authorisation from Maliki’s inner circle.34 When negotiations were reaching 
an equilibrium that seemed unsatisfactory to the Prime Minister, he 
unceremoniously fired the negotiating team and replaced them with three of his 
close advisors, while distancing himself personally from the unpopular negotiations 
about US troop immunity.
35
 As 2008 drew to a close and the US became 
increasingly anxious about securing an agreement, Maliki was able to extract more 
and more concessions from the US. President George Bush wryly admitted that 
Maliki ‘proved a tough negotiator,’36 and a former political insider characterised 
Maliki as a ‘very hard negotiator’ who was able to insist on conditions that ‘the US 
never agreed to’ in SOFA negotiations elsewhere.37 Even once a final agreement had 
been reached, Maliki reneged on a number of key issues, infuriating the Americans 
and leading President Bush to observe, ‘A year ago we complained Maliki was too 
weak, now he’s too strong.’38 
In the final agreement Maliki secured a date for the total withdrawal of US 
troops,39 which the US had been extremely reluctant to concede, in addition to the 
loss of immunity for US contractors and for US government personnel under certain 
circumstances.40 The agreement also stated that operations conducted by US troops 
‘shall not infringe upon the sovereignty of Iraq and its national interests, as defined 
by the Government of Iraq,’ giving the Maliki government enormous leeway in 
controlling the extent of US activities in Iraqi territory.41 One exasperated US 
official concluded that the US had been played ‘like fiddles’ and that despite all 
America’s investment in Iraq, ‘the Prime Minister’s office got exactly what they 
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wanted, a presence in the country that protects them and which they have oversight 
over and which they can use as a stick against opponents.’42  
The degree of influence that Prime Minister Maliki wielded over the SOFA 
negotiations exemplifies the extent to which his foreign policy power had been 
bolstered by the improving domestic security situation and the enhanced legitimacy 
that it had afforded him. Not only was the US dealing directly with the central Iraqi 
government, instead of with a series of sub-state actors as it had during the Surge, 
but Maliki was also able to a large extent to dictate the Iraqi government’s position. 
Although numerous parliamentarians loudly criticised the agreement, it was soon 
clear that the Prime Minister had the final say and had the political leverage to 
secure the success of the agreement if it was what he wanted. The Iraqi government 
was now dominant in Iraqi society, and the Prime Minister had a high degree of 
control over the government – leading to an Iraqi foreign policy making process that 
was more centralised than at any time since 2003. 
Stronger Iraq, Weaker Kurdistan? 
While Iraq was struggling through the ravages of civil war, the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) had grown very powerful. The Kurdish military forces, the 
Peshmerga, controlled more territory than had been recognised as part of the 
Kurdish region by the Transitional Administrative Law (2004) and the Iraqi 
constitution (2005).
43
 The Kurdish Department of Foreign Affairs had opened 
representations all over the world, and international investors were contributing to 
the rapid modernisation of the Kurdish region. Kurdistan became an important 
political and economic gateway to the rest of Iraq, and the Kurds were extremely 
valuable interlocutors with the Iraqi government at a time when Sunni and Shi’ite 
politicians were locked in battle. One senior KRG diplomat recalls that during that 
‘crazy period ‘05-‘08 we had a more intense relationship’ with the Americans 
‘trying to avert civil war’ but that once Iraq stabilised in 2008 everything changed.44 
The KRG’s relationship with the US became a ‘normal diplomatic relationship,’ 
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which represented a loss of access and influence that was ‘difficult to adjust to.’45 
The diplomat bitterly recalls that once violence in Iraq subsided, the US lost interest 
in Kurdistan, focusing on drawing up long term strategic agreements with Baghdad 
that excluded their erstwhile Kurdish partners.  One scholar characterises the US 
treatment of the Kurdish region since 2008 as one of ‘benign neglect,’ that has taken 
the region’s stability for granted and has underinvested in ensuring its long term 
success.
46
  
Moreover, as the Iraqi state has regained strength it has increasingly begun to 
challenge what is sees as the overreach of the Kurdish regional administration. In the 
newly nationalist atmosphere that descended on Arab Iraq in the aftermath of the 
civil war, popular anti-Kurdish sentiments were heightened as politicians tried to 
outbid each other on their nationalist credentials.
47
 Prime Minister Maliki’s 
popularity with Sunni voters started to rise when he was seen as standing ‘up to the 
Kurds in Kirkuk,’48 and challenging their assertion of control over other disputed 
territories. In August 2008 the Kurdish and Iraqi militaries got involved in the first 
of a series of incidents in disputed territories that raised the spectre of possible 
armed confrontation. The Iraqi army had planned an assault on militants near the 
town of Khanaqin in the disputed Diyala province and ordered the Peshmerga  to 
withdraw from the area. Khanaqin is a Kurdish majority town that is outside of the 
designated Kurdish-administered territory and the Kurdish government was afraid 
that the Iraqi army was trying to retake control of the town, so they refused to 
withdraw.
49
 Tensions escalated, as the pro-Maliki Iraqi press published a deluge of 
anti-Kurdish articles, and fears were raised that an outbreak of violence was 
imminent.
50
 In the end a last minute agreement between KRG President Masoud 
Barzani and Prime Minister Maliki averted violence, and both armed forces 
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withdrew from the area. As the drawdown of US troops began, politicians and 
commentators feared that similar incidents in the future may lead to armed 
confrontation, and that any outbreak of Arab-Kurdish violence would lead to full 
scale war. Indeed, on a number of occasions it was only US intervention that 
prevented a stand-off from descending into violence, for example when the Iraqi 
army tried to pass through the disputed Kurdish majority town of Makhmur in June 
2009, they were prevented by Peshmerga in a heated confrontation that was 
dissipated by US intervention.
51
 Similarly in February 2011, when the Peshmerga 
deployed to the highly sensitive outskirts of Kirkuk, it was the US who negotiated 
their withdrawal before violence broke out over control of the oil-rich city.
52
    
The Prime Minister was slowly strengthening his position in the disputed 
areas, where the Kurds had previously had the upper hand. Maliki created a number 
of tribal support councils around the country which the Kurds interpreted as an 
effort to consolidate anti-Kurdish political blocs in disputed areas.
53
 In the aftermath 
of the 2009 provincial elections the Prime Minister entered into a number of anti-
Kurdish political coalitions in disputed areas and, as one Kurdish official 
complained, succeeded in turning ‘the [Arab] street against us.’54 
Even as the Prime Minister’s hand was strengthening vis-à-vis the KRG, 
there remained an immense disparity between the Kurdish region and the rest of 
Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan was a safe and hospitable business environment: great strides 
had been made in infrastructure development; the political elite was highly 
accommodating to investors; and, as five star hotels and shopping malls sprang up in 
the region, it bore greater resemblance to a Gulf emirate than to Arab Iraq. As 
Kurdish leverage over the Iraqi central government began to dissipate with the end 
of the civil war, the KRG began to focus more heavily on securing the sponsorship 
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of international corporations as a means of ensuring its long term economic and 
political security. This strategy was most apparent in the oil sector.  
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The Battle over Kurdish Oil 
The Kurds have long recognised that Kurdish independence, which remains the 
long-term goal of almost every Kurdish politician,
55
 was utterly dependent on 
achieving economic self-sufficiency. The Kurds, however, remain a net beneficiary 
of the Iraqi state budget, receiving 17% of the budget whilst they contribute far less 
than that into the federal coffers.
56
 The region does, however, lie atop significant oil 
reserves – particularly if disputed territories are included – and exerting control over 
these resources has been a core part of the KRG’s economic strategy since the 
invasion. In the early days of the American presence in Iraq, the Kurds were 
overrepresented in Baghdad, partly because of their close relations with the ruling 
Americans and partly because many Sunnis had boycotted the political system. As a 
result the Kurds exerted an enormous degree of influence over the writing of the 
constitution, a document which has set the stage for an immense amount of conflict 
between the region and the central Iraqi government.
57
 The constitution specifies 
only that the present oilfields will be controlled by the federal government, but is 
silent on new oilfields, leading both the federal government and the regional 
government to assert their authority over the awarding of contracts for the 
exploration and exploitation of new oilfields.
58
 In 2007, in the midst of protracted 
negotiations between all Iraq’s political parties over the drafting of a federal oil and 
gas law, the KRG passed its own regional oil and gas law and unilaterally awarded 
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contracts to several international firms – prompting the collapse of negotiations in 
Baghdad.
59
 Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani declared the move ‘illegal’ and 
was unceremoniously told to ‘shut up’ by Kurdish Oil Minister Ashti Hawrami.60 
Two issues were central to the intractability of negotiations between Baghdad and 
Erbil. Firstly the Kurds claimed an absolute right to sign contracts for the 
exploration, production and export of oil on their territory, even though they agreed 
on revenue sharing with Baghdad.
61
 Secondly the Kurds wanted to enter into 
Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) with international oil companies. PSAs are 
a type of contract whereby the oil company provides the upfront investment required 
to develop an oilfield, and once the field is productive the company is entitled to 
recoup its investment costs from the crude oil, and is thereafter entitled to a 
proportion of all oil produced within a defined timeframe.
62
 PSAs are extremely 
controversial in Iraq; because of the high quality of oil and the relative ease of 
access, some analysts consider the contracts to be far too generous to international 
oil companies.
63
 The contracts are also considered reminiscent of colonial-era oil 
concessions, and were unpopular with Iraqi nationalists for whom the contracts were 
seen as an extension of US occupation.
64
 Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani 
strengthened his nationalist image by aggressively pursuing the best possible deal 
for Iraqi oil, becoming very popular with Arab Iraqis in the process.
65
 He denounced 
the KRG’s use of PSAs as ‘illegitimate’ because they failed to achieve ‘fairness for 
Iraq.’66 The Iraqi Oil Ministry, which had yet to open bidding for its own fields,67 
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also feared that the generous deals on offer in the Kurdish region would undermine 
its ability to achieve the best possible deals for Iraq’s remaining oilfields.68 
Despite signing over forty contracts with international oil companies in great 
haste,
69
 the Kurds could not actually monetise their resources without the consent of 
the Iraqi government because there were no pipelines that could export from 
Kurdish territory to international markets. In 2009 a dramatic fall in global oil prices 
forced the Iraqi government to cut its budget by almost a third and led to a 
temporary agreement with the KRG, enabling the Kurds to export oil through the 
Iraqi pipeline.
70
 Within a matter of months, however, the agreement broke down 
because Baghdad refused to pay the operating costs of the international companies 
as agreed by the KRG ratified contracts.
71
 A new deal concluded in 2010 broke 
down again for similar reasons.
72
 
This slow Kurdish war of attrition on oil and gas jurisdiction seemed to be 
having little concrete impact on the region’s ability to advance towards economic 
independence. Everything changed, however, in 2011, when years of patient 
Kurdish lobbying of international oil companies finally paid off and the super-major 
oil company ExxonMobil signed an exploration deal with the KRG. The deal 
marked a watershed moment in Kurdish politics. The fact that a company of the 
wealth and international stature of ExxonMobil was willing to invest in Iraqi 
Kurdistan was a huge vote of confidence in the region. For its part, the KRG was 
convinced that a company with serious international prowess such as ExxonMobil 
would protect its investment by securing the support of Western governments should 
the region ever come under severe threat from Baghdad.
73
 As the Turkish Consul 
General in Erbil Aydın Selcen remarked, the super-majors had now ‘voted with their 
feet,’ demonstrating the KRG’s legitimacy as custodians of the region’s natural 
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resources.
74
 The deal was a production sharing agreement, signed off without the 
consent of Baghdad, and, most controversially, two of the six oil fields awarded to 
the company were in disputed territories outside of the constitutionally mandated 
Kurdish region.
75
 Baghdad’s response was furious but impotent. The government 
blacklisted all companies dealing with oil and gas exploitation in the Kurdish region, 
preventing them from participating in any contracts in the rest of Iraq. But many oil 
companies were already losing patience with the Iraqi government, finding the 
contracts they had signed insufficiently lucrative, and the operating conditions 
extremely difficult.
76
 
The importance of economic relationships with powerful international 
corporations underscores the power of economic relations as foreign policy. Though 
the KRG often claims not to have a foreign policy, but simply a strategy to 
encourage greater investment in the region, in reality the two have gone hand in 
hand. By encouraging large multi-nationals to commit to the region, and to bypass 
the central government and sign contracts with the regional government, the KRG’s 
economic strategy has contributed directly to its political goals. Although the 
growing strength of the Iraqi government had started to impinge on the KRG’s 
ability to assert its autonomy in northern Iraq, the KRG’s years of investment in 
conducting independent foreign relations paid off when international oil companies 
invested in the region in defiance of Baghdad’s interpretation of the Iraqi 
constitution. Though it remains to be seen whether or not investment by super-
majors will protect the KRG against the possibility of Iraqi attempts to re-dominate 
the region, the development has certainly brought the region closer to its goal of 
economic independence and has bolstered its strength in relation to Baghdad.   
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Creeping Authoritarianism and Weakening Legitimacy 
Although Prime Minister Maliki’s strength, and to some extent his very image as a 
strongman, was the source of his popularity, his increasingly authoritarian approach 
to power started to undermine his legitimacy and to hamper Iraq’s progress. The 
Prime Minister centralised power over Iraq’s security forces and used them to settle 
political scores; he undermined the Awakening Councils that had had so 
successfully fought al-Qaeda; and he reacted badly to his narrow defeat in the 2010 
elections. After months of negotiations Maliki secured a second term, but in the 
midst of these political battles the delivery of essential services was low on the 
priority list and the Iraqi public responded to the continued ineffectiveness of the 
state with protests in a ‘Day of Rage.’ Repression followed, and Maliki’s legitimacy 
suffered as did his capacity to effectively conduct foreign policy.  
Iraq’s Armed Forces 
The improvement in Iraqi security was partly achieved through the massive 
centralisation of Iraq’s security forces under the ultimate authority of the 
commander in chief, Prime Minister Maliki. Instead of having competing militias 
using government departments and police brigades to wreak revenge on their 
enemies, the country’s security forces were now largely under the control of the 
Prime Minister – and if they were misused it was most likely at the behest of the 
Prime Minister’s Office. In 2007 Maliki established the Office of the Commander in 
Chief, with authority overriding that of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of 
the Interior.
77
 This office then directly subordinated Iraq’s most elite forces to itself, 
including the Baghdad Brigade which is responsible for security in the heavily 
protected Green Zone, the Counter-Terrorism Command and the Iraqi Special 
Forces. Many of these elite soldiers were directly loyal to the Prime Minister,
78
 and 
their brigades would be commanded via cell phone directly from his office.
79
 Once 
US forces withdrew from Iraq’s towns and cities in 2009, the Prime Minister and his 
son Ahmed quickly dominated the Green Zone, with Ahmed taking charge of his 
father’s personal security in addition to requisitioning much of the prime property in 
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the Green Zone.
80
 The Prime Minister soon began using the special brigades under 
the control of the Office of the Commander in Chief to target political rivals. In 
2008 and 2009 Iraqi Special Forces arrested a series of Sunni members of the Diyala 
provincial council, threatening to undo the Sunni majority on the council, whilst 
Diyala’s Sunni governor fled the country after being directly threatened by Maliki’s 
staff.
81
 The Baghdad Brigade, meanwhile, has been sent as far afield as Diyala and 
Ninewa to arrest Maliki’s political opponents.82 The Prime Minister’s use of this 
extra-constitutional chain of command as a tool ‘for repression and intimidation’ 
troubled US Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who questioned ‘whether the PM is 
becoming a non-democratic dictator bent on subordinating all authority to his hand’ 
in a 2009 embassy cable.
83
 
Maliki’s forces also began targeting members of the Awakening Councils, 
those Sunni groups that had successfully battled al-Qaeda and had played a 
significant role in reducing internal violence in Iraq. Control over the Awakening 
Councils was handed over by the Americans to the Iraqi government in late 2008 
and early 2009 on the understanding that 20% would be integrated into the Iraqi 
Security Forces and the rest would be given appropriate government jobs.
84
 The 
Prime Minister was afraid, however, that these armed Sunni figures could represent 
a political threat to his government, and in 2009 forty Awakening leaders were 
arrested.
85
 Targeted by the government and by al-Qaeda militants seeking revenge, 
the Awakening leaders were incredibly vulnerable and by 2010 ‘most Awakening 
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leaders were either dead or arrested.’86 Many rank and file Awakening members 
were left unemployed as the government failed to integrate them into government 
jobs in large enough numbers. In 2009, members of the Awakening Council in 
Salman Pak protested these government failures by resigning en masse.
87
 By 2010 
only 37,041 of the approximately 100,000 Awakening members had been integrated 
into Iraqi government jobs, and many of those jobs on offer were menial and poorly 
paid.
88
 
2010 Parliamentary Elections 
In the lead up to the March 2010 parliamentary elections, 511 candidates were 
disqualified by the Justice and Accountability Commission for their previous 
affiliations to the Ba’ath party. The dubious Commission was run by two Shi’ite 
political candidates, Ahmed Chalabi and Ali al-Lami, and although both Sunni and 
Shi’ite candidates were affected, the most prominent banned candidates were from 
the Sunni dominated Iraqiya list. Much to the disappointment of many Sunni voters, 
the Prime Minister and the Independent High Electoral Commission stood by the 
ban, and the acrimonious arguments about the decision dredged up sectarian 
sentiments and poisoned the atmosphere around the elections.
89
    
The elections went ahead despite the uproar, and Prime Minister Maliki’s 
State of Law list came in second place, winning two seats fewer than Ayad Allawi’s 
Iraqiya coalition. The Prime Minister, who had not considered Iraqiya a threat and 
fully expected to receive the highest number of votes, was astounded.
90
 He declared, 
explicitly in his capacity as commander in chief, that there was ‘No way we will 
accept the vote,’ and demanded that the Independent High Electoral Commission 
conduct a recount.
91
 Maliki secured a ruling from the pliable Supreme Court that 
enabled him to create, post-election, the largest coalition and therefore to have the 
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first chance to create a government. After ten months of negotiations, with more 
than a little assistance from the Iranians who brokered a frosty rapprochement 
between Maliki and the Sadrists, Maliki managed to put together an agreement that 
brought him back to power. The so-called Erbil Agreement promised to install Ayad 
Allawi as the head of a National Council for Strategic Policy with oversight powers, 
to properly supply the Kurdish Peshmerga and to practise joint decision making. 
Much of what was agreed, however, never came to pass. Once Prime Minister 
Maliki had secured his second term in office his priority was to ensure that the 
humiliating electoral defeat that he had just suffered could never take place again. 
Maliki aggressively undermined and marginalised the already weak and divided 
Iraqiya coalition.
92
 He sought to replace the commissioners on the Independent High 
Electoral Commission, which had confirmed the veracity of the election results, with 
his own political loyalists.
93
 And he reactivated the sectarian rhetoric that he had 
abandoned in 2008 and 2009, warning his Shi’ite constituency of Ba’athist plots to 
topple his government.
94
 
Growing Disillusionment of the Iraqi Public 
By 2011, there was a growing sense of disgust at Iraqi politics amongst the general 
public. Iraq’s political elite had wasted almost an entire year on political infighting 
after the 2010 elections, levels of government corruption had reached endemic 
proportions, and despite Iraq’s vast resource wealth, basic services including 
electricity provision, sewage, and water purification remained seriously 
underdeveloped. In February 2011 protests broke out across Iraq, culminating in a 
‘Day of Rage’ in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square on 25th February. Thousands protested 
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against the government’s failure ‘to provide the services, jobs, and security 
promised during the elections.’95 The Maliki government was deeply shaken by the 
events, and, fearful of the protests expanding, he announced a hundred day 
programme to improve services and declared that he would cut his salary in half and 
would not seek a third term in office.
96
 The government also sought to discourage 
and discredit the protestors. The protestors’ attempts to set up tents in the square, 
mimicking Cairo’s protest encampment, were prevented by government supporters 
armed with ‘clubs and knives;’ a curfew prevented traffic from moving around 
Baghdad;
97
 and the Prime Minister denounced the protestors as ‘Ba’athists,’ 
‘terrorists’ and ‘Al Qaeda.’98  
By October 2011 public confidence had plummeted, with 85% of Iraqis 
reporting that job opportunities were shrinking, 82% complaining that corruption 
was continuing to worsen, and 67% saying that the central government was 
becoming less responsive to people’s needs.99 Indeed it became clear that the 
political elite actually benefited from Iraq’s decrepit infrastructure, as all parties 
were mired in scandalous contracting practices whereby sham companies would be 
awarded contracts in return for extortionate kickbacks.
100
 Across the spectrum, 
confidence in Iraq’s political leadership fell, with Maliki enjoying only a 31% 
approval rating.
101
    
Negotiating a SOFA Extension 
When the original Status of the Forces Agreement was signed off in December 
2008, the US had intended to eventually extend the agreement – to allow for US 
troops to stay in Iraq beyond December 2011. Indeed the Bush administration had 
envisaged a long-term presence for US troops in Iraq similar to that in South Korea, 
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where over 20,000 US troops are permanently stationed.
102
 The Obama 
administration was much more ambivalent about its relationship with Iraq.
103
 
Eschewing the idealism of the Bush years, Obama’s pragmatic realism led him to 
conclude that a semi-stable, semi-autocratic Iraq was the best that the US could hope 
for, and he was unconvinced about the need to extend American troop presence in 
the country.
104
 Nonetheless, the US military assessed that a continued troop presence 
in Iraq was important and Obama focused on limiting the number of troops that 
would be left in Iraq, rather than advocating for a total withdrawal.
105
  
Although Prime Minister Maliki was conflicted about the US role in Iraq, he 
decided on balance that a limited troop presence would be preferable to a total 
withdrawal of US forces.
106
 By this time, however, Maliki had lost much of the 
political capital he had enjoyed in the original SOFA negotiations in 2008, and he 
struggled to pull together the agreement that he wanted. The popular disillusionment 
indicated by the demonstrations earlier that year, and Maliki’s alienation of Iraqi 
parliamentarians, made it very difficult for the Prime Minister to pursue his foreign 
policy agenda. Although the other political parties in government were privately in 
favour of the SOFA extension, they used Maliki’s support for the move as an 
opportunity to undermine him politically, declaring that the SOFA extension would 
be handing Iraq’s sovereignty to the US.107 Although Maliki had assured the Obama 
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administration that he would secure the SOFA extension, as time went on it became 
increasingly apparent that he was simply not capable of delivering on his promise.
108
 
Maliki could not muster the political support to usher the agreement through 
parliament, and he feared that publicly supporting the agreement could fatally 
undermine his fragile legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi public.
109
 The Prime 
Minister suggested bypassing the Iraqi parliament, and simply extending the troop 
presence under the rubric of training, but the US military felt that the option did not 
provide the level of assurances that they needed.
110
 By October 2011 it became clear 
that the Prime Minister had failed to make the SOFA extension happen. On 21 
October 2011 President Obama announced that a total withdrawal of US troops from 
Iraq would take place by the end of the year.  
The contrast between Maliki’s confidence, legitimacy and level of political 
capital during the 2008 SOFA negotiations and his relative weakness and timidity in 
2011 indicates the importance of regime strength when it comes to obtaining foreign 
policy goals. Although Prime Minister Maliki’s moves towards authoritarianism had 
alienated his political colleagues and had called his legitimacy into question in some 
parts of the country, the Prime Minister did not yet wield the level of political power 
that he needed to unilaterally force the agreement through. Iraq now resembled, as 
Toby Dodge argues, competitive authoritarianism: the Prime Minister could not 
govern unilaterally but the space for democracy was being rapidly circumscribed.
111
 
It was nonetheless the case, however, that the Prime Minister was now the main 
arbiter of Iraqi foreign policy – and although he could not put together an 
agreement, neither the US nor Iraqi politicians circumvented him in this process. 
Maliki was clearly Iraq’s sovereign leader, and if the agreement could not be 
reached through him, it seemed that it could not be reached at all.  
                                                                                                                                                                   
but anger and frustration with the Prime Minister hampered political cooperation on the issue. 
Hussainy, 'Interview with author'. 
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 An insider in the Obama administration observed that Maliki had initially promised to ‘get this 
through,’ but things changed once it became apparent that his political rivals would use the issue to 
‘club him over the head.’ Former Senior Adviser to Obama Administration, 'Interview with the 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that as the Iraqi state strengthened in the aftermath of the 
Iraqi civil war, the state’s credibility as a foreign policy interlocutor was enhanced in 
the eyes of foreign powers. The state’s legitimacy was derived from its increasing 
capacity to monopolise violence in the country, and to articulate a narrative of state 
that was resonant with the population. The increased centralisation of state 
institutions, particularly of security bodies, and their dominance by the Prime 
Minister, limited the space in which competing political parties could manipulate 
state bodies in pursuit of their own goals and better enabled the Prime Minister to 
control state foreign policy. This process of centralisation, however, enabled the 
Prime Minister to deploy state institutions in pursuit of his own political ends, 
thereby undermining the legitimacy of the state as a professional and depersonalised 
arbiter of public affairs. The continuation of extreme corruption and its undermining 
of public service delivery, and the political manipulation of security forces, began to 
diminish the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the Iraqi public. 
Reduced legitimacy hampered the Prime Minister’s ability to effectively 
pursue his foreign policy goals, but because of his grip over the state institutions and 
over violence the Prime Minister was also able to ensure that alternative sub-state 
actors could not take his place as foreign policy interlocutors. Although the Prime 
Minister by no means presided over a straightforwardly authoritarian state, he was 
able to significantly reduce the ability of competing political parties to deploy state 
resources to their own political ends, and was able to prevent violent sub-state actors 
from occupying territory and from effectively building local constituencies. When it 
came to the Kurds, however, the Prime Minister gathered the strength to challenge 
their overreach too late and was unable to prevent either their presence in disputed 
territories or their unilateral decision-making over the use of natural resources. The 
ability of the Kurdish region to consistently maintain a high level of internal 
stability, their creation of a desirable investment environment, and the success of 
their long-term diplomatic efforts had given them access to powerful international 
companies that have the resources, the will and the political leverage that could 
secure the long-term future of the autonomous Kurdish region.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SYRIA AND THE SECOND IRAQI 
CIVIL WAR 
 
Introduction 
This chapter argues that in 2012 and 2013 the Iraqi state dramatically lost legitimacy 
after its targeting of senior Sunni politicians triggered a series of events that plunged 
Iraq back into violent sectarian conflict. Its failure to provide security to Iraqi 
citizens once again empowered sub-state actors who have fuelled continuing 
violence in Iraq in addition to actively engaging in the civil war in neighbouring 
Syria. The renewed weakness of the Iraqi government has also rendered it 
increasingly vulnerable to Iranian influence. In pursuit of regime security, the Prime 
Minister has acted against Iraq’s formal policy toward Syria in order to help Iran to 
better pursue its objectives there. Meanwhile, the KRG has continued to pursue a 
foreign policy that is entirely separate to Iraq’s, and has heavily engaged with the 
Kurdish politics in civil war Syria. The level of independence enjoyed by Iraqi 
Kurdistan in its foreign relations raises questions about the impact of federalism on 
weak state foreign policy capacity, which are addressed in this chapter and in the 
conclusion to the thesis. 
US Withdrawal and the Power to be Weak 
The end of the US troop presence in December 2011 gave Prime Minister Maliki the 
latitude to govern without the restraints imposed by the US,
1
 and could be 
interpreted as the final moment at which sovereignty was restored to the country.
2
 
                                                          
1
 US officials say that US influence over the Iraqi government was already in decline – particularly 
once the US had announced its intention to leave. They nonetheless acknowledge that the departure 
of US troops led to a significant loss of leverage over the Iraqi government. Former Senior Adviser to 
Obama Administration, 'Interview with the author conducted on condition of annonymity'. US 
Government Official, 'Interview with the author conducted on condition of annonymity'. Indeed soon 
after the US withdrawal, Prime Minister Maliki drastically limited US diplomatic access to Iraqi 
politicians and civil servants, and slowed the process of issuing visas to US personnel. Dodge, Iraq: 
From War to a New Authoritarianism, 185-6. 
2
 One powerful Iraqiya financier declared that the party was striving for ‘a sovereign state, void of 
occupation and external interference,’ implying that the US presence in Iraq prevented the country 
from claiming full sovereignty. The irony is that Iraqiya ultimately wanted an extension of the US 
presence in the country to protect the Sunni population from what it saw as sectarian and politicized 
Iraqi security forces. Senior Iraqiya Financier, 'Interview with the author conducted on condition of 
annonymity'.  
182 
 
Although the Sunni and Kurdish communities were somewhat nervous about their 
security in the face of US withdrawal,
3
 the Prime Minister could have used the 
opportunity to celebrate Iraq’s unity, strength, and return to independence. Instead 
the Prime Minister chose to use his newfound freedom to target his political rivals.
4
 
Hours after an official military ceremony brought the US presence in Iraq to a 
formal end, tanks from the Baghdad Brigade surrounded the homes of three of Iraq’s 
most senior Sunni politicians: Deputy Prime Minister Salih al-Mutlaq,
5
 Finance 
Minister Rafi’ al-Esawi, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi.6 Several of 
Hashemi’s bodyguards were arrested on terrorist charges and the Vice President fled 
to the Kurdish region as a warrant was issued for his arrest.
7
 Forty-eight hours after 
their arrest, Hashemi’s bodyguards were paraded on national television ‘confessing’ 
that the Vice President had ordered the assassination of Shi’ite officials and was 
linked to terrorist activity.
8
 One of those bodyguards later died in custody from 
injuries likely sustained during torture.
9
 Although there have been questions about 
Hashemi’s links to unsavoury groups,10 this attack on him was clearly politically 
motivated and designed to bolster support for the Prime Minister in his Shi’ite base 
                                                          
3
 By October 2011 a mere 11% of Sunnis thought the country was going in the right direction, with 
their concerns about security rising, their personal economic situations deteriorating, and with a 
growing feeling that they were being treated unfairly by society and by the government. Greenberg 
Quinlan Rosner Research, 'Iraq Enters a Critical Period: Graphs for the Report on the October 2011 
Survey',  31, 34, 32, 35. Kurds were also becoming increasingly fearful of the growing strength of the 
Iraqi central government, and in 2012 President of the Kurdish Regional Government Masoud 
Barzani accused the Iraqi government of seeking to buy F16 Fighter Jets to use against the Kurdish 
region. Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism, 168.  
4
 As a former advisor to Prime Minister Ja’fari observed, ‘Maliki would not have dared to go after 
Hashemi with the US there.’ Former Senior Adviser to Prime Minister Ja'fari, 'Interview with the 
author conducted on condition of annonymity'. 
5
 The Prime Minister had already demanded that Parliament hold a vote of no confidence in Salih al-
Mutlaq and the Deputy Prime Minister was already being barred from his office and from the cabinet. 
Sullivan, 'Maliki's Authoritarian Regime',  29. Jabar, Mansour, and Khaddaj, 'Maliki and the Rest: A 
Crisis within a Crisis',  21. 
6
 The Baghdad Brigade is commanded by the Office of the Commander in Chief, which reports 
directly to the Prime Minister. Sullivan, 'Maliki's Authoritarian Regime',  11. 
7
 Asharq al-Awsat, 'Al-Hashemi Hits Back Against al-Maliki' (20th December 2011). 
8
 James Hider, 'Iraqi Vice-President Flees "Death Squads" Arrest Warrant', The Times, 20th 
December 2011. 
9
 Human Rights Watch, 'Iraq: Investigate Death of VP’s Bodyguard in Custody ', (Beirut, 2012). 
10
 Several US officials have indicated that they believe either Hashemi or at least his bodyguards 
were guilty of crimes. US Government Official, 'Interview with the author conducted on condition of 
annonymity'. Former Senior National Security Council Official, 'Interview with the author conducted 
on condition of annonymity'. An article by the Iraq Institute for Strategic Studies claims that Al 
Qaeda affiliated personnel may have been integrated into Hashemi’s security staff in order to prevent 
‘retribution by Al Qaeda.’ Jabar, Mansour, and Khaddaj, 'Maliki and the Rest: A Crisis within a 
Crisis'. 
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whilst further undermining the already fragmented Iraqiya coalition.
11
 Ultimately 
Hashemi was convicted on terrorism charges and sentenced to death by hanging
12
 in 
a trial that was widely condemned as politicised by Sunni and Kurdish politicians.
13
 
The highly charged Hashemi episode ushered in an era of revived sectarian 
polarisation in Iraq, as many Shi’ites believed in Hashemi’s guilt and supported his 
conviction,
14
 whilst the majority of Sunnis saw the trial as a witch-hunt and the 
latest in a series of steps designed to disenfranchise their community. Fully 79% of 
Shi’ites approved of filing charges against Vice President Hashemi, whilst 69% of 
Sunnis disapproved of it.
15
 The attack on Hashemi also renewed tensions between 
Baghdad and Erbil, as the fugitive Vice President took refuge in the Kurdish region 
amidst demands from Baghdad that he be surrendered to the Iraqi authorities. Prime 
Minister Maliki accused Kurdish President Masoud Barzani of complicity in 
Hashemi’s crimes,16 and threatened to cut the KRG’s income and to sack the 
Kurdish chief of staff of the Iraqi army in response to the Kurds’ ‘harbouring’ of 
Hashemi.
17
 President Barzani responded with an extensive attack on Prime Minister 
Maliki on 20
th
 March 2012 in which he accused the Prime Minister of attempting to 
‘establish a one-million-strong army whose loyalty is only to a single person,’ and 
warned the Prime Minister that ‘enough is enough.’18 
In the wake of this political crisis, Iraqi leaders began to coalesce and plans 
were made to launch a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister. Signatures were 
                                                          
11
 A senior member of the Maliki Government said that ‘Hashemi is a criminal, but not only he,’ and 
that the Prime Minister ‘intentionally did this’ because he thought it would make him a ‘Shi’ite hero.’ 
According to this figure, Maliki was not worried about the Sunni backlash because he ‘knows very 
well Sunnis won’t give him the vote.’ Former Senior Member of Prime Minister Maliki's 
Government, 'Interview with the author conducted on condition of annonymity'. This is supported by 
President Barzani’s declaration that Prime Minister Maliki had privately asked him to smuggle 
Hashemi out of the country, even as he was publicly lambasting the Kurdish President for refusing to 
hand Hashemi over to the Iraqi authorities. Josh Rogin, 'Kurdish Leader: No to Arming the Syrian 
Opposition', Foreign Policy, 5th April 2012. 
12
 Al-Arabiya, 'Fugitive Iraqi VP Hashemi Sentenced to Death by Hanging' (8th September 2012). 
13
 Mohamad Ali Harissi, 'Iraqi Judiciary Draws Fire Over Fugitive VP Trial', Agence France Presse, 
21st June 2012. There are serious questions about the impartiality of the Iraqi justice system. A string 
of pro-government decisions issued by the Federal Supreme Court substantiate claims that the justice 
system has been co-opted by the Maliki government. These include the ruling for a recount after 
Maliki’s loss in the election, the ruling that placed all of Iraq’s independent bodies including the Iraq 
High Electoral Commission under cabinet supervision, and the ruling that prevented parliament from 
initiating legislation. Sullivan, 'Maliki's Authoritarian Regime',  20. 
14
 Jabar, Mansour, and Khaddaj, 'Maliki and the Rest: A Crisis within a Crisis',  18. 
15
 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, 'A Major Shift in the Political Landscape: Graphs for the 
Report on the April 2012 National Survey', (Washington D.C.: National Democratic Institute, April 
2012b) 35. 
16
 Jabar, Mansour, and Khaddaj, 'Maliki and the Rest: A Crisis within a Crisis',  20. 
17
 Kaysi and Ottaway, 'The State of Iraq',  8. 
18
 International Crisis Group, 'Iraq and the Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears',  12. 
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gathered from the Kurdish parties, Iraqiya, and the Sadrists, and were submitted to 
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani who stalled the process by referring the signatures to 
the Criminal Investigation Department.
19
 In the meantime furious lobbying and an 
alleged bevy of threats and promises issued by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
Corps led to a number of MPs dropping their support for the motion and the vote of 
no confidence failed.
20
 Despite widespread Sunni and Kurdish disapproval of 
Maliki’s behaviour, the vote of no confidence also failed to inspire the Iraqi public. 
For many in the Iraqi population the continued poor performance of local services 
was their number one priority, and the vote of no confidence provided further proof 
that the Iraqi political elite did nothing but spend their time bickering amongst 
themselves.
21
 
For Prime Minister Maliki, consolidating power remained a top priority. He 
took heart from the failure of the vote of no confidence, and was buoyed by his 
continued popularity in the Shi’ite heartlands. Indeed the Prime Minister’s approval 
ratings in the south shot up by 20 points, and the Da’wah Party gained 15 points 
between October 2011 and April 2012, the very period in which this political crisis 
took place.
22
 Only 14% of Shi’ites considered Maliki to be ‘acting like a dictator,’ 
compared to 64% of Sunnis.
23
 The Prime Minister, to some extent, enjoyed the 
popularity of incumbency that comes with a patrimonial state; as one respected Iraq 
commentator notes, Maliki’s legitimacy partly comes from ‘being behind 6 million 
salaries.’24 But the Prime Minister has also successfully cultivated an image as a 
strong leader and protector of the Shi’ites whilst also playing up the threats to Shi’ite 
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 Jabar, Mansour, and Khaddaj, 'Maliki and the Rest: A Crisis within a Crisis',  30. 
20
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23
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security posed by Ba’athists and terrorists.25 One senior ISCI member declared 
Maliki’s popularity in the south ‘a little bit strange’ given that Iraq had ‘not good 
services or economy,’ but puts it down to Maliki’s constant planting of ‘very 
negative emotion.’ ‘Everyone in the south believes Maliki is a strong leader and 
wants to do good,’ he continues, and when they see things are not improving ‘they 
are not blaming him, they are blaming others.’26  
The Prime Minister’s pursuit of regime security led him to severely damage 
the fragile cross-sectarian legitimacy that the Iraqi state had achieved by fighting 
both Sunni extremists and Shi’ite militants in 2008 and 2009. Although the Prime 
Minister was motivated by a desire to protect his regime from political rivals, the 
fact that those rivals were primarily Sunni damaged the inclusive narrative of state 
that had persuaded many Sunnis to eschew violence in favour of political 
participation. The loss of this inclusive narrative of state was to precipitate an 
outbreak of violence that would undermine the functional legitimacy of the Iraqi 
regime across all communities.  
The Sunni Protest Movement 
On 20
th
 December 2012 the Maliki-controlled Baghdad Brigade
27
 raided the home 
and offices of Sunni Finance Minister Rafi’ al-Esawi and arrested a number of his 
security detail and staff in a move that strongly echoed the campaign against Vice 
President Hashemi almost exactly a year earlier.
28
 Rafi’ al-Esawi was a popular 
Sunni politician from the staunchly ‘nationalist’29 town of Fallujah, and protests 
quickly gathered pace in his defence. Starting in Fallujah and spreading to Ramadi, 
Mosul, Samarra and Tikrit, tens of thousands of Sunni protestors poured onto the 
streets defending Esawi
30
 and decrying what they saw as the collective persecution 
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 Maliki even threatened President Obama that if Sunnis in the Arab World tried to undo the gains 
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American Foreign Policy in Retreat, 157. 
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 Sullivan, 'Maliki's Authoritarian Regime',  11. 
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of the Sunni community at the hands of the Iraqi government.
31
 The protest 
movement developed an astonishing momentum, large scale protest camps were 
erected, protestors blocked the highway from Baghdad to Jordan and Syria,
32
 and 
mass prayers evocative of those used in the Arab Spring were staged on the 
occupied highway.
33
  
Although the targeting of Esawi was the catalyst for this mass action, the 
Sunni community’s grievances had been mounting since the 2010 elections shattered 
their faith in the political system. Prior to the elections 78% of Sunnis said they 
would vote in the next elections,
34
 a number which fell to 48%
35
 after the 2010 
elections in which the Sunni dominated Iraqiya coalition won the vote and yet failed 
to come to power.
36
 The Sunni population was also sick of being disproportionally 
targeted in de-Ba’athification and anti-terrorism operations that resulted in arrests 
without due process, detentions without trial, and often torture in prison.
37
 An April 
2012 survey showed that three-quarters of Iraqi Sunnis did not think Iraq was a real 
democracy, with 69% believing that Prime Minister Maliki had too much power and 
61% saying that Iraq’s judges were becoming less independent.38 Moreover, 
perceptions of the economic climate in Sunni dominated areas were far more 
negative than in Shi’ite areas; 72% of Anbaris branded the economic situation there 
as bad, whilst 78% of people in Shi’ite Maysan said that their economic situation 
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was good.
39
 The demands articulated by the protestors were, therefore, wide-ranging 
– quickly moving on from the release of Esawi’s bodyguards to the dismantling of 
anti-terror legislation, the reversal of de-Ba’athification, and equal public 
employment opportunities for Sunnis.
40
 There was also a wide variety of attitudes 
towards the government expressed in these protests, from those protestors who 
wanted basic reforms, to those who wanted a new political system, and others with 
extremist agendas who wanted to destabilise Iraq.
41
 The nature of the demands and 
the breadth of interests represented at the protests made it difficult for any leader to 
claim to represent and to negotiate on behalf of the protestors. And because many of 
the demands were based on the particularities of how many Sunnis had experienced 
the Maliki government,
42
 they were alienating and even threatening to many Shi’ite 
Iraqis.
43
 The call for a radical reform of anti-terror laws and prisoner amnesty was, 
for example, antithetical to many Shi’ites who felt victimised by extremist mass-
casualty attacks almost exclusively carried out by Sunnis that continued to kill 
hundreds of Shi’ites a year.44    
Perhaps one of the most important trends in the Sunni protests has been a 
turning away from the mainstream Sunni political leadership. Though the protests 
may have started in response to the victimisation of a Sunni leader, it can be argued 
that Rafi’ al-Esawi was defended more as a member of his tribe and locality rather 
than as a political representative.
45
 Many in the Sunni community were disappointed 
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with the performance of its political representatives, and in large part had become 
disillusioned with the entire political process.
46
 Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi’s 
approval ratings fell amongst Sunnis,
47
 whilst protestors chased away Sunni Deputy 
Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq when he attempted to speak at a protest camp in 
Ramadi.
48
 Rather than generating and leading the protests themselves, the Iraqiya 
leadership had been caught by surprise by the protest movement,
49
 and, whilst they 
argued about how to respond,
50
 local tribal and religious figures began to take the 
lead.
51
 If anyone has emerged as a leader of the Sunni protests it has been cleric 
Abdul Maliki al-Sa’adi, raising fears that a new Islamic political elite could replace 
the current Sunni political cadre.
52
  
Prime Minister Maliki’s response to the mass demonstrations was confused, 
vacillating between offering concessions to the demonstrators and condemning them 
as Ba’athists and foreign agents.53 Attempts to negotiate a settlement were hampered 
by the disunity of the protestors, and by the sensitivity of Shi’ite constituents to the 
reforms that were being proposed. An April 2012 settlement reached between Maliki 
and Deputy Prime Minister Salih al-Mutlaq was eschewed by protestors who saw 
Mutlaq as a traitor, rather than as their representative in negotiations, and was also 
rejected by all major Shi’ite parties for offering significant amendments to the de-
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Ba’athification law.54 As the prospect for a settlement receded, radical minorities 
become increasingly influential within some of the protest camps.
55
 Jaysh Rijjal al-
Tariqa al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) was one such militant group;
56
 led by former Iraqi 
Vice President and Ba’athist Izzat al-Duri, the group caused a stir when its fugitive 
leader issued a video statement in support of the Sunni protests.
57
 Fears were raised 
in February 2012 that JRTN were participating in protests in the northern village of 
Hawija, which was a ‘stronghold’ for the group.58 In April the group was accused of 
being behind an attack on an Iraqi Security Forces checkpoint in which one soldier 
died and three were injured, and security forces believed that the men responsible 
were hiding within the Hawija protest camp.
59
 Government forces surrounded the 
camp on April 23
rd
 and demanded that the men be handed over, and when the 
protestors refused the camp was raided. Violent clashes ensued in which over 50 
protestors – mostly unarmed – were killed, and 110 were injured.60 The deaths 
caused an uproar across the Sunni protests, which had been surprisingly peaceful up 
to that point. JTRN and other ad hoc militant groups went on the rampage, attacking 
police stations and army convoys and temporarily taking over the town of Suleiman 
Beg.
61
  
The rhetoric that dominated the protests made clear the extent to which 
Sunnis felt excluded by what they saw as a Shi’ite narrative of state. Many Sunnis 
felt that the vision of state held by the Prime Minister and senior Shi’ite politicians 
involved relegating Sunnis to the status of a persecuted minority. The failure of the 
Iraqi state to successfully include Sunni political representatives in the governing 
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process precipitated an almost total loss of confidence in the political system, and 
made Iraq much more vulnerable to renewed violence. 
  
191 
 
A Second Civil War? 
The Hawija incident marked a turning point in the breakdown of security in post-
Surge Iraq. For disaffected Sunnis it seemed that participating in the political system 
had failed to deliver, and that peacefully protesting had brought nothing but further 
oppression, leading some to the conclusion that armed confrontation was the only 
way forward. The growing restlessness of the protests and the anger generated by 
the Hawija killings provided al-Qaeda in Iraq, which had been renamed Islamic 
State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006,
62
 with fertile ground in which to mount a resurgence in 
the country.
63
 In 2010 ISI had been virtually defeated in Iraq; the Awakening 
movement, the engagement of Sunnis in the political process, and the extra US 
soldiers provided by the Surge had all contributed to starving al-Qaeda of the space 
it needed to operate. By the Spring of 2010, thirty-four out of forty-two top ISI 
leaders had been killed or were in jail, and ISI’s operating capacity was severely 
degraded.
64
 But the failure of the Iraqi political system to sufficiently integrate 
Sunnis offered ISI a new opportunity to mount a comeback in Iraq. In 2012 ISI 
mounted a campaign dubbed ‘Breaking the Walls’ which sought to target Iraqi 
Security Forces on behalf of those thousands of Sunni prisoners who had been 
unfairly detained, a message which resonated with much of the Sunni community.
65
 
As the demonstrations endured for months without resolution, ISI became an 
increasingly uncontested presence at the protests. Black ISI flags could be seen at a 
number of protest sites, whilst footage emerged of masked ISI fighters openly 
participating at a protest in Ramadi.
66
 ISI has also been bolstered by the services of 
former Awakening fighters, many of whom have been abandoned by the Maliki 
government and have been co-opted by ISI for fear of being murdered if they 
refuse.
67
 A renewed willingness of parts of the Sunni community to tolerate ISI 
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fighters in their midst has vastly increased the ability of ISI to mount effective 
attacks in the country. Since April 2013 there has been a significant rise in the 
number of ISI attacks, marked by the use of co-ordinated Vehicle Bourne 
Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) which usually target Shi’ite civilians.68 In 
July 2013 ISI mounted an audacious jailbreak at the Abu Ghraib prison in which 68 
security guards were killed and over 500 prisoners escaped.
69
 This and other similar 
jailbreaks have no doubt replenished ISI’s ranks, and some of the more experienced 
fighters have likely contributed crucial technical expertise and leadership skills to 
the organisation. 
The escalation of violence against Shi’ite civilians has begun to elicit 
retaliatory anti-Sunni violence on the part of resurgent Shi’ite militias. Asa’ib Ahl 
al-Haq (AAH), an offshoot of the Mahdi Army, which had been the leading Shi’ite 
militia in the first Iraqi civil war,
70
 has been a dominant actor in this renewed anti-
Sunni violence, and is likely behind the murder of Sunnis at false checkpoints, and 
the staging of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks on Sunni mosques.
71
 
AAH have been accused of murdering candidates for the 2013 provincial elections, 
and allegedly plotted to kill former Prime Minister and Iraqiya leader Ayad 
Allawi.
72
 There has also been a rise in so-called ‘morality killings’ in Shi’ite areas, 
perhaps indicating that militias are trying to assert their authority and recreate local 
strongholds.
73
 Although AAH has formally denied involvement in any violent acts 
inside Iraq, on 9
th
 October 2013 AAH leader Qais al-Khazali announced that the 
group would co-operate with Iraqi Security Forces in reaction to the ‘killings and 
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destruction’ in the country,74 raising fears amongst many Sunnis that the Security 
Forces would become infiltrated with Shi’ite militias as in the first civil war.75 
The scale of violence across Iraq is beginning to transform life in the 
country, as Iraqi citizens feel increasingly insecure and fearful that Iraq may be 
plunging back into civil war. April 2013 saw a dramatic rise in the number of Iraqis 
killed, making it the deadliest month in Iraq since June 2008.
76
 In May 2013, 1,045 
Iraqis were killed in 560 security incidents, including 178 detonations of improvised 
explosive devices, 82 vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and 243 killings 
using small arms fire.
77
 In the subsequent months civilian casualties have often 
topped 1,000 a month.
78
 Although there is still support for the Prime Minister in 
Shi’ite constituencies, and sympathy for the Prime Minister’s depiction of the 
violence as a ‘war of genocide by terrorists,’79 his inability to effectively protect the 
Iraqi people – and indeed his government’s role in precipitating the political crisis 
that spawned this violence – has undermined his functional and normative 
legitimacy across Iraq. 
Maliki Weakened 
The political crisis that has engulfed Iraq throughout 2013 has weakened the Prime 
Minster, and empowered his political rivals.
80
 The Sadrists have desperately tried to 
re-position themselves politically to take advantage of Maliki’s move away from the 
cross-sectarian centre-ground. Muqtada al-Sadr has re-emerged from his political 
retirement and the group has reached out to the Sunni protestors and condemned 
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Maliki for stoking the unrest.
81
 The Prime Minister’s authoritarian moves have 
alienated Iraq’s supreme Shi’ite religious leader Ayatollah Sistani, who has refused 
to meet with all elected officials since 2010,
82
 and who has publicly exhorted the 
Prime Minister to address the demands of the protestors.
83
 His own Foreign 
Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, has said that the Prime Minister is responsible for 
exacerbating mistrust between Iraq’s sectarian communities and that he is trying to 
bring back ‘Saddamism without Saddam.’84 Altogether, Maliki is ‘far more 
vulnerable now than he was in the run-up to the 2010 general election,’85 and he is 
increasingly looking to work with other groups to bolster his legitimacy. The Prime 
Minister has long worked with Shi’ite militant group Asa’ib al-Haq, who he had 
turned to as a counterbalance to the militant Sadrist movement, with whom he had 
so often come to blows.
86
 The relationship appears to have been renewed as the 
Prime Minister has faced increasingly troubled times. AAH vocally condemned the 
2012 vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister,
87
 and the following year AAH 
leaders were allegedly provided with security details courtesy of the Prime 
Minister
88
 and the group held a large scale political rally in a government owned 
stadium in Baghdad.
89
 The Prime Minister has perhaps tried to reconnect with the 
Shi’ite grassroots through his association with AAH, and is trying to use the group 
to compensate for the ineffectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces. In September 
2013 it transpired that the Iraqi government was creating a security division of the 
Iraqi Security Forces that brings together Shi’ite militias, including Asa’ib Ahl al-
Haq, the Mahdi Army and Kata’ib Hezbollah, to defend Baghdad from ISI.90 Such a 
move risks empowering these militant groups as potential political rivals to his own 
Da’wah Party, but the Prime Minister may feel he has no choice but to partner with 
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groups that can help him to robustly defend the nation’s Shi’ites, and thereby to 
reclaim his legitimacy. It is also possible that the Prime Minister feels that such 
groups are becoming so powerful on their own that he risks being politically left 
behind unless he somehow joins forces with them.
91
 In the midst of the renewed 
violence and political tensions of 2013 came the Iraqi Provincial Elections, in which 
the Prime Minister’s Party lost around forty-two seats in yet another indication of 
his waning political fortunes.
92
 
The outbreak of violence in Iraq has weakened the functional legitimacy of 
the Iraqi government across all communities. The failure of the Iraqi state to fulfil its 
primary responsibility, which is to protect its citizens, has led to the re-
empowerment of local militia groups. These groups, which are once again 
attempting to provide security for their local communities, have been increasingly 
able to challenge the foreign policy authority of the state. 
Iraqi State Weakness and the Syrian Conflict 
With a significant part of its Sunni population in revolt, and overwhelmed by 
resurgent violent militias, Iraq was in turmoil and the state’s capacity to effectively 
pursue foreign policy was once again severely diminished. The inability of the 
Prime Minister to execute foreign policy according to what he considered to be in 
the best interests of Iraq demonstrates the intimate connection between state 
weakness and foreign policy.  
The Iraqi Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister agreed that when it came 
to the civil conflict in neighbouring Syria it was in Iraq’s best interest to stay 
neutral.
93
 Iraq wants a negotiated settlement that keeps Syria intact and that prevents 
the further empowerment of extremist elements.
94
 A 2013 Da’wah Party document 
describes its policy towards Syria as advocating ‘for a political settlement in Syria, 
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seeing military attempts at resolving the conflict as a recipe for the disintegration of 
Syria’ which would ultimately benefit ‘Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups.’95  
Iraq shares a 400 mile long border with Syria, and has suffered extensive 
problems attempting to regulate that border to prevent the transfer of extremist 
foreign fighters into Iraq.
96
 The unwillingness of the Syrian authorities to stop 
extremists from travelling into Iraq has long been a source of tension between the 
two governments, and diplomatic relations broke down as recently as 2009 over a 
series of spectacular bombings for which Iraq held the Syrian government 
responsible.
97
 There has also been a tense personal relationship between Prime 
Minister Maliki and President Assad, the latter having supported Maliki’s rival Ayad 
Allawi in the 2010 parliamentary elections.
98
 The Iraqi Prime Minister therefore has 
little sympathy for the Ba’athist Assad and is not personally invested in his 
survival.
99
 Though it may not naturally sympathise with the Assad regime, the Iraqi 
government is also extremely wary of a breakdown of the Syrian state which may 
provide extremists with a safe haven from which they can continue to destabilise 
Iraq.
100
 They consider that a victory of Syria’s Sunni-dominated rebel movement 
could empower militant Sunni groups in Iraq, leading to a civil war or3 the possible 
break-up of Iraq.
101
 For that reason the Iraqi government is against any kind of 
                                                          
95
 Islamic Dawa Party, 'Islamic Dawa Party: Vision for Iraq's Foreign Policy', (2013) 7-8. 
96
 See chapter four for more details of Syria’s approach to the transfer of militants into Iraq from its 
territory.  
97
 On the 19
th
 August 2009 truck bombings targeting Iraq’s Foreign Ministry and Finance Ministry 
killed over a hundred civilians. A furious Prime Minister Maliki demanded that Syria hand over the 
alleged Syrian-based masterminds of this attack. When Syria refused, the Iraqi government recalled 
its Ambassador from Damascus. Mona Yacoubian, 'Syria and the New Iraq', in Henri J. Barkey, Scott 
B. Lasensky, and Phebe Marr (eds.), Iraq, Its Neighbors, and the United States: Competition, Crisis 
and the Reordering of Power (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), 145-64, 146-
47. 
98
 Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi said that Bashar al-Assad, along with the rest of the Arab world, 
supported his victory in the 2010 parliamentary elections and tried to convince Iran to change its anti-
Allawi stance, but eventually Iran ‘influenced Bashar al-Assad to shift position’ away from overtly 
supporting Allawi. Allawi, 'Interview with author'.  
99
 Despite having spent most of his years in exile in Syria, Prime Minister Maliki does not have fond 
memories of the country, declaring Syrians to be ‘sons of bitches to the last man.’ Parker and Salman, 
'Notes From the Underground: The Rise of Nouri al-Maliki'.  One Maliki insider said that the Prime 
Minister ‘has a deep hatred of Syria from his time there’ because he felt constantly humiliated by 
Syrian intelligence. Cited in Rosen, Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the 
Muslim World.  
100
 Baghdad worries that the fall of Assad could ‘have a profoundly destabilizing effect on Iraq’s still 
fragile politics’ because Syria could once again become a major source of weapons and fighters for 
militants in Iraq. Sean Kane and Elie Abouaoun, 'Baghdad's Wary Support for the Syrian Status Quo', 
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2011) 1-2. 
101
 Former Iraqi Political Attaché, 'Interview with the author conducted on condition of annonymity'. 
197 
 
military intervention in Syria in support of the rebels,
102
 and has been wary of 
communicating with the rebels for fear of empowering them in any way. The Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister even came to blows when the latter met with 
members of the Syrian opposition in Cairo. The Foreign Minister felt that the Iraqi 
government should make it clear that it was not supporting President Assad, whilst 
the Prime Minister favoured a much more ambiguous position.
103
 
Despite their fear of the Islamist component of the Syrian opposition, it is not 
in Iraq’s interests to support the Assad regime. Such a move would place Iraq firmly 
outside of the Arab consensus at a time when it has been trying to rebuild some 
prestige in the Arab world,
104
 and would further antagonise Iraq’s already restive 
Sunni population. The official Iraqi government position on Syria has, therefore, 
been to encourage dialogue between the government and the opposition without 
offering substantial support to either side.
105
  
Iraq’s actual interaction with the Syrian conflict, however, belies its stated 
national interests in the matter. In practice, Iraq has enabled the endurance of the 
Assad regime by allowing Iran to funnel weapons to Syria through Iraqi airspace, by 
enabling currency transfers for the embattled Syrian regime through the Iraqi 
currency markets, and by turning a blind eye to Shi’ite militants who have travelled 
to Syria to fight for the regime. This instance is a good example of how the concept 
of the ‘national interest’ can be used as a political tool without the existence of a 
concurrent process for integrating assessments of the national interest into the policy 
making process. The Prime Minister is able to restate his claim to legitimacy and to 
re-emphasise his position as a national leader in contrast to his opponents by 
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claiming to act in the ‘national interest’, whilst simultaneously pursuing regime 
survival objectives that actively compromise Iraqi national security. 
The tension between Iraq’s stated national interests and its activities in 
relation to Syria can also be explained by the renewed weakening of the Iraqi state. 
Prime Minister Maliki had been dependent on Iran to broker the electoral coalition 
that returned him to power in 2010, and was now further indebted to Iran for 
scuppering the vote of no confidence that had threatened to remove Maliki from 
power in 2012. As the Prime Minister loses his domestic legitimacy he becomes 
increasingly dependent on external support to maintain his position of power, and 
Iran has taken advantage of this reliance to pressure Iraq into enabling Iran’s policy 
of vigorously supporting the Assad regime. According to a 2012 US intelligence 
estimate, Iran flew 200 tonnes of ammunition, mortars, machine guns, assault rifles, 
and rockets to Syria through Iraqi airspace, triggering a severe response from the US 
ambassador in Baghdad.
106
 The Iraqi government alternately denied that the flights 
were taking place and protested their inability to prevent them given that there is no 
Iraqi air force,
107
 but the over-flights continued. Towards the end of 2013 the US 
administration accused Transport Minister Hadi al-Ameri of personally organizing 
the over-flights in co-ordination with the Iranians.
108
 US officials admit, however, 
that Prime Minister Maliki is being put under enormous pressure by the Iranians to 
allow the over-flights at a time when he is domestically politically vulnerable.
109
 
The Iraqi government has also enabled both the Iranians and the Syrians to use Iraqi 
currency exchanges to purchase hundreds of millions of dollars, subjecting the Iraqi 
Central Bank to unsustainable levels of demand.
110
 When Central Bank Governor 
Sinan al-Shabibi tried to erect measures to better regulate these currency exchanges, 
Prime Minister Maliki blocked the move and later ousted the Governor on trumped 
up charges.
111
 The Iraqi government also supplied fuel oil to a desperate Syrian 
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regime, making a renewable deal in 2012 to sell the regime 720,000 tonnes worth at 
50% off the market value of the product.
112
 And the Iraqi government has refused to 
support Arab League action that has sought to punish the Assad regime, abstaining 
from a 2011 Arab League vote to impose sanctions on Syria. Although the Iranian 
government is still not satisfied with the extent of Iraqi engagement in the Syrian 
conflict, it appears clear that Iranian pressure has already pushed the Iraqi Prime 
Minister into a level of involvement in the conflict that is not in Iraq’s national 
interest.
113
  
The re-emerging weakness of the Iraqi state has also empowered militias that 
have further undercut Iraq’s Syria policy by directly engaging in the conflict. 
Hundreds of Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’ite militants have crossed over into Syria to 
fight for the Assad regime, most of them highly trained and well-equipped.
114
 These 
include fighters from Asa’ib al-Haq, the Mahdi Army and Kata’ib Hezbollah who 
have joined forces with either Assad’s troops or with the umbrella Shi’ite militant 
body the Abu al-Fadhil al-Abbas Brigade to conduct offensive and defensive 
operations throughout the greater Damascus area.
115
 Asa’ib al-Haq has confirmed its 
role in Syria, and has explicitly linked its fighting in Syria with its violent activities 
in Iraq, asserting that both conflicts are part of the same war against ‘Takfiri 
extremists.’116 The participation of Iraqi militants in Syria exacerbates sectarian 
tensions in Iraq, and further diminishes the ability of politicians to isolate Iraq from 
the effects of the neighbouring conflict.
117
 Prime Minister Maliki’s political 
weakness, however, and his increased dependence on Asa’ib al-Haq, has prevented 
him from taking a stand against Iraqi Shi’ite militant activities in Syria and has 
allowed Iraq’s security institutions to turn a blind eye to the practice.118  
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Just as the Iraqi Security Forces have become increasingly powerless to 
prevent al-Qaeda/Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) activities in Iraq after the almost total 
breakdown of the government’s legitimacy in the Sunni community, the Iraqi 
government is also failing to prevent the transfer of ISI fighters into Syria. From 
May 2012 ISI expanded its operations into the Syrian conflict with support from 
some of the very same Awakening fighters that the Iraqi government had abandoned 
after their successful defeat of al-Qaeda in 2006 and 2007.
119
 ISI sent a number of its 
fighters to Syria to establish an Islamist fighting force that would become Jabhat al-
Nusra (JN), now the most effective rebel militia in Syria.
120
 Part of the success of JN 
has been attributed to the expertise of both Syrian and Iraqi fighters in its ranks who 
have extensive fighting experience from their time as part of the insurgency in 
Iraq.
121
 ISI continued to send weapons and fighters to JN until April 2013, when 
ISI’s attempt to subordinate JN to its newly rebranded organisation, the Islamic 
State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), failed and ISIS established its own branch in 
Syria.
122
 The expansion of ISIS into Syria has provided its branches in Iraq with a 
stronger network of safe havens and more secure and extensive supply routes for the 
transfer of weapons and fighters into Iraq – thereby contributing further to Iraq’s 
instability.
123
 The Iraqi government has also been unable to prevent Iraqi tribes from 
smuggling weapons and goods to the Syrian rebels.
124
 The trade is both lucrative for 
these tribes and acts on the extensive sympathy that there is for the Syrian uprising 
in Sunni areas of Iraq.
125
 These tribes also allegedly act as a conduit for Saudi and 
Qatari aid to the Syrian rebels, further undercutting the Iraqi government’s control 
over its borders and its foreign relations.
126
 
The weakness of the Iraqi state, which has been evident in the loss of its 
monopoly over internal violence in Iraq and in the wholesale rejection by much of 
                                                          
119
 Wing, 'Explaining The Political Factors Behind The Increasing Violence In Iraq, An Interview 
With Maria Fantappie, Iraq Researcher At The International Crisis Group '. 
120
 Zelin, 'Al-Qaeda in Syria: A Closer Look at ISIS'. 
121
 Tim Arango, 'Syrian Rebels Tied to Al Qaeda Play Key Role in War', The New York Times, 8th 
December 2012. 
122
 Abigail Fielding-Smith, 'Iraq al-Qaeda Fighters Radicalise Syria', Financial Times, 18th August 
2013. 
123
 Lewis, 'Al Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking Walls Campaign, Part 1',  7. 
124
 Some tribesmen claim to be returning their ‘debt’ to the Syrians for aiding them in the insurgency 
against US occupation. Dan Murphy, 'Weapons Flowing from Iraqi Sunnis to Syria's Rebels?', The 
Christian Science Monitor, 2nd April 2012. 
125
 Free Syrian Army flags have been raised at the Sunni protests in Iraq in solidarity with the Syrian 
rebels, who many Iraqi Sunnis see as suffering through a parallel struggle against an oppressive 
Shi’ite dictator. Mardini, 'Metternich in Baghdad'. 
126
 Kenneth Pollock and Daniel Byman, 'The Syrian Spillover', Foreign Policy,  (2012). 
201 
 
the Sunni community of the Iraq state, has had a clear impact on Iraqi foreign policy 
towards Syria. The weakness of the Maliki regime has rendered it vulnerable to 
Iranian influence. Despite the Iraqi government deciding that a policy of non-
intervention in Syria is in Iraq’s best interests, the Maliki regime has facilitated 
Iranian support of the Assad regime. Meanwhile, the weakened Iraqi government 
has been unable to prevent sub-state Iraqi actors from intervening on both sides of 
the Syrian conflict. These actors have been empowered by the breakdown of 
security in Iraq, and have regained legitimacy by providing security or by offering a 
powerful sectarian narrative in Iraqi communities that have been deprived of state 
support. 
The KRG in Syria 
The distance between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the central 
Iraqi government continued to widen in 2012 and 2013, and the weakening Iraqi 
grip over the Kurdish region allowed the KRG to pursue an entirely independent 
policy towards the Syrian conflict. The signing of a deal to build an oil and gas 
pipeline between Kurdish territory and the Turkish port of Ceyhan was roundly 
condemned by the Iraqi government, who had until then been able to control the 
piped export of oil and gas from Iraqi Kurdistan.
127
 In 2013 the pipeline was 
completed and a deal was reached to build a second pipeline between Iraqi 
Kurdistan and Turkey to transport the heavy oil from Kurdistan’s northern fields.128 
The uncovering of extensive oil smuggling
129
 from the KRG to Iran without the 
repatriation of revenues to Baghdad led Iraqi ministers to threaten to cut the KRG’s 
budget, which they briefly did in March 2012.
130
 Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein 
Shahristani declared that Kurdish oil smuggling was depriving Iraq of $5.6 billion in 
revenue,
131
 whilst the head of the Kurdish Department of Foreign Affairs declared 
that if Iraq attempted to regain control over Kurdish resources, Kurdistan’s 
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participation in Iraq would be ‘over.’132 Meanwhile the continued entry of super-
majors into the Kurdish oil market further heightened tensions between the central 
and regional governments.
133
 The rhetoric on both sides of the divide also escalated 
in the wake of the Hashemi debacle and the vote of no confidence, as the Kurdish 
President accused Prime Minister Maliki of seeking to buy F16 fighter jets from the 
US in order to ‘drive the Kurds back to the mountain.’134 Maliki caused uproar by 
referring to the hotly disputed town of Kirkuk as an Arab city,
135
 whilst Barzani 
declared that Kurdistan would secede if Maliki was still in power after the 2014 
elections.
136
 The war of words almost escalated into armed conflict in the town of 
Tuz Khurmato in December 2012 when Iraqi Security Forces attempted to arrest a 
Kurdish man in the disputed town. Both President Barzani and Prime Minister 
Maliki sent reinforcements to the area after a fire-fight broke out, leading the 
country perilously close to conflict between the Kurdish and the Iraqi armies.
137
 A 
settlement was reached that averted further violence, but the incident demonstrated 
just how quickly the tension between the Iraqi government and the autonomous 
region could escalate into war.
138
 
The KRG has pursued an independent foreign policy towards Syria during 
the conflict that has been at odds both with both the official and unofficial policies 
of the Iraqi government. The KRG has sought to shape the Syrian Kurdish reaction 
to the civil conflict in Syria in order to create a potential partner autonomous 
territory for the Syrian Kurds and to demonstrate its influence over the Kurdish 
populations to neighbouring powers. A primary aim of the Barzani government has 
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been to unify the disparate Kurdish parties under one umbrella group.
139
 The most 
powerful and unified Syrian Kurdish group is the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD), 
which is an offshoot of the militant Turkish group the PKK. The PYD continues to 
be heavily influenced by the PKK, and Barzani sought to enhance his access to 
Syrian Kurdish politics by uniting the many small Kurdish parties outside of the 
PYD into a Kurdish National Council (KNC).
140
 Once the KNC had been formed, 
Barzani exerted a great deal of pressure over a number of months to bring the PYD 
and the KNC together under an umbrella body called the Supreme Kurdish 
Committee.
141
 President Barzani was convinced, based on the Kurdish experience in 
Iraq,
142
 that if the Syrian Kurds could unite and present their demands for regional 
autonomy whilst Syria was weakened by civil war, the Kurds would maximise their 
chances of achieving a beneficial outcome.
143
  
The KRG has also sought to build up the capacity of the Syrian Kurds, again 
drawing on their experience of having become suddenly functionally independent in 
1991 without the resources or experience to take over the management of the public 
service infrastructure that had been abandoned by Saddam Hussein.
144
 To this end 
the KRG has provided training in bureaucratic management and public 
administration for the Syrian Kurds.
145
 Early in the civil conflict President Assad 
withdrew his forces from Kurdish areas, betting that they would be least likely to 
join forces with the Arab rebel fighters – so Kurdish groups have already begun 
administering certain territories.
146
 The KRG has been keen to establish itself as a 
primary influencer of Syrian Kurdish politics, and is competing with the PKK in this 
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regard.
147
 In part the KRG wants to demonstrate its value as a strategic partner to 
Turkey,
148
 because Turkey offers the KRG a lifeline to the outside world and a 
possible path to independence. Turkey has been nervous about the possible impact 
of Syrian Kurdish autonomy in refuelling the long-standing war between Turkey and 
the PKK.
149
 In a bid to enhance its stature, the KRG has offered military training to 
the Syrian Kurds and has offered them strategic advice, mainly counselling them to 
avoid becoming entangled in the Syrian Arab civil conflict,
150
 and to focus on 
securing their own territories. The KRG’s intense involvement with the Syrian 
Kurds is expressly against the interests of the Iraqi government. Maliki’s stated 
Syria policy is absolutely against any Iraqi interference in the Syrian conflict 
whatsoever, and the KRG clearly contravenes Iraq’s stated neutrality. The KRG are 
also upstaging the unofficial Iraqi policy which has been to offer tacit support to the 
Assad regime. Though the KRG are advising against the Syrian Kurds joining the 
Free Syrian Army, they are even more strongly against the Kurds joining forces with 
the Assad regime – a strategy which the KRG believes would lead to revenge attacks 
against the Kurds by rebel forces. The Iraqi government has, however, been 
powerless to prevent the KRG from conducting an independent policy towards Syria 
as perceptions of the legitimacy of the Iraqi government in the Kurdish region have 
continued to plummet,
151
 and as Iraq weakens under the weight of its own resurgent 
sectarian civil conflict.  
The persistence of KRG independence in foreign policy making asks the 
larger question: to what extent does federalism in a weak state enable a federal 
region to conduct foreign policy independently of the central government? This 
thesis treats the federal Kurdish region as a sub-state actor, and hypothesises that its 
ability to conduct foreign policy is inversely correlated with the strength of the 
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central government. It appears, however, that the ability of a federal region to build 
its own institutional structure enables it to maintain foreign policy independence 
even when the central state regains its strength. This proposition will be considered 
in greater detail in the conclusion of the thesis.  
The KRG’s pursuit of Kurdish ‘national interests’ in the Syrian conflict is 
also worth noting. As part of its strategy to present itself to the international 
community as a de-facto state, the KRG has self-consciously adopted many of the 
trappings of statehood, including regularly referring to its policies as being driven by 
its assessment of the Kurdish national interest. Chief of Staff to the Kurdish 
Presidency Fuad Hussein, for instance, refers to the KRG’s Syria policy as being 
grounded in ‘our belief and our interest,’ and highlights the fact that geographically 
Iraqi Kurdistan shares a border with Syria and that they have a burgeoning Syrian 
refugee population in their territory.
152
 Framing Kurdish policy in this way the KRG 
echoes the way in which foreign policy narratives are traditionally constructed 
around the world, and allows the KRG to present itself to the international 
community as a pseudo-state that has an independent set of interests and a foreign 
policy based on the pursuit of those interests. By consistently emphasizing the ways 
in which it behaves like a state, and by highlighting the ways in which it is separate 
from Iraq, for example by showing KRG and Iraqi interests to be fundamentally 
different, the KRG continues to strengthen the legitimacy of its claim to statehood.     
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the Iraqi government’s collapse of normative 
legitimacy amongst the Sunni community, and the ongoing waning of functional 
legitimacy precipitated by the resurgence of violent militancy, has re-empowered 
sub-state foreign policy actors. Both Sunni and Shi’ite sub-state actors are becoming 
increasingly involved in the Syrian civil war, and are reducing the ability of the 
central government to define Iraq’s role in the conflict. The weakening of the Iraqi 
government has also rendered it more vulnerable to external influence, leading Iraq 
to pursue a Syria policy that undermines its national security. Meanwhile, the KRG 
has continued to build its foreign policy portfolio by pro-actively engaging with the 
Syrian Kurdish community and by seeking to influence the role of Syrian Kurds in 
the conflict. 
 The Prime Minister’s decision to target senior Sunni politicians betrayed a 
fundamental lack of understanding of the processes by which security had been 
returned to post-civil war Iraq. Security and stability returned to Iraq in 2008 
because parts of the Sunni community had been persuaded to buy into the political 
process and to deny support and safe havens to al-Qaeda elements in their localities. 
The priority for the Iraqi government in this immediate post-civil war state should 
have been to initiate a broad reconciliation and trust building programme to repair 
wounds between Iraq’s communities and to solidify the legitimacy of its political 
system. Instead the Prime Minister focused on consolidating power and preventing 
political rivals from challenging his position. Although the decision to indict the 
Sunni Vice President was likely political rather than sectarian, it was seen as a 
deeply sectarian move by Iraq’s Sunnis and prompted many to abandon their faith in 
the political process. As the non-violent protest movement also failed to deliver 
results to a Sunni community that felt largely embattled by arbitrary arrests and 
barred from public sector jobs, many became less and less resistant to the return of 
al-Qaeda militants to their midst. The resulting swell of violence across Iraq has 
been devastating, destroying hopes of rebuilding trust between Iraq’s sects and 
returning the country to the precipice of civil war.  
In this context, sub-state actors have once again been empowered to 
challenge the foreign policy authority of the Iraqi state. The Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) has continued to strengthen as the Iraqi government fails to 
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exert its authority over the region, and the KRG has become embroiled in Syrian 
Kurdish politics as that community grapples with how to respond to the Syrian civil 
war. Shi’ite militants backed by Iran have fought alongside the Assad regime, whilst 
Iraqi al-Qaeda elements have heavily influenced the Syrian rebel movement’s most 
effective fighting force, Jabhat al-Nusra. The Iraqi government has been powerless 
to prevent these actors from participating in the Syrian conflict, and has been 
susceptible to Iranian pressure to become more involved in the support of President 
Assad than is in Iraq’s interests. The renewed weakness of the Iraqi state has 
reduced its capacity to exert control over sub-state actors, and the political 
vulnerability of the Prime Minister has rendered Iraqi foreign policy more 
susceptible to influence from external factors. As a result, Iraq is involved in the 
Syrian conflict in a way that further exacerbates the sectarian tensions in its own 
country, and makes it far more likely that Iraq will collapse into a second civil war. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
 
A close reading of the Iraqi case demonstrates the utility of much of the conceptual 
framework posited at the start of this thesis. In this conclusion I start by assessing 
the utility of the weak state framework, and by determining the relative importance 
of functional relative to normative legitimacy. I then take each of my original 
hypotheses in turn and explore the myriad instances in which they have offered 
explanatory value in this study of Iraq’s foreign policy making over the last ten 
years. On the basis of this discussion I draw some conclusions about the relative 
importance of each hypothesis. A discussion of the limitations of the hypotheses 
then follows, on the basis of which I propose a future research agenda. I also suggest 
that the empirical contribution made by this thesis could be expanded through the 
collection of additional data, particularly through the use of archives or of 
ethnographic fieldwork. I conclude that, although the approach I have taken is 
intended to provide an explanatory framework for the Iraqi case, it offers a useful 
starting point for future analyses of foreign policy making in other weak states. 
 This study of Iraqi foreign policy making has demonstrated the utility of the 
weak state conceptualisation when it comes to understanding domestic foreign 
policy making processes. By analysing each period in Iraqi politics according to its 
relative levels of functional and normative legitimacy, this thesis has been able to 
account for variation in foreign policy over time. At times when functional and 
normative legitimacy have been relatively high in Iraq, foreign policy has tended to 
be more centralized, more effective, and more closely aligned with policies that 
could be identified as being in the national interest. And the converse has tended to 
be the case when functional and normative legitimacy have been deficient. I would 
argue that the weak state category has proven to be much more useful than the 
categories used in the existing literature on foreign policy in developing states. The 
literatures on developing states, Third World states, and African states have proven 
to be remarkably applicable to the Iraqi state despite it being neither in Africa nor 
resource poor. It is the shared experience of legitimacy deficits that in fact bring 
these states together, and that accounts for the commonalties in experience across 
such different contexts. Moreover, categorising a state in terms of the level of 
legitimacy it enjoys amongst its citizenry focuses attention on the source of long-
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term authority in a state, namely the consent and acquiescence of the governed, and 
thus enables us to get to the heart of the success or otherwise of state policy.        
 Based on the theorising of Seymour Martin Lipset, this thesis expected to 
find that normative legitimacy was marginally more important than functional 
legitimacy in shoring up state power. The Iraqi case study, however, has 
demonstrated that normative legitimacy is in fact a much more important component 
of state power than functional legitimacy. There has been less correlation, for 
instance, between the functional effectiveness of the Maliki government and support 
for the Prime Minister in Iraq’s Southern provinces than I would have expected. 
Rather, support for the Prime Minister in Shi’ite dominated regions has tended to be 
very effectively achieved through the use of narratives that refer to the protection of 
Iraqi Shi’ism. Similarly, amongst many in Iraq’s Sunni community, it has been their 
exclusion from what they have seen as pro-Shi’ite narratives of state and perceptions 
of pro-Shi’ite bias in state institutions that have driven their protests against the 
government, and that have led some to a violent rejection of the Iraqi state. This is 
perhaps because the use of exclusive, identity based narratives can trigger feelings 
of group insecurity and enhance threat perceptions. Groups that feel insecure, or 
even under threat from the state, are more likely to organise in armed opposition to 
the state than groups that feel functionally underserved by the state. The inability 
and unwillingness of the leaders of Iraq’s major communal groups to establish any 
sort of consistent and common legitimising narrative for the post-2003 state has 
been shown to have played a crucial role in the making of Iraqi foreign policy. 
Utility and Limitations of Hypotheses 
The working hypotheses that have guided this thesis have, on the whole, enabled me 
to make sense of an otherwise chaotic and confusing foreign policy landscape in 
Iraq. The focus on the proliferation of foreign policy actors has particularly allowed 
me to get the heart of Iraq’s problems in pursuing the national interest, and in 
achieving its foreign policy goals. But there have also been some limitations, 
particularly in that the hypotheses do not help to elucidate Iraqi foreign policy whilst 
it was under the jurisdiction of the Coalition Provisional Authority, and that they do 
not allow us to account for the continued strength of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government in sufficient depth. 
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The first hypothesis that I suggested at the start of this thesis was: In a weak 
state, the central government is unable to monopolise authority over foreign policy, 
including setting of foreign policy goals and exercising effective control over 
interaction with foreign actors. This has clearly been the case throughout the period 
that I analyse in Iraq. The Iraqi state was at its weakest point in the late Ja’fari, early 
Maliki governments when the Iraqi civil war reached its height. The state had not 
only failed to contain the violence, but in some cases was an active participant in it. 
In this environment, the state’s authority over foreign policy completely broke down 
and numerous sub-state actors were empowered to pursue their own, independent 
foreign policies. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and its militia wing the Badr 
Brigades, worked directly with Iran despite being partners in the coalition 
government. The Sadrists developed a strong relationship with backers in the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps and used some of the finance, equipment and weaponry 
that they had obtained to fight the Americans, against Iraqi civilians in the civil war.  
The weakness of the early Maliki government’s authority over foreign policy 
was also displayed when Sunni tribes were able to pursue close military 
relationships with the Americans totally independently of the central government. 
These tribes, many of whom had formerly supported the ‘resistance’ and were 
widely seen as opposing the government in the Iraqi civil war, were financed and 
armed by the US military without the permission of the Iraqi government. 
The Maliki regime again lost authority over foreign policy when its 
increasing authoritarianism damaged its legitimacy amongst the Sunni community. 
The Sunni political elite reached out to Turkey for support, and gained political and 
possibly financial support from the foreign neighbour. As the Prime Minister’s 
campaign against his Sunni political rivals intensified, Iraq’s fragile political 
settlement began to collapse. Months of Sunni protests re-empowered al-Qaeda in 
Iraq, who mounted a vicious campaign of violence in Iraq that has sparked a wider 
civil conflict. The breakdown of the normative and functional legitimacy of the Iraqi 
state once again enabled sub-state Iraqi actors to challenge the foreign policy 
authority of the central government. In this instance, sub-state Iraqi actors have 
intervened on both sides of the Syrian conflict. Iraqi al-Qaeda affiliated militants 
have become influential amongst the Syrian opposition, and have had an extremely 
detrimental effect on the nature of that conflict. Iraqi Shi’ite militias, meanwhile, 
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have made a show of going into Syria to protect Shi’ite shrines, and have supported 
President Assad, in a move that has further exacerbated sectarian tensions in Iraq. 
The Iraqi case demonstrates that, at moments when the Iraqi state is most 
deficient in functional and normative legitimacy, it is also able to exercise the least 
authority over foreign policy. Conversely, at moments when the Iraqi state has been 
stronger, it has been able to limit sub-state actors’ foreign policy activities. In late 
2008 and 2009, for instance, the Maliki government presided over the strongest 
incarnation of the Iraqi state since the invasion. Violence had dramatically fallen and 
the government was articulating a highly resonant, nationalist, non-sectarian vision 
for Iraq. At this stage al-Qaeda had been strategically defeated, the Shi’ite militias 
were very weak, and, except for the Kurdish parties which I will discuss later, 
relationships between Iraqi political parties and foreign powers were weaker than 
ever. In this context, the Maliki government was able to exercise clear authority over 
Iraqi foreign policy in negotiations with the US over a Status of the Forces 
Agreement. 
The second hypothesis posited by this thesis was: In a weak state, foreign 
policy is driven by a primary concern for the security and authority of the foreign 
policy actor, which can result in foreign policy choices being made that are 
detrimental to the interests of the population as a whole. The Iraqi case gives us 
multiple examples of the Iraqi executive pursuing regime security over national 
security for fear of losing power to domestic competitors. When the Iraqi state was 
at its weakest point, and the country was consumed by violence that was in part 
being fuelled by Iran, the Ja’fari government pursued a favourable relationship with 
Iran in a bid to ensure the security of his regime in the face of opposition from 
domestic political rivals. As the Maliki government began to bleed legitimacy in the 
aftermath of the 2010 elections, in which he had lost the vote but managed to stay in 
power, he jettisoned his plans to extend the Status of the Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
with the US for fear that political opponents would exploit a renewed agreement to 
undermine him politically. This move contrasts with the original SOFA negotiations 
which took place in 2008, in which the Prime Minister was able to negotiate from a 
position of political strength and as such was able to pursue national security, rather 
than regime security, goals. In the final years covered by this study, Prime Minister 
Maliki’s normative and functional legitimacy plummeted as internal violence once 
again subsumed Iraq and as Iraqi protestors clamoured for the Prime Minister to 
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leave office. In the face of these challenges, the Maliki regime has been unable to 
pursue the Iraqi national interest in Syria – which would have been a policy of strict 
non-intervention. Instead, the Maliki government has supported Iran’s pro-Assad 
policy in the hope that Iran will use its influence inside Iraq to ensure the security of 
the Maliki regime. 
The final hypothesis explored by this study was: In a weak state, the capacity 
of the central government to effectively implement its foreign policy agenda is 
diminished. The weak state is likely to suffer from limited functional capacity, 
which is compounded by a legitimacy deficit which renders the state more cautious 
about pursuing policies that could elicit negative responses from the populace. This 
hypothesis has also been borne out by the Iraqi case study. The unelected Iraqi 
Governing Council and the government led by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi were 
functionally and normatively extremely weak. They had been appointed by the US, 
they had little control over the resources they needed to govern, and they were 
entirely dependent on US forces for security. These administrations were able to 
conduct extensive diplomacy, but when it came to making substantive foreign policy 
decisions, they were powerless. Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, for instance, was 
convinced that handing over peacekeeping operations in Iraq to a multi-national 
force composed of Muslim soldiers would radically reduce the tensions being 
caused by the presence of US troops, and would improve security and stability in the 
country. Without US support for the idea, however, the Prime Minister had 
absolutely no way of making his foreign policy plan into a reality. Although the 
functional and normative legitimacy of the Iraqi government had somewhat 
improved by the time of the Maliki government, the continued dependence on the 
US military undermined its ability to successfully pursue its foreign policies. For 
example, the Maliki government was powerless to prevent Turkey from conducting 
cross-border bombing raids on PKK positions in northern Iraq. The US military 
controlled Iraqi airspace, and decided to co-operate with the Turkish bombings, and 
even provided intelligence to the Turkish air force without the permission of the 
Iraqi central government.    
Of the three hypotheses that have guided this thesis, it has been the first 
hypothesis that has offered the greatest explanatory value. The proliferation of 
foreign policy actors has the most serious effect on diminishing the capacity of the 
government to effectively execute its own policies, on reducing the likelihood that 
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foreign policy is produced that is in the best interests of the citizenry as a whole, and 
on further undermining the legitimacy of the central government. In the Iraqi case, 
the existence of multiple, competing foreign policy actors during 2005 and 2006 
allowed Iran to play Iraqi actors off against each other, thereby maximising its 
influence in Iraqi domestic politics and bolstering its bargaining position vis-à-vis 
the formal government. The clear entry of Iranian figures into Iraqi politics at the 
time, and particularly their role in fuelling the militias during the civil war, severely 
diminished the legitimacy of the Iraqi government in the eyes of much of the 
citizenry and further compromised its ability to gain control over the state’s foreign 
policy. The third hypothesis, which deals with the ability of the government to 
effectively pursue its own policies, has been somewhat less useful than anticipated 
because of the unusual operational effectiveness of the Iraqi foreign ministry. Led 
throughout this entire period by the capable and well-respected Foreign Minister 
Hoshyar Zebari, the Foreign Ministry has been able to maintain a modicum of 
functional effectiveness almost regardless of the domestic political situation in Iraq. 
Though the Foreign Ministry has been relatively effective when it comes to day-to-
day foreign policy administration, the most important foreign policy issues have 
tended to come under the purview of the executive, and the ability of the executive 
to effectively achieve its foreign policies has been compromised at times when the 
government has faced a legitimacy deficit – so the hypothesis maintains some 
explanatory value. The extent to which state foreign policy sufficiently correlates 
with the national interest is extremely difficult to untangle, because it requires a 
fairly rigid understanding of what actions would be in the national interest when of 
course there are many possible interpretations of what the national interest is. I have 
tended to focus in this study, therefore, on instances where the foreign policy 
pursued has clearly been detrimental to the Iraqi state, and in this regard the 
hypothesis has been somewhat useful. 
By using these working hypotheses to guide the parameters of this thesis, I 
believe I have been better able to understand Iraqi foreign policy making in the 
relevant period. The use of the ‘weak state’ analytical construct has enabled me to 
focus on the fundamentals of legitimacy and state authority, and has made sense of 
what would otherwise seem to be an extremely chaotic Iraqi foreign policy scene. 
The tools offered by my conceptual framework have usefully delineated the 
correlation between state weakness, the multiplicity of foreign policy actors, and the 
214 
 
capacity of the state to execute foreign policy. And my findings suggest that state 
weakness reduces the authority of the central government over foreign policy, it 
forces regime security considerations to take the fore in foreign policy decision 
making, and it reduces the capacity of the government to successfully pursue its 
policies. Although this thesis has deployed a methodology that neither seeks nor 
claims the generalisability of its results, I would nonetheless venture that the 
findings of this study suggest that the weak state prism is a useful way of analysing 
domestic foreign policy making in weak states, and that it is an improvement over 
the existing tools offered by the strong-state centric foreign policy analysis 
literature. 
The Iraqi case study has also thrown up anomalies, suggesting that some 
qualifications to my stated conceptual framework would be useful. For the first year 
after the invasion Iraq was effectively an occupied state, in that the administrative 
and military capacity of the state was entirely controlled by a foreign power. The 
perception that Iraq was an extension of the US fuelled hostility towards Iraq from 
powers that felt threatened by the US. But US foreign policy making towards the 
wider region was not constrained by the domestic weakness of the Iraqi state. The 
US had access to another constituency, the American general public, with whom it 
could achieve the functional and normative legitimacy required to conduct effective 
foreign policy. The result was that Iraq was punished for US foreign policies that 
were not empowered by, and could not be disempowered by, Iraqi state strength or 
weakness. I conclude, therefore, that the weak state framework is not the best way to 
analyse the foreign policy behaviour of occupied states. 
The Kurdish region had achieved a level of independence from the Iraqi 
government back in 1991, after the establishment of a no-fly zone in Northern Iraq. 
The region thus had a major head-start as compared with the rest of the Iraqi state. 
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) continued to establish its foreign policy 
independence in the aftermath of the US invasion, whilst the Iraqi state was at its 
weakest, and ever since then the KRG’s ability to conduct foreign policy 
independently of the Iraqi state has progressively increased, and has not been 
diminished in periods of greater Iraqi state strength. In 2008 the KRG’s relationship 
with Turkey flourished, with political and economic co-operation reaching new 
heights, despite the fact that in 2008 and 2009 the central Iraqi government was at its 
strongest point since the invasion. Although Turkey had also reached out to the Iraqi 
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government, when dissatisfaction was expressed about the extent of Turkish co-
operation with the KRG, Turkey effectively chose the KRG over the Iraqi 
government. Similarly, in the last few years the KRG has been able to conclude a 
number of production sharing agreements with super-major oil companies despite 
the legal and diplomatic objections raised by the Iraqi government. Kurdish foreign 
policy has become an integrated and institutionalised part of the Kurdish Regional 
Government, and appears unmoved by changes in the rest of Iraq. The KRG’s 
formulation of a mature, independent, Kurdish-focused foreign policy towards Syria 
is just the latest in a series of foreign policies that demonstrate that the KRG is 
acting more like a state than a sub-state foreign policy actor. The KRG took 
advantage of Iraqi state weakness to erect an elaborate foreign policy structure 
including a Department for Foreign Affairs and a series of permanent, diplomatic 
representations in strategic locations across the world. These structures have 
institutionalised and normalized Kurdish foreign policy making and have made it 
very difficult to reverse. The KRG’s foreign policy power is also bolstered by the 
domestic strength of its governing institutions, and by the durability of that strength. 
Although there have been some political upheavals in the KRG such as the success 
of the oppositional Goran party and civil society criticisms of KRG governance, the 
KRG is largely functionally and normatively legitimate. Its normative legitimacy in 
particular is extremely strong, drawing on a widely shared Kurdish ethnic identity 
that evokes a mythology surrounding the long struggle for Kurdish freedom. 
Functionally, the KRG has been extremely successful in delivering security to the 
Kurdish population, despite the presence of the most appalling violence in 
neighbouring areas under Iraqi governmental control. As a result of its underlying 
strength, the KRG has proven to be a very attractive partner to foreign powers and to 
international commerce, much more so that the central Iraqi government which has 
demonstrably failed to resolve the underlying political and ethnic conflicts that 
constantly threaten its undoing. 
At one level it is clear that the post-war Iraqi government, even at its 
strongest, could not match the normative and functional legitimacy achieved by the 
KRG and therefore could not dominate KRG policy-making. Beyond this 
explanation, however, it is possible that there is a particular dynamic at play when a 
federal region in a weak state institutionalises its ability to challenge the foreign 
policy authority of the central government. This is a fascinating dynamic that would 
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have important implications for the long-running debate about the utility of 
federalism as a conflict-management structure in the developing world. The 
literature on federalism has traditionally focused on assessing its ‘capacity to 
represent and accommodate territorially based ethnic, cultural, and linguistic 
difference in divided societies.’1 A more recent strand in the literature, known as 
‘new institutionalism,’ has focused its research agenda more specifically on the 
efficacy of different institutional structures that divide power between such groups. 
But the literature has somewhat neglected the impact that federalist structures have 
on the policy making capacity of the central state, particularly in a weak state 
setting. The literature on federalism in the developing world has tended to focus on 
the way in which federalism has interacted with conflict in African countries such as 
Nigeria and Ethiopia.
2
 But questions remain about the extent to which the adoption 
of federalist structures inhibit the growth of functional capacity in the central 
government, and I have yet to come across any work that discusses how federal 
structures limit the ability of a weak state’s executive to execute foreign policy. 
There is a nascent literature on foreign policy making in federal regions in strong 
states, such as Scotland, Flanders, Quebec and Catalonia,
3
 which raises some 
important questions around the impact of federalism on the long term cohesion of 
the state. I would suggest that there is a real opportunity here for a researcher to 
launch a new research agenda that builds on the recent investigation of foreign 
policy making in the federal regions of developed states and asks how federalism 
affects foreign policy making in weak states. Such a research agenda could grapple 
with some of the core questions in the federalist literature by deploying new 
evidence and by addressing these questions from a different angle. It could ask how 
                                                          
1
 Jan Erk, 'Federalism and Its Discontents: The Limits of New Institutionalism', The Social and 
Political Foundations of Constitutions,  (2012). 
2
 See David Turton (ed.), Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective 
(Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 2006). Aarono Tesfaye, Political Power and Ethnic Federalism: The 
Struggle for Democracy in Ethiopia (Maryland: University Press of America, 2002). John Mukum 
Mbaku, Pita Ogaba Agbese, and Mwangi S. Kimeyni (eds.), Ethniciy and Governance in the Third 
World (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). Asnake Kefale, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2013). Ebere Onwudiwe and Rotimi. T Suberu (eds.), Nigerian Federalism in 
Crisis (Ibadan: Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies, 2005). Lovise Aalen, The Politics of 
Ethnicity in Ethiopia: Actors, Power and Mobilisation under Ethnic Federalism (Boston: Brill, 
2011).  
3
 See Ferran Requejo (ed.), Foreign Policy of Constituent Units at the Beginning of the 21s Century 
(Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, Institut d'Estudis Atonòmics, 2010). David Criekemans, 
'Foreign Policy and Diplomacy of the Belgian Regions: Flanders and Wallonia', (Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations, 2010). Michael Keating, Nations Against the State: The New 
Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland (Basingstoke: St. Martin's Press, 1996). 
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federal structures impact the foreign policy capacity of the central state; how the 
production of competing foreign policies between the region and the central 
government affect the ability of either to effectively pursue their interests; and how 
the process of engaging in foreign policy activity affects cohesion between the 
region and the centre. Based on my understanding of the KRG, I would hypothesise 
that federal structures in weak states institutionalise challenges to the foreign policy 
authority of the central government. This dispersion of foreign policy authority 
renders the state more vulnerable to external intervention and reduces the ability of 
the state to successfully pursue its national interest. The dispute over foreign policy 
authority, and increased intervention from foreign powers, is likely to result in 
conflict between the central government and the federal region. Its fostering of 
foreign policy competition, therefore, means that federal structures in a weak state 
act as a centrifugal force that are likely to result in internal conflict. But it is for 
future researchers to explore this hypothesis further. 
The constructivist methodology that was deployed by this thesis offered a 
suitable approach to the qualitative data that has formed the basis of this study. It has 
allowed me to appreciate the multiple narratives about contemporary Iraqi politics 
that are at the heart of its current state of political crisis, and has enabled me to 
honestly and authentically reflect Iraqi interpretations of events throughout the 
course of this thesis. Future studies on Iraqi foreign policy could benefit from the 
use of a wider range of data than was available to me in this study. Once archives 
related to this time period are declassified in Iraq and in those countries with which 
Iraq has had important bilateral relations, a researcher could add a great deal more 
detail and depth to the analysis offered here. A more comprehensive study of the 
Iraqi foreign ministry itself would also make for a fascinating addition to this field, 
particularly if an ethnography of the ministry could be conducted at a time when 
Iraq is perhaps a little less violent than it is today. Although, as has been seen, the 
Foreign Ministry is only one of many potential loci of foreign policy production. 
This thesis has made a significant contribution to the empirical literature 
both on domestic Iraqi politics and on Iraqi foreign policy since the invasion of Iraq. 
It has systematised the observations made in the literature on the foreign policies of 
developing states, and transformed them into a set of working hypotheses. Through 
a close reading of the Iraqi case, made possible by dozens of elite interviews 
conducted as part of this research, I have shown that, with a few qualifications, my 
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hypotheses are borne out by this case, and have suggested a new prism through 
which weak state foreign policy making can be better understood. 
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